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INTRODUCTION

Consensual secrecy pervades virtually every phase of modern civil
litigation. At the inception of many civil lawsuits, parties stipulate to
"umbrella" protective orders that restrict the dissemination of confidential discovery and require its return or destruction upon resolution of the controversy.' Litigants sometimes further agree that
documents, exhibits, pleadings, and even court transcripts be filed
under seal with the court.2 Settlements are often conditioned upon
confidentiality agreements and orders that prohibit disclosure of the
terms and amount of the compromise or the facts upon which they
are premised. 3 Even court decisions and jury verdicts have been
erased from the public record by stipulation of parties who belatedly
resolve their dispute after trial, often during the pendency of an
4
appeal.
1 See MANUAL FOR CoMPLEx LITIGATION §§ 21.431-432 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing
benefits and standard terms of early umbrella protective orders in cases involving
voluminous discovery).
2 See Nault's Auto. Sales, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 148 F.R.D. 25, 43
(D.N.H. 1993) (noting the "growing tendency" of parties to stipulate to the sealing of
"documents produced during the discovery process as well as pleadings and exhibits
filed with the court").
3 Professor David Luban has criticized the secrecy of many settlements, noting:
The sticking point with settlements is not truth but openness. Parties consummate settlements out of public view. The facts on which they are based
remain unknown, their responsiveness to third parties who they may affect is
at best dubious, and the goods they created are privatized and not public.
Settlements are opaque.
David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEo. L.J. 2619, 2648-50
(1995).
4 While the United States Supreme Court recently restricted the use of stipulated vacatur by federal appellate courts, the practice still subsists in some state courts,
most notably California. CompareUnited States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall
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Courts sanction these confidentiality agreements in order to promote the private settlement of disputes-a long-established public
policy aimed at preserving the autonomy of litigants to resolve their
own disputes as they wish and at conserving both public and private
resources by avoiding trial. 5 Shifts in the American procedural landscape and in our overall vision of civil litigation, however, have called
these rationales into question and have suggested that, at least in
some cases, party autonomy and the preference for settlement should
yield to some greater interest supporting public access.
In this Article, I explore these issues by examining the appropriate uses and limits of confidentiality in the pursuit of the settlement in
civil litigation. 6 I reject the "one size fits all" approach to litigation
confidentiality that has been adopted by many courts and commentators and analyze instead the distinct issues of public access that surround stipulated protective orders governing discovery, the sealing of
judicial records, and confidential settlements. To address these issues,
I suggest a balancing approach that uses as its measure the principal
objectives of the right of public access to judicial proceedings. Under
this approach, the importance of party autonomy and the strong preference for settlement both vary according to the role that the confidential materials play in the principal adjudicative function of the
courts.
Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 25 (1994) (criticizing stipulated vacatur) with Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 834 P.2d 119, 121 (Cal. 1992) (creating "strong presumption"
in favor of vacatur on consent). For an extensive discussion of stipulated vacatur in
state and federal courts, see generally Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? VacatingJudgments, Preferencesfor Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth
Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471 (1994).
5 See generally Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme
Court, 48 HAS-rINrs L.J. 9 (1996) (extolling the institutional benefits of private
settlement).
6 While litigation confidentiality is as (if not more) pressing an issue in state
courts today, see infra Part II.C.2 (describing federal and state sunshine laws), this

Article focuses primarily upon secrecy orders in the federal courts. Given that a majority of states have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, this federal focus can nevertheless instruct the broader confidentiality debate. See Stephen C.
Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 631,
632 n.1 (noting that over 35 states have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

for their trial courts).
Further, although precedent concerning public access to pretrial criminal proceedings informs the access debate in the civil context, this Article focuses exclusively
on access issues as they arise in the settlement of civil litigation. See infra note 155 and

accompanying text (distinguishing between access issues in criminal and civil
proceedings).

1999]

SECRECY

BY CONSENT

Part I of the Article surveys the shift in our procedural landscape
and examines the conflicting visions of civil litigation that have resulted from that movement. Trial on the merits no longer holds
center stage for lawyers who currently spend the great majority of
their time engaging in pretrial activities such as discovery and motion
practice. The norm of a public trial is giving way to the norm of private settlement, with almost two-thirds of all filed federal civil cases
terminating by pretrial agreement of the parties. 7 These changes in
orientation-from trial to litigation; from adjudication to settlement-have heightened the existing tension between the traditional
party-centered view of civil litigation as a public service for private dispute resolution and the often conflicting perception of courts as "in8
stitutions expressive of and accountable to the public."
Part II then assesses how this broad systemic tension contributes
to the more particular controversy over secrecy agreements and
agreed confidentiality orders. In that section, I examine the increasingly heated debate over whether there is an "excess of court secrecy
in civil litigation" that undercuts the tradition of public access to judicial proceedings orjeopardizes public health and safety. 9 In that connection, I canvass various judicial and legislative proposals aimed at
limiting the discretion of judges and parties alike to enter into or approve secrecy agreements at virtually every phase of the litigation
process.
The Article then studies the public access issues that particularly
arise at the various stages of litigation where agreed confidentiality is
frequently utilized. Part III sets the stage by inspecting the rationales
that traditionally support public access to judicial proceedings and
7 See infra Part IA (reviewing moves from trial to litigation and from adjudication to settlement).
8 Resnik, supra note 4, at 1527 (describing one vision of the courts as "instruments" and "guardians" of the public with an interest in adjudication beyond dispute
resolution). For a discussion of the systemic debates concerning the appropriate role
of the civil justice system, the traditional primacy of party autonomy, and the institutional value of settlement, see infra Part I.B.

9 Henry J. Reske, Secrecy Orders at Issue, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 32, 33 (quoting
Abner Mikva and contending that court secrecy poses a "serious problem for the
health and safety of our population"). See also James L. Gilbert et al., The Price of
Silence, TIuL, June 1994, at 17 (maintaining that "[d]eadly secrets lie sealed on the
shelves of courtrooms across America"); Sen. Herbert Kohl, Testimony before Senate
Judiciary Committee on Courts and Administrative Practice, F.D.C.H., 1994 WL
230123, at *1 (April 20, 1994) [hereinafter Kohl Testimony] (proposing federal sunshine legislation that would remedy the perceived "cover-up" involving the prevalent
"use of secrecy agreements in litigation to shield critical information about health and
safety from the public").
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records. Part IV critiques the applicability of these rationales to unfiled confidential discovery and analyzes the private and public considerations relevant to the entry and modification of stipulated
protective orders. Part V examines how public access analysis might
vary with the filing of confidential discovery and suggests a functional
approach to the sealing of judicial records. Finally, Part VI explores
judicial oversight of confidential settlements-an arena in which stipulated protective orders and sealing orders frequently converge.
I.

A

SHIFTING PROCEDURAL LAkNDSCAPE AND CONFLICTING VISIONS OF
CIVIL LITIGATION

A.

From Trial to Litigation; From Adjudication to Settlement

Although popular perception views the public trial as the centerpiece of ourjustice system, trial-on-the-merits increasingly represents a
rare and atypical resolution of the majority of civil lawsuits filed in this
country.1° In federal court alone, the proportion of filed to tried
cases has declined by four-fifths over the last fifty years, with only approximately four percent of all filed civil cases now resulting in a
trial." Indeed, a civil litigator today devotes less than ten percent of
her time to trials, hearings, appeals, and judgment enforcement. 12 As
recently noted by Professor Stephen Yeazell, lawyers and courts alike
now focus on "events that occur instead of trial and which typically
head off trial,"' 3 including discovery, pretrial motions, and settlement
negotiations. The last half century, Professor Yeazell concludes, has
witnessed "the displacement of trial as the culmination of civil litiga10 See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: CivilJuy Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1, 63 (1996) (arguing that the very few "extreme
and unrepresentative cases" that do go to jury trial "distort public perception of the
administration of civil justice").
11 See Yeazell, supra note 6, at 631, 633 ("Only 4.3% of the filed civil cases [in
1990] resulted in trials, a proportional decline of almost four-fifths from the pre-Rules
world."); see also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle': JudicialPromotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1342 (1994) ("[I n the federal courts,
the portion of cases that terminated in trials dropped from 11 percent in 1961 to 4
percent in 1991."). Recent studies suggest that the national trial rate is significantly
lower, with a mere two percent of civil filings in both state and federal courts actually
proceeding to trial. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 10, at 2, 63 & n.2 (citing a study
by Professor Theodore Eisenberg for the National Center for State Courts).
12 See David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of OrdinaryLitigation,31 UCLA L. REv. 72,
91 tbl. 3 (1983).
13 Yeazell, supra note 6, at 639.
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tion" and the investiture of pretrial activities as "a fundamental char14
acteristic of modem process.
This shift from trial to pretrial litigation has brought about a corresponding decline in adjudications on the merits and a dramatic rise
in settlement. 15 Only one-third of all federal civil cases end after some
form of merits determination-eleven percent by trial and the remainder by pretrial adjudication such as motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment. 16 The remaining two-thirds of all filed
cases settle without any "definitive judicial ruling."'1 7 These figures
represent more than a doubling of the settlement rate over the last
half decade.' 8 In short, civil process in this country is increasingly
diverting time and resources away from trial and adjudication toward
pretrial activities and settlement.
B.

Conflicting Visions

This evolution in modem process has created some wrenching
tensions in our vision of the civil justice system, tensions which contribute to and inform the current debate over litigation confidentiality. For instance, the value one places upon settlement as opposed to
adjudication directly correlates with one's willingness to sanction secrecy as a method of achieving compromise. How one views the primary role of the courts further fuels the secrecy debate, for if the
primary function of the judiciary is dispute resolution, then courts
should readily accede to the parties' mutual desire for confidentiality
if it serves that purpose. On the other hand, one would expect a certain amount of suspicion toward stipulated secrecy if one conceives of
courts as accountable to and guardians of a broader public interest.
Finally, the question of who owns a lawsuit and its resolution-the
parties or the public-significantly influences one's stance toward
14

Id. at 633, 674. See also Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What

We Know and Don'tKnow (And Think We Know) About OurAllegedly Contentious and Litig-

ious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4,45 (1983) (concluding that "the trial is no longer the
center of gravity of common law litigation").
15 SeeYeazell, supra note 6, at 674 (attributing decline in adjudication to emphasis on pretrial process).
16 See id. at 636 (stating that in 1990, trial constituted only 11% of adjudicated
dispositions).
17 Galanter & Cahill, supra note 11, at 1340. See also Gross & Syverud, supranote
10, at 2 (noting that "[o]f the hundreds of thousands of civil lawsuits that are filed
each year in America, the great majority are settled").
18 See Yeazell, supra note 6, at 638 (noting that "pretrial activity that does not
result in dispositive adjudication is producing fewer abandoned cases and twice as
many settlements as was the case fifty years ago").
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stipulated secrecy. In order to fully understand (and potentially resolve) the confidentiality controversy, then, one must have a broader
understanding of these competing systemic visions.
1. Settlement Versus Adjudication
a.

Public Policy Favoring and Judicial Promotion of
Settlement

The expense, risk, and delay that frequently attend formal adjudication in the American legal system explain, at least in part, the party
preference for and rising incidence of settlement. 19 A strong and
well-established public policy favoring the private settlement of disputes, however, also contributes to the decline of trial and the ascendancy of settlement. 20 This public policy appears deeply embedded
in, and actively encouraged by, our civil justice system, which has, as
its primary objective, "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action."2 ' Our procedural rules thus promote private settlement from the outset of a civil lawsuit through its appeal.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, for example, recognizes facilitation of settlement as an objective of the pretrial conference, 22 and
expressly authorizes a trial court to convene a settlement conference
at any appropriate time and "at as early a stage of the litigation as
possible." 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) further directs the
parties to meet "as soon as practicable" to discuss, among other
19 See Gross & Syverud, supra note 10, at 3-5 (explaining the American legal system's preference for settlement with structural reasons such as "scarcity ofjudges and
abundance of lawyers, adversarial fact-finding, [and] trial by jury").
20 See Resnik, supra note 4, at 1477 (discussing the "myriad of contemporary developments that promote, as a matter of public policy, the settlement of disputes and
the diminution of the role of formal adjudication").
21 FED. R. Crv. P. 1. See also Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471

(1995) (giving the 'just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of civil disputes" as one
purpose of civil justice expense and delay plans).

22

FED.

R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5).

23 FED. R. Cirv. P. 16 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment (reasoning
that settlement "obviously eases crowded dockets and results in savings to the litigants
and the judicial system").
Rule 16 was recently amended to reinforce the court's authority, even over party
objection, "to make appropriate orders designed . . . to facilitate [pretrial] settle-

ment." FED. R. Clv. P. 16(c) advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment. The
1993 amendments now authorize trial courts to direct party representatives with settlement authority to appear or to be available by telephone during the pretrial conference to discuss possible settlement of the case. In addition, if authorized by statute or

local rule, courts can now utilize alternative dispute resolution procedures such as
mini-trials, summary jury trials, mediation, neutral evaluation, and nonbinding arbi-
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things, "the possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the
case." 24 Up until ten days before trial, a defending party can make an
offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, the
"plain purpose" of which "is to encourage settlement and avoid litigation. '25 Our procedural rules even facilitate post-trial settlement by
now authorizing appellate courts to order the parties to address the
"possibility of settlement" at appeal conferences and to enter any order necessary for "implementing any settlement agreement. ' 26 The
27
push for settlement similarly manifests itself in our evidentiary rules,
in federal legislation like the Civil Justice Reform Act,28 and in
tration. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c), 16(c) (9), and FED. R. CrV. P. 16(c) advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
24 FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(f).
25 Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985). The public policy favoring the compromise of disputes explains why Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 renders unaccepted
offers ofjudgrnent inadmissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. See FED. R.
EvID. 408 advisory committee's notes.
26 FED. R. App. P. 33. This Rule was completely revised in 1994 to, among other
things, acknowledge settlement as a potential tool to "aid in the disposition of the
proceedings." Id. See also FED. R. AP. P. 33 advisory committee's note to 1994
amendment. To that end, Rule 33 now requires that attorneys come to the appellate
settlement conference only after consulting with their clients and obtaining "as much
authority as feasible to settle the case." Id.
27 To promote "the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes," Federal Rule of Evidence 408 renders evidence of a settlement or an offer to
settle inadmissible to prove either the validity or the amount of a disputed claim. FED.
R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note. See also Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 957, 999 (1988) (cautioning
that while Rule 408 "clearly reflects a significant federal policy in favor of promoting
settlement by encouraging freedom of communication," it does not create a privilege
and thus does not necessarily protect against the discovery or admissibility of settlement materials in all cases).
28 CivilJustice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1995). Although it does
not explicitly direct federal courts to actively promote private settlement, the Act accomplishes that objective implicitly by directing federal district courts to implement
plans for reducing expense and delay in civil lawsuits. Id. § 471. In formulating such
plans, district courts should consider and may include provisions that explore "the
parties' receptivity to, and the propriety of, settlement," id. § 473(a) (3) (A), that authorize referral to alternative dispute resolution or neutral evaluation programs, id.
§§ 473(a) (6), 473(b) (6), and that require that representatives "with authority to bind
[the parties] in settlement discussions" be present or available at settlement conferences. Id. § 473(b) (5).
Congress continues to favor settlement. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 1988, H.R. 3528, 105th Cong. (1988), recently approved by the House Judiciary
Committee, would require federal district courts to authorize the use of alternative
dispute resolution in all civil cases and to implement their own alternative dispute
resolution programs. See Bill Would Require FederalCourts To Devise Proceduresfor ADR
Use, 66 U.S.L.W. 2584 (1998).
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Supreme Court decisions. 2 9 These procedural rules and innovations,
30
together with a court's inherent authority to manage its own affairs,
have intensified judicial efforts to actively promote the private settlement of disputes.31
b.

The Current Debate and the Push to Regulate Settlement

Over the last decade, legal scholars have vigorously debated the
value of settlement in lieu of adjudication 3 2 and the propriety ofjudicial promotion of settlement. 33 Defenders of settlement argue that it
29 In Evans v.JeffD., 475 U.S. 717, 732-38 (1986), for example, the United States
Supreme Court relied upon the public policy favoring settlement when it construed
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 to permit settlement of civil rights
claims conditioned upon the waiver of attorney fees. To hold otherwise, according to
the Court, might impede the settlement of civil rights claims, "thereby forcing more
cases to trial, unnecessarily burdening the judicial system, and disserving civil rights
litigants." Id. at 736-37. See also Marek, 473 U.S. at 10 (construing Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 68 to promote both settlement and civil rights). Professor Cordray,
however, criticizes a recent trilogy of Supreme Court cases for giving insufficient, if
any, consideration to the important federal policy favoring settlement. See Cordray,
supra note 5.
30 See Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can theJudgeDo That?-The Need for A ClearerJudicialRole
in Settlement, 26 ARiz. ST. L.J. 45, 57 (1994) (noting that courts may issue orders
designed to encourage or facilitate settlement, even if not specifically authorized by
Rule 16, pursuant to their "inherent authority to control litigation before them").
31 See Stephen Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44
HASnNGs L.J. 1, 3-4 (1992) (tying expanded judicial promotion of settlement to Civil
Justice Reform Act and Rule 16); Cordray, supra note 5, at 40-41 (asserting that "procedural rules and reforms... have encouraged judges to become increasingly active
in trying to broker settlements between parties"); Floyd, supranote 30, at 51 (attributing increasingly active role ofjudges in settlement to "growing concern over litigation
delay and expense"); Galanter & Cahill, supra note 11, at 1340-41 (noting that the
Civil Justice Reform Act "encourages district courts to include active judicial promotion of settlement in their arsenal of techniques for expediting litigation"). But see
Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REv. 1051,
1122-23 (1996) (attributing "[c] ourts' strong disposition toward settlements" to judicial self-interest in avoiding uninteresting cases and in clearing crowded dockets).
32 CompareLuban, supranote 3, and Galanter & Cahill, supra note 11 (both questioning the current understanding of the value of settlement), with Carrie MenkelMeadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophicaland Democratic Defense of Settlement
(In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995), and Cordray, supra note 5 (both extolling
the systemic value of settlement in certain cases).
33 See generally Floyd, supra note 30, at 50 (proposing judicial education and the
revision of Rule 16 and the Code ofJudicial Conduct "to prevent misuse of case management techniques with regard to settlement and to give judges clearer guidance
regarding their role in settlement"); Galanter & Cahill, supra note 11, at 1364-70
(questioning whether judicial intervention increases the incidence or quality of settlement or judicial productivity); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses
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produces significant institutional benefits in adldition to benefiting
the immediate parties. 34 Settlement, it is contended, conserves scarce
judicial resources and relieves a court's crowded dockets-weighty
objectives in a world characterized by too few judges, too many lawyers, and an overflow of disputes.3 5 Settlement arguably spares the
litigants the time, expense, and, perhaps most importantly, the risk of
an unpredictable adjudication. 36 Moreover, many view settlement as
qualitatively better than adjudication because settlement permits a
37
more satisfying and lasting resolution of a controversy.
Others strongly criticize the current celebration of settlement
and the resulting decline in adjudication.3 8 In his seminal article
Against Settlement, for example, Professor Owen Fiss rails against settlement as an inadequate substitute for adjudication and "a capitulation
to the conditions of mass society [that] . . .should be neither en-

couraged nor praised." 39 More recent critics of the settlement movement question the supposed benefits of settlement over adjudication,
and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485 (1985) (discussing pros and cons of mandatory settlement conferences); LeroyJ. Tornquist, The ActiveJudge in PretrialSettlement: InherentAuthority Gone Awry, 25 WniAMETEr L. REv. 743
(1989) (examining the costs and benefits of active judicial involvement in pretrial
settlement).
34 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 32, at 2669 (making "a case for settlement
by arguing that there are philosophical, as well as instrumental, democratic, ethical,
and human justifications for settlements (at least in some cases)").
35 See Gross & Syverud, supra note 10, at 4.
36 See id. at 3-4 (noting that "[a]dversary fact-finding is... expensive, unpredictable . . .and, given the scarcity of judges, slow"); Cordray, supra note 5, at 36-37
(contending that settlement can obviate "the debilitating effects of uncertainty and
exposure to risk that exist while a dispute remains unresolved, and the toll taken by
the aggravation and distress that so often plague a party as a lawsuit grinds its way
through the court system").
37 As explained by Professor Menkel-Meadow: "[U]ntil litigation is permitted to
recognize the ambiguities and contradictions in modem life by developing a broader
'remedial imagination,' settlement offers the opportunity to craft solutions that do
not compromise, but offer greater expression of the variety of remedial possibilities in
a postmodem world." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 32, at 2674-75. See also Cordray,
supra note 5, at 37 (arguing that settlements allow the parties greater flexibility to
consider non-legally cognizable facts and to craft more creative and responsive solutions); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33, at 504-05 (suggesting that settlement offers
"substantive justice that may be more responsive to the parties' needs than
adjudication").
38 Galanter & Cahill, supra note 11, at 1339.
39 Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073, 1075 (1984). Because consent is often coerced and dependent upon party resources, Fiss finds settlement a
"highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets" that is "at odds with a conception of justice." Id. at 1075-76.
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pointing to the lack of empirical evidence demonstrating either that
settlement reduces the cost, time, and aggravation of litigation or that
settlement produces any superior outcome. 40 Of particular relevance
to the confidentiality controversy is the more fundamental criticism
that settlement fails to produce the "public goods" created by adjudication. 41 According to Professor David Luban, these public goods include the development of precedent that binds nonparties and guides
future conduct,4 2 the honing of advocacy and case assessment skills, 43
the discovery and dissemination of facts, 44 and the enhancement of a
court's adjudicative authority.45 At the same time, he insists that adjudication avoids the "public bads" of settlement by making it impossible or very difficult to pass on the burdens of a compromise to
46
unrepresented third parties.
Even the staunchest defenders of adjudication, however, today
grudgingly acknowledge that settlement will remain a permanent fixture of the litigation landscape. 47 Instead of advocating the abandonment or curtailment of settlement, then, they seek to police or
regulate the settlement process to promote settlements that achieve at
least some of the public goods created by adjudication and to avoid
settlements that defeat those public values. 48 In short, the argument
has shifted away from one either "for" or "against" settlement to one
40 See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 11, at 1350-87. Professor Galanter also faults
the "hidden costs" of settlement, such as the depletion of precedent. Id, at 1364.
41
See id. at 1379-80 (examining the impact of settlement upon nonparties and
doubting that settlement can produce comparable public goods to those produced by
adjudication); Luban, supra note 3, at 2621-42 (making an "instrumentalist" argument premised upon the "public goods" created by adjudication). Professor MenkelMeadow characterizes such criticisms as "litigation romanticism." Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 32, at 2669.
42 See Luban, supra note 3, at 2622-23.
43 See id. at 2623-24, 2641. According to Luban, adjudication enhances the advocacy skills of trial judges, as well as lawyers. See id.
44 See id. at 2625.
45 See id. By this, Luban refers to "the courts' claim as an authoritative resolver of
controversies" which is weakened when litigants "turn elsewhere" and resolve their
dispute through private bargaining or other extrajudicial processes. Id
46 Id. at 2626. Adjudication avoids this pitfall, according to Luban, because of its
judicial oversight and the public nature of a trial. See id.
47 See id. at 2647 (predicting that "settlement [will] inevitably... become more
salient in the universe of litigation"). Luban further admits that too much adjudication can create its own "public bads." See id. at 2642-47.
48 See Galanter & Cahill, supranote 11, at 1388 (stating that the "task for policy is
not promoting settlements or discouraging them, but regulating them" to ensure
their quality); Luban, supra note 3, at 2647 (reframing the issue as "how can matters
be arranged to preserve the values promoted by adjudication as best they can be
preserved?").
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focused upon the appropriate regulation, if any, of settlements"when, how, and under what circumstances should cases be settled?" 49
As discussed below, the controversy over litigation confidentiality
figures prominently in this developing 'jurisprudence of
settlement."5 0
2.

The Judicial Function

Whether one values settlement over adjudication or vice versa ultimately reflects how one imagines the role of the courts and our legal
system. Professor Luban characterizes the current competition as one
between a "problem solving" and a "public life" conception of the judicial role. 5 1 The first regards dispute resolution as the primary mission of the courts, which exist in order to resolve the particular
dispute before them according to the substantive law.52 Under that
traditional viewpoint, courts function as neutral and authoritative arbiters to assist litigants in resolving their private disputes. 5 3
49 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 32, at 2664-65. As iterated by Professor Luban:
"We cannot really be against settlements; nor can we really be against settlements that
vastly outnumber adjudications. But we can be against the wrong settlements."
Luban, supra note 3, at 2662.
50 Luban, supra note 3, at 2620 (asking whether there is "a jurisprudence of settlements waiting to be developed"); Menkel-Meadow, supranote 32, at 2696 (acknowledging need to develop and debate this new "jurisprudence of settlement").
51 Luban, supra note 3, at 2626-42. Professor Luban distinguishes the two as
follows:
Proponents of the problem-solving conception desire the minimum amount
of adjudication necessary to create bargaining-shadows and adjudicatory authority. Proponents of the public-life conception, on the other hand, desire
the maximum amount of adjudication consistent with respect for the parties,
who may be reluctant to go to trial.
Id. at 2642.
52 See Cordray, supra note 5, at 47 n.161 (describing the core purpose and "primary function" of the judicial system as helping parties to resolve their dispute); Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, U. ILL. L. REv. 457, 469-70
(1991) [hereinafter Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality] (arguing that the primary role of
a court, unlike other "organs of government," is to resolve disputes and "decide cases
according to the substantive law," rather than to "give expression to 'public values'");
Richard L. Marcus, Myth andReality in Protective OrderLitigation, 69 CoRNE-L L. Rxv. 1,
16 (1983) [hereinafter Marcus, Myth and Reality] (criticizing assumption that courts
play a role in resolving "major social issues"); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and PublicAccess to the Courts, 105 HAzv.L. REv. 427, 431-32 (1991) (contending that the court's "primary mission" of resolving disputes among litigants
should not be diverted by the collateral effect of information dissemination).
53 See Koniak & Cohen, supra note 31, at 1127-28 (suggesting that "traditional
paradigm ofjudging is that of a neutral arbiter, rather than partisan or protector");
Luban, supra note 3, at 2638 (describing problem-solving conception as one that re-
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In contrast, proponents of a public life conception regard courts
as playing a role beyond the resolution of the immediate dispute and
independent of the particular litigants before them. Adjudication,
the traditional charge of the courts, functions as a vehicle for public
discourse, for the explication of public values, and for the refinement
or improvement of the law.54 Moreover, as publicly funded institutions, courts are accountable to and guardians of a broader public
interest. 55 As described by Professor Judith Resnik, this alternative vision thus regards courts
as instruments of the public, of judges as guardians of the public,
and of the public as having an interest in adjudication beyond its
function of concluding disputes of the parties or across a series of
disputes over time. Courts are not "servants" of the parties; courts
have an independence from the parties, not only as the voices of
other parties' interests, but as institutions expressive of and account56
able to the public.
This tension concerning the appropriate judicial role informs the
controversy concerning public access and litigation secrecy. As discussed further below, proponents of a problem-solving conception of
litigation, like Professors Arthur Miller and Richard Marcus, oppose
any attempt to supplant the primary dispute-resolving role of the
courts with what traditionally have been mere "collateral effects" of
litigation such as information generation and dissemination. 5 7 In
gards "adjudication as a social service that the state provides disputing parties to keep
the peace"); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 32, at 2680 (characterizing one vision of
courts as "public service for private dispute resolution").
54 In arguing against settlement, Professor Owen Fiss laments the decline of adjudication, whose purpose is not "to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to
secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes to interpret those values and to bring
reality into accord with them." Fiss, supranote 39, at 1085. Fiss contrasts adjudication
with settlement, which "trivializ[es] the remedial dimensions of a lawsuit,
and . . .reduc[es] the social function of the lawsuit to one of resolving private disputes." Id. See also Luban, supra note 3, at 2638 (arguing that "there is nothing wrong
with using [litigants'] resort to the courts as an occasion for improving [or refining]
the law").
55 SeeJack B. Weinstein, EthicalDilemmasin Mass Tort Litigation,88 Nw. U. L. REV.
469, 513 (1994) (asserting that the "public, which created and funds ourjudicial institutions, depends upon those institutions to protect it").
56 Resnik, supra note 4, at 1527 (suggesting that stipulated vacatur runs counter
to this perception of the law).
57 Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supranote 52, at 478-79 (stating that affording
access to materials based upon the public's interest diverges from basic dispute resolution role of courts); Miller, supa,note 52, at 432 (suggesting that the presumption of
public access promotes goals unrelated to litigation before the court).
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contrast, and as Professor Marcus has acknowledged, a public life conception of our judicial process inevitably points to an "expansive attitude toward the publicness of all aspects of litigation."58
3.

Party Autonomy, Court Control, and the Public InterestWhose Settlement Is It?

Both the controversy concerning the value of settlement and the
friction concerning the judicial function create the almost schizophrenic "public versus private" character of civil litigation today. Indeed, many of the current conflicts in modern process, including
litigation confidentiality, turn on a sense of ultimate ownership of a
civil dispute and all its accouterments-its pleadings, its discovery, its
precedent, and, of importance to this Article, its settlement. 59 This
inquiry pits the value our system traditionally places upon party autonomy against the trend toward active judicial management and the recognition that some disputes reach beyond the particular litigants.
The importance our procedural system traditionally places upon
party autonomy explains, in large part, the preference for settlement
over adjudication. 60 As designed, the civil justice system purports to
resolve disputes with the minimum possible amount of judicial involvement or interference. 61 To the extent possible, the parties themselves are responsible for the investigation, initiation, conduct, and
resolution of their lawsuit, a significant portion of which now takes
place outside the purview ofjudicial review. 62 The parties are the per58 Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 469.
59 This underlying friction is reflected in the titles to several recent law review
articles. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 32, at 2680 (asking "[t]o whom does a dispute belong when it enters the legal system? Whose 'property' is a particular dispute,
and who should decide how it should be treated?"); Resnik, supra note 4, at 1472
(identifying ownership query as one of the "central problems of fin-de-siecle
procedure").
60 See Gross & Syverud, supra note 10, at 4 (contending that the "special importance of settlement" manifests a "single cultural value: the preference for private ordering over public control").
61 See Luban, supranote 3, at 2626 (exploring "contemporary American antipathy
to government" and to "constraints on private conduct").
62 Professor Stephen Yeazell notes that after the enactment and subsequent
amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "lawyers operated further from
anyjudicial scrutiny than they had a century earlier, and when judicial scrutiny came,
it was likely to be by a trial judge, most of whose decisions would effectively escape
appellate review." Yeazell, supra note 6, at 647-48. See also Gross & Syverud, supra
note 10, at 48 (describing an American legal system where "[p] retrial negotiation and
much of pretrial litigation go on in private with no judicial oversight at all"). For a
discussion of the importance of party autonomy in the current discovery regime, see
infra Part IV.C.2.
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sons who will bear the risk and expense of adjudication and who will
most keenly feel the effect of any judgment if compromise cannot be
6
reached. Such a party-initiated, party-centered, and party-controlled
system regards litigant autonomy as a value in itself and "installs pref'6 4
erences of the parties as the best measure of fairness available.
Under this viewpoint, the parties "own" their dispute and should be
permitted to dispose of it in any mutually agreeable manner.6 5
Several procedural innovations, however, have begun to erode
our traditional commitment to party autonomy and the proprietary
nature of a lawsuit. As Professor Resnik points out, the increase in
"managerial judging" and the trend toward case aggregation
subordinate individual interests in and control over a lawsuit in favor
of some broader public interest. 66 Thus, while some recent amendments of the Federal Rules reinforce litigant autonomy, others encourage judges to assume tighter control over their dockets at a much
earlier stage in the process. 67 Burgeoning multidistrict litigation and
consolidation of related cases further reflect a desire to consistently
and efficiently address related problems in one lawsuit, often at the
66
expense of litigant autonomy.

63 See Cordray, supra note 5, at 43 (rejecting "party-centered" view of settlement
as "simplistic"); Menkel-Meadow, supranote 32, at 2696 (recognizing the need to reassess the traditional "party-initiated and party-controlled legal system" in light of potential nonparty interests).
64 Resnik, supra note 4, at 1539. See also id. at 1491 (contending that stipulated
vacatur enhances party autonomy).
65 Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow suggests that party consent may supply a
"democratic justification for settlement":
For those who regard our legal system as a public service for private dispute
resolution, or as a "democratic and participatory" party initiated system, the
dispute and its resolution remain the property of the parties and can be
removed from the system in any way, as long as the parties consent.
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 32, at 2696, 2680. But see Galanter & Cahill, supra note
11, at 1359 (hesitating to equate party choice of settlement "with an informed affirmation of the quality of the selected process").
66 Resnik, supra note 4, at 1472-74, 1486, 1528.
67 In addition to prodding the judicial promotion of settlement (see supra notes
22-23 and accompanying text), Rule 16 also encourages judges to establish "early and
continuing control so that the case will not be protracted because of lack of management." FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a) (2). See also FED. R. CIrv. P. 16(b) (requiring entry of
scheduling order). A similar motive underlies the Congressional mandate to establish
expense and delay reduction plans. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C.
§ 471 (1990) (intending that plans "improve litigation management"); id. § 472(a) (2)
(aiming plans at establishing "early and ongoing control of the pretrial process
through the involvement of a judicial officer").
68 See Resnik, supra note 4, at 1486; see also Roger H. Transgrud, Mass Trials in
Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 74 (1989) (arguing that aggregation
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This erosion of party autonomy contributes to a contrasting vision of civil litigation as a public good. From this perspective, all adjudication has public significance and a dispute will lose its private
character once a litigant resorts to the publicly subsidized court system for its resolution.6 9 The focus in settlement accordingly shifts
away from the individual litigants to "actors who are not parties to the
dispute at hand. '70 Because a case or controversy may have profound
ramifications beyond the immediate parties or a particular court, the
quality of its resolution should be gauged according to its effect upon
71
others.
Thus, third parties and even the general public might have "ownership" interests in a particular lawsuit, as well as its resolution. The
lingering dilemma is determining when these nonparty interests exist,
how they can be raised, and how, if at all, they can be balanced against
our traditional preference for litigant autonomy. 72 Nowhere is the
techniques in "substantial tort cases" derogate the "right to control personally the suit
whereby a badly injured person seeks redress from the alleged tortfeasor").
69 Professor Luban thus finds:
There is nothing wrong with using [the parties'] resort to the courts as an
occasion for improving the law. Parties still get their dispute adjudicated, as
at least one of them requested. At the same time, however, the litigants
serve as nerve endings registering the aches and pains of the body politic,
which the court attempts to treat by refining the law. Using litigants as stimuli for refining the law is a legitimate public interest in the literal sense of
the term: the public is interested in learning the practical implications of
past political choices and the values they embody. The law is a self-portrait
of our politics, and adjudication is at once the interpretation and the refinement of the portrait.
Luban, supra note 3, at 2635, 2638. But see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 32, at 2680,
2683 (noting and criticizing the view that "a case, once filed, becomes the property of
the polity," and that parties waive their "right... to privatize their disputes" by their
resort to the courts).
70 Galanter & Cahill, supra note 11, at 1351. See also icL at 1380 (discussing "public goods" produced by adjudication).
71 As expressed by Professor Marc Galanter:
In assessing the quality of different instances or rival modes of dispute
processing, we should shift our focus from the results among the parties
(and the forum) to consider the effects a given process has on others-for
example, parties in other cases, individuals in similar situations who have not
brought suit or been sued, parties who will be affected by the patterns of
activity of those in the plaintiff and defendant classes, and parties who have a
professional interest as potential participants in such disputes (such as other
lawyers, psychologists, social workers, and police officers).
Id at 1379.
72 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 32, at 2696 (acknowledging that nonparty interests should be raised and accounted for if parties do not exclusively own the dis-
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need to accommodate these competing interests more pressing than
in the current debate concerning litigation confidentiality.
II.

THE CONFIDEN'rALrIy DEBATE

The conflicting visions of our civil justice system described in Part
I fuel the current controversy concerning the appropriate use and limits of confidentiality in conducting and settling civil lawsuits. That
often heated debate, 73 while previously focused upon protective orders governing discovery, now extends to the sealing of judicial
records and proceedings, as well as to the entry into and judicial approval of confidential settlements.7 4 The current controversy
germinates with a dispute over the very existence of any improper excess of court secrecy, grows into a disagreement regarding the propriety of confidentiality and the need for public access to civil litigation,
and eventually blooms into a quarrel over the most effective method
of curbing perceived confidentiality abuses.
A.

Is There An Excess of Secrecy in Our Courts?

Many judges, legislators, and lawyers decry what they perceive as a
worrisome excess of confidentiality orders and secrecy agreements in
civil litigation. 75 Often citing high profile product liability or toxic
tort cases, these proponents of increased public access argue that protective, sealing, and confidentiality orders prevent dissemination of vital information relevant to public health and safety. Stipulated
protective orders and settlement gag orders in cases involving silicone
pute); Resnik, supranote 4, at 1525 (exploring tension between the litigants' right to
buy and sell the risk of their lawsuit and the "social investments in the production of
adjudication and often unspecified third party interests in the decisions thus
produced").
73 While the broad systemic debates appear largely confined to the legal academy, the issue of litigation secrecy is of great pragmatic concern to the many practicing lawyers and judges who routinely confront confidentiality issues. Not surprisingly,
then, practitioners are often the most vocal participants in the confidentiality debate.
See, e.g., Gilbert et al., supra note 9; Michael McCauley, ProposedRule Changes Threaten

to Increase CourtSecrecy, NAT'L B. Ass'N MAG., Feb. 1996, at 31; William E. Shull, Opposing Counsel-Protective Orders, 18 A.B.A. SEC. Lrro. NEWS 3, 11 (1993); Sharon
Sobczak, To Seal or Not to Seal? In Search of Standards, 60 DEF. COuNS. J. 406 (1993);
Chilton Davis Vamer & M. Graham Loomis, Surviving Settlement: Ethical Problems and
StrategicRisks Associated with Settlement of Litigation,20 A.B.A. SEC. LrrIG. NEws 3 (1995).
74 Although I ultimately propose an approach that varies with each of these differing uses of confidentiality, many who enter the confidentiality fray fail to distinguish between these various functions-often lumping all under the generic rubric of
"secrecy" or "confidentiality" orders. See infra Part III.A.
75 See supra note 9.
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breast implants, the Shiley heart valve, the antidepression drug
Prozac, toxic shock syndrome, and the fungicid6Benlate, to name just
a few, have spurred attempts to restrict such orders and facilitate public access to the often voluminous discovery and pleadings underlying
76
the confidential settlement of these cases.
These efforts to increase public access to virtually all phases of
civil litigation (at least in some cases) have been met with strident
opposition. Defenders of the status quo accuse "reformers" of making
empirically unsubstantiated and exaggerated claims concerning the
incidence and dangers of secrecy orders. Professor Arthur Miller, for
example, dismisses the claim that sealing orders endanger the public
as based upon anecdotal evidence of "questionable content" and
"nonexistent" research and statistical data.77 Professor Miller and
others further criticize as myopic the reform movement's focus upon
product liability cases, which arguably overlooks the number of nonpersonal injury suits in which secrecy orders are legitimately entered
to protect confidential trade secrets or individual privacy. 78
The paucity of empirical evidence in this area makes it difficult to
assess the existence or extent of any secrecy crisis that may be plaguing our courts. The Federal Judicial Center (FJC), however, recently
conducted a study concerning the extent of protective order activity

76 One can taste the flavor of these arguments by reviewing the Senate testimony
concerning the failed Sunshine in Litigation Act of 1994. See Court Secrecy, Its Impact
on PublicHealth and Safety, and the Sunshine in LitigationAct: Hearings on S. 1404 Before

the SenateJudiciarySubcommittee on Courts andAdministrative Practice,103d Cong. (1994)
[hereinafter Hearing Testimony]; see also Edward Felsenthal, Secret Accords in Civil Cases
Are UnderFire, WALL ST. J., June 26, 1996, at B1-2 (reporting on secret side arrangements in settlements involving the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the drug Prozac, and the
Ford Bronco II); see, e.g., Kohl Testimony, supranote 9; 1994 WL 230112 (Abner Mikva)
[hereinafter Mikva Testimony]; 1994 WL 230087 (Prof. Charles Clausen); 1994 WL
230346 (Sybil Niden).
77 Miller, supranote 52, at 480. Professor Miller further argues that these reformers exaggerate the extent of the problems, which he contends can be adequately dealt
with through conscientious use of existing procedural rules. See id at 428; see also
Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 464 (finding "hard
data... generally lacking" to support broad assertions regarding "supposed cover-ups
of hazards"); Richard J. Vangelisti, ProposedAmendment to FederalRule of Civil Procedure

26(c) ConcerningProtectiveOrders:A CriticalAnalysis of What It Means and How It Operates,
48 BAYLOR L. Rxv. 163, 175-76 (1996) (asserting that empirical data does not support
the claim that secrecy orders suppress information vital to public health and safety).
78

See Arthur R. Miller, Effective Rulemaking Damaged By Politics, N.L.J., May 1,

1995, at A21-22 (reporting that protective orders are "predominately" requested in
civil rights and contracts actions); see also infra note 82.
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during a three year period in three judicial districts. 79 That study
does not support claims that federal district courts have perfunctorily
acceded to a plethora of stipulated requests for discovery protective
orders or that such orders create significant hazards to public health
and safety. Instead, stipulated protective orders accounted for only
twenty-six percent of the protective orders entered in the districts
studied, and approximately one-half of all motions for protective orders were contested. 80 Moreover, protective orders were sought in
only about five to ten percent of all civil cases, 81 most of which were
civil rights and contract cases, 82 and approximately sixty percent of
83
the orders were partially or wholly denied.
The limited scope of the FJC study should make one cautious in
drawing any firm conclusions from its data, however. 84 One could fur79 See Elizabeth C. Wiggins & MelissaJ. Percherski, FederalJudicialCenter,Protective
OrderActivity in ThreeFederalJudicialDistricts-InterimReport to the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules (Oct. 14, 1994) [hereinafter FJCStudy]. The FJCStudy examined protective
order activity in 300 cases from the District of Columbia federal district court for the
three-year period from 1990-1992; 293 cases from the Eastern District of Michigan
for the two-year period from 1991-1992; and 310 cases from the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania from 1991-1992. Id. at 1-4.
80 See id. at 4.
81 Protective order activity varied from five percent in the Eastern Districts of
Michigan and Pennsylvania to between eight and ten percent in the District of Columbia. See id.at 3.
82 See id. at 9. The FJC Study classified cases as either contract, property, civil
rights, labor, or personal injury. According to the Study, products liability cases accounted for only a small minority of protective orders issued. Instead, a large percentage of protective orders were entered in civil rights cases to protect personal
information concerning both parties and nonparties. See Letter from Judge Patrick E.
Higginbotham, Chair of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to (Standing) Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure (June 2, 1995) [hereinafter HigginbothamLetter]
(criticizing "broad gauged hostility toward protective orders" and its focus upon product liability claims); Civil Rules Advisory Committee Draft Minutes, at 9-10 (Apr. 20,
1995) [hereinafter Apr. 20, 1995 Advisory Comm. Minutes] ("Civil rights cases are the
single most common category of cases involving protective orders, protecting against
general access to highly personal information that may relate to nonparties as well as
parties.").

83 The FJC Study reports that approximately 40% of all resolved motions for protective orders were granted in whole or in part. See FJC Study, supra note 79, at 6.
84 The FJC Study covered a limited three-year time period and an extremely small
sample ofjudicial districts. See FJC Study supranote 79. One might further question
the choice of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as representative of protective order
activity in the 93 other federal judicial districts. As discussed below, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, of which the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is a part, leads a movement to circumscribe judicial discretion to enter all types of secrecy orders. See infra
Part II.C.3. Finally, trend lines may have improved or worsened in the years following
the periods studied and completion of the study.
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ther question whether an empirical study of federal protective order
activity presents a complete portrait of the extent of such activity in
state courts.8 5 Moreover, the FJC study carefully limited its parameters to protective orders governing the use or dissemination of materials generated through discovery. It thus did not encompass the filing
of such discovery with the court, the sealing of judicial records, or
86
confidentiality orders regarding settlements.
In short, the few and limited empirical studies in this area make it
difficult to confirm or deny the existence of any excess of secrecy in
civil litigation today. As judicial attention increasingly focuses upon
pretrial activity and settlement, however, and as the public trial gives
way to private compromise, the debate concerning litigation confiden87
tiality will likely continue and intensify.
B.

Conflicting Visions: Confidentiality Debate

At the risk of over-generalizing the various positions involved in
this multifaceted discussion, the debate over litigation confidentiality
can generally be divided into two camps. On one side are those who
oppose any attempt to increase public access to litigation-generated
information or to further restrict trial court discretion in this area.
These "confidentiality proponents," as I will call them, highly value
the use of confidentiality in the settlement of civil litigation and believe that trial court discretion, as it currently exists, can adequately
accommodate the competing interests that arise when secrecy issues
emerge during the course of a lawsuit.8 8 On the other side of the
debate are those who advocate increased public access to materials
generated by the litigation process. These "public access advocates"
seek to restrict trial courts' discretion to enter secrecy orders, and
some even argue for restricting the ability of the parties themselves to
85 One might expect federal courts to more frequently issue protective orders in
civil rights cases, which fall within their federal question jurisdiction, than in product
liability or other personal injury cases, which might not qualify for federal diversity
jurisdiction.
86 See FJC Study, supra note 79, at 1-2 (noting possible future empirical study on
sealed court records and sealed settlement agreements). But seeJudicial Conference
of the United States, Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, at 22-23 (Apr. 28, 1994) (1994 WL 809916) [hereinafter Apr. 28, 1994
Advisory Comm. Minutes) (tabling possible procedural rule concerning sealing orders
because time had not yet come for further study).

87 See Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 476 (acknowledging that
"epochal shifts in litigation" may "at some point" justify increased public access to
historically closed pretrial proceedings).
88 See generally id.; Marcus, Myth and Reality, supra note 52; Miller, supra note 52.
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privately negotiate confidentiality agreements. 8 9 As discussed below,
the various arguments made by both confidentiality proponents and
public access advocates reflect the broader systemic debates concerning the value of settlement, the proper judicial function, and the importance of party autonomy.
1.

The Value of Settlement

Confidentiality proponents generally choose settlement over adjudication in the "settlement versus adjudication" debate. Confidentiality, they argue, conserves scarce party and judicial resources by
fostering the cooperative exchange of discovery and by minimizing
judicial involvement. 90 Confidentiality likewise facilitates, and indeed
makes possible, the final compromise of many disputes. 9 1 Any reduction in the availability or reliability of secrecy orders, it is argued, will
jeopardize these savings by making litigants reluctant to voluntarily
disclose confidential or private information through discovery, to settle high profile cases where the chances of liability are slim or nonexistent, or to establish any sort of benchmark for the settlement of
future related claims. 92 In sum, confidentiality proponents believe
that restrictions on litigation secrecy will significantly impede the settlement process and unduly burden an already oversubscribed judicial
system.
Public access advocates, in contrast, question how critical confidentiality really is to the compromise of most cases when trial repre89 See also infra Parts I.C.2-3 (discussing legislative and judicial sunshine reform). See generally Gilbert et al., supra note 9; Luban, supra note 3.
90 See Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supranote 52, at 487 (arguing that discovery protective orders serve the purposes of Rule 1); see also infra Part IV.B.l.b.iii (discussing benefits of stipulated protective orders).
91 Confidentiality proponents virtually all assume that confidentiality is critical to

the settlement of many lawsuits. See Marcus, Discover, Confidentiality, supranote 52, at
484-85 (arguing that presumption of public access would impede settlement); Miller,
supra note 52, at 429 (contending that confidentiality is "not only acceptable, but
essential" to discovery and settlement of lawsuits); see also Luban, supranote 3, at 2656
(admitting that some settlements will collapse without confidentiality); Weinstein,
supra note 55, at 510-11 (noting that many mass tort cases would not settle without
secrecy agreement).
92 See Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supranote 52, at 484 (asserting that restric-

tions on protective orders will "foment... opposition to broad discovery"); Shull,
supranote 73, at 11 (contending that confidentiality encourages settlement in "high
visibility cases, particularly where liability is slim or nonexistent"); Varner & Loomis,
supra note 73, at 3 (arguing that both plaintiffs and defendants may be reluctant to
establish settlement benchmark).
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sents a lengthy, expensive, and risky alternative. 9 3 They dismiss cost
and delay arguments as mere "housekeeping" or efficiency concerns
that should not overshadow the public benefits that flow from open
judicial proceedings. Increased public access to settlements and their
underlying information, it is said, fosters the public debate previously
associated with adjudication and that is altogether lacking when cases
are secretly settled.9 4 Moreover, restricting secrecy orders promotes
the efficient resolution of related litigation by permitting collaboration among litigants and the sharing of discovery-fostering systemic
efficiency. 95 Arguments for increased public access, then, rest on a
vision of the judicial system that is broader than the individual lawsuit
and that seeks to import the values of adjudication into settlement.
2.

The Judicial Function

Confidentiality proponents tend to regard dispute resolution as
the principal function of the civil courts, with the judge acting as neutral arbiter or adjudicator who decides cases according to the substantive law. Unlike the executive or legislative branches of government,
civil courts should not primarily aim to represent the general public
interest, to formulate major social policy, or to protect public health
93 Many public access advocates doubt whether restricting confidentiality would
have any effect upon the frequency or amount of settlement. See Laleh Ispahani,
Note, The Soul ofDiscretion: The Use and Abuse of ConfidentialSettlements, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETmcs 111, 119 (1992) (contending that settlements will occur without confidentiality because they mutually benefit parties); Barry C. Schneider, Sealing of Records and
Other Secrecy Problems, C949 ALI-ABA 95, 111 (Aug. 1994) (predicting "that the prospect of the settlement being made public is less significant to the parties than the cost
of trial and exposure of all that will be revealed in a public trial"); see also Pansy v.
Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 788 (3d Cir. 1994) (positing that settlements
will occur regardless of whether confidentiality can be promised).
94 Professor Luban, for example, strongly criticizes the secrecy that currently surrounds many settlements. He advocates legislative orjudicial sunshine regimes as "an
important step toward allowing settlements to fulfill at least some of the public values
of adjudication." Luban, supra note 3, at 2659; see also infra Parts II.C.2-3 (discussing
sunshine reforms). According to Luban, public debate constitutes one benefit of adjudication that would be furthered by increased public access to settlements. See
Luban, supra note 3, at 2653; see also supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing the other "public goods" that Luban believes adjudication creates).
95 See Luban, supra note 3, at 2653 (discussing the "other-litigants argument"
which supports making discovery "available for other litigants to avoid unnecessary
multiplication of expense"); Shull, supra note 73, at 3, 9 (noting that restricting secrecy orders fosters consistency in discovery responses and avoids the waste of time
and resources associated with relitigation of issues); see also infraPart IV.D.2 (examining discovery sharing as reason for modifying stipulated protective orders).
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and safety.9 6 Instead, confidentiality proponents like Professors Marcus and Miller deem these "collateral" or "side" effects of litigation
that should not override the fundamental problem-solving role of the
97

courts.

Confidentiality proponents thus criticize efforts to enhance public access to pretrial discovery and civil settlements as improper attempts to transform the court into an advocate (either of the general
public interest or of existing or future plaintiffs) or an information
clearinghouse. 98 Such a transformation arguably motivates litigants to
utilize the court system for purposes other than resolution of the case
at hand-whether to exploit discovery for use in other cases, to force
a settlement, to circumvent the regulatory process, or to drum up
publicity and foment future litigation. 99 In so doing, confidentiality
96 In addition to questioning whether secrecy orders actually jeopardize public
health and safety, see Miller, supranote 52, at 477 (contending that only a "minuscule"
number of protective orders impact public health and safety), confidentiality proponents also dispute whether courts are the appropriate government institution to disseminate information or warnings concerning public hazards such as product defects.
Professor Marcus, for example, contends that product safety is already subject to extensive regulatory scrutiny by agencies far better equipped than the courts to make
such determinations. See Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 481-82.
97 See Marcus, Discovery Confidentialiy, supra note 52, at 470 (arguing that information dissemination is a collateral effect of litigation that should not be permitted to
interfere with the primary role of courts); Miller, supra note 52, at 431 (asserting that
"public access to information produced in litigation has always been a secondary benefit-a side effect-of civil adjudication"); see also supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussing problem-solving conception of the justice system).
98

See CHARLEs

ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL

2d

§ 2042 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (criticizing sunshine efforts as misperceiving "function
and the role of courts"); see also Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supranote 52, at 478
(affording access based upon public interest in materials diverges from basic disputeresolving purpose of the courts); Miller, supra note 52, at 431-32 (contending that
efforts to restrict judicial discretion promote goals unrelated to the litigation before
the court and undermine its "primary goal"); Shull, supra note 73, at 11 (asserting
that court should not function as advocate by funneling information to plaintiffs'
counsel).
99 See Apr. 28, 1994 Advisory Comm. Minutes, supra note 86, at 5 (noting that litigation might be brought "to foster generation of new disputes not to resolve old ones");
id. at 1 (recording view that current drive for increased access is motivated by a "desire for publicity," not a need to inform or protect the public); Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 485-86 (suggesting that increased access enhances
incentive to undertake discovery for non-litigation purposes); Miller, supra note 52, at
483-84 (noting that facilitating the modification or vacatur of protective orders will
increase the incentive to file suit in order to exploit discovery or to force a settlement); Shull, supra note 73, at 11 (arguing that access perpetuates the litigation explosion by facilitating the filing and prosecution of other litigation); Vangelisti, supra
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proponents contend, mere "side effects" of litigation take precedence
over the primary judicial function-the tail wags the dog, so to speak.
Not surprisingly, public access advocates rely heavily upon a contrasting public life conception of the judicial system to support reforms aimed at reducing the level of secrecy in the courts. They argue
that courts are publicly funded government institutions that serve interests broader than those of the immediate parties. Courts thus play
a role beyond the resolution of the case at hand by explicating public
values and protecting public interests. 10 0 As representatives and
guardians of the general public, courts should thus oppose even consensual attempts by litigants to shield information or documents that
are of public interest or that are relevant to public health and
1 1
safety.
According to public access advocates, however, courts currently
do not adequately consider the public interest in approving stipulated
protective orders, sealing orders, or confidential settlements.' 0 2 They
thus support reforms aimed at restricting the issuance or facilitating
the modification or vacatur of such secrecy orders. In such a way,
similarly situated plaintiffs, future consumers and victims, regulatory
agencies, and the media might gain timely access to otherwise unavailable information concerning a defendant's wrongdoing, a product defect, or any other type of public hazard.' 0 3
note 77, at 178-79 (characterizing anti-secrecy reform as an effort to facilitate other
litigation, protect the public, or force a settlement).
100 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 55, at 513 ("The public, which created and
funds our judicial institutions, depends upon those institutions to protect it."); Mikva
Testimony, supranote 76, at 3 (arguing that courts do not exclusively serve the litigants
given the "heavy expenditure of public funds and resources on the courts").
101 Although proposed sunshine regimes often focus upon products liability, toxic
tort, personal injury, or other cases that arguably impact public health and safety, see
infra Part II.C.2, a public life conception might also restrict secrecy in other suits that
affect even broader public interests. See infra Part IV.D.2.d for a discussion of the
public interest considerations that might guide a decision whether to modify or vacate
a protective order.
102 See Kohl Testimony, supra note 9 (contending that "public interest receives far
too little consideration in cases affecting public health and safety"); Ispahani, supra
note 93, at 127 (finding that "courts appear to grant seals perfunctorily, as a matter of
course" at the parties' request in order to facilitate settlement); Shull, supra note 73,
at 3, 9 (arguing that courts give no consideration to policy in granting stipulated
protective orders).
103 See DorothyJ. Clarke, Court Secrecy and the Food and DrugAdministration:A Regulatory Alternative to RestrictingSecrecy Orders in ProductLiability Litigation Involving FDARegulated Products, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 109, 117-18 (1994) (identifying arguments in
favor of restricting secrecy orders). But see Weinstein, supra note 55, at 512-16 (acknowledging that increased public access in mass tort suits might discourage a de-
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Party Autonomy

Perhaps the least controversial use of confidentiality to preserve
party autonomy occurs when courts issue secrecy orders in order to
protect a litigant's privacy or property interests. Stipulated secrecy orders thus engender little debate when used to protect intimate personal information, trade secrets, or proprietary confidential business
information. Controversy does occur, however, in determining when
those interests exist, what interests other than privacy or property
merit confidentiality, and how those arguably lesser interests in secrecy should be balanced when pitted against the public's interest or
desire for increased public access. Positions frequently divide on
these more difficult questions based upon the value given to litigant
autonomy and the parties' mutual desire for settlement.
Confidentiality proponents highly value litigant autonomy and
the ability of parties to dispose of "their" private dispute in any manner as long as they consent. This includes utilizing as much secrecy as
they mutually deem necessary to achieve settlement.1 0 4 Confidentiality proponents express the fear that unless parties can rely upon stipulated secrecy agreements and orders, they may opt out of the public
court system in favor of private dispute resolution or abandon the liti10 5
gation altogether.
In contrast, public access advocates often assume a public ownership stance toward civil litigation. Once a matter has been brought
before the courts for resolution, it is argued, it no longer belongs
solely to the parties. Instead, the public, which creates and heavily
subsidizes the courts, 10 6 has an interest in observing their operation to
fendant from recording the dangers of a product or activity, thereby increasing
danger to society).
104 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 32, at 2680, 2690; see also Marcus, Myth and
Reality, supra note 52, at 44 (advocating settlement confidentiality orders as a "form of
party autonomy that is critical to the reliability of such orders"); Resnik, supra note 4,

at 1491, 1539 (suggesting that stipulated vacatur "enhances the autonomy of litigants
on both sides of a dispute" and "installs preferences of the parties as the best measure
of fairness available").
105 See Edward H. Cooper, Memorandum on Protective Orders, 1994 WL 23044
(F.D.C.H.) (April 20, 1994) [hereinafter CooperMemo] (warning that sunshine legisla-

tion might encourage non-public means of dispute resolution or abandonment of
litigation altogether); Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 486 (sug-

gesting that restrictions on protective orders may deter claimants from seeking court
relief for fear of disclosure); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 32, at 2684 (fearing that

parties who seek to "privatize their disputes

ill simply avoid the public courts

completely").
106 Party-borne court costs and filing fees do not begin to cover the overall costs of
operating the civil justice system. See Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future ofJudicial
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ensure their proper functioning. Increased public access to pretrial
matters and settlements, the bread and butter of civil courts today,
enhances the opportunity to view the courts in action and to hold
them publicly accountable. In the process, public confidence in its
10 7
court system is encouraged.
C. Falloutfrom the Debate
The confidentiality debate has prompted varying responses from
commentators, courts, and legislatures. One reaction argues for the
continued maintenance of the status quo, which deposits confidentiality issues in the discretionary and largely unreviewable hands of the
trial court. A counter-response presumes that courts are ill-equipped,
over-worked, or too self-interested to perform the necessary balancing
of public and private interests, and thus supports legislative curbs on
litigation confidentiality. Finally, some courts, disturbed by their previously cavalier approach to confidentiality, have self-imposed flexible,
but articulated, limits on the issuance or modification of secrecy
orders. 108

Federalism; "NeitherOut FarNor in Deep", 45

CASE W. RES. L. REv. 705, 731 (1995) (noting the describing "free-rider problem" caused by discrepancy between revenues generated by current filing fees and the "cost of running a typical trial court [which] is
estimated at between $400 and $600 an hour, upwards of $5000 a day").
107 See Clarke, supra note 103, at 118-19 (restricting secrecy orders arguably furthers public debate and confidence in the judicial system); Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 470 (examining the argument that increased access improves
public's opportunity to observe the functioning of the courts). For a discussion of the
rationales that support public access to judicial proceedings, see infra Part III.D.
108 Although beyond the scope of this Article, sunshine reform could also arguably be accomplished through more stringent ethical prohibitions on a lawyer's ability
to enter into secrecy agreements. See Attorneys Face Legal, Ethical Dilemma in Batties Between Privacy and Access: Protective Orders, BNA's 50 State Survey (BNA) No.
47, at 46-48 (Nov. 1992) [hereinafter BNA Survey] (reporting on proposed ethical
amendments that would restrict attorney's ability to confidentially settle cases involving public health and safety); Ispahani, supra note 93, at 112, 128-30 (arguing that
plaintiffs' lawyers are better positioned than judges to determine whether a settlement should be confidential). Such ethical reform, however, would require an overhaul of existing regimes that emphasizes client choice and an attorney's duty to her
client over any as-yet-to-be-defined duty to the general public. See BNA Survey, supraat
46, 48 (concluding that current ethics rules "emphasize the role of lawyers as advisors
and confidantes rather than as society's whistleblowers and morality police"). But see
Shull, supra note 73, at 9 (noting lawyer's conflict between procuring big settlement
for client and her obligation to the general public and future clients).
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1. Status Quo: Judicial Flexibility and Discretion
Most confidentiality proponents place great stock in a trial
court's discretion to flexibly fashion secrecy orders on a case-by-case
and issue-by-issue basis. 10 9 They would thus leave the issue of discovery confidentiality to the flexible and undefined "good cause" rubric
of Federal Rule 26(c), 1 10 permit sealing ofjudicial records if the interests in confidentiality outweigh a rebuttable presumption of public access," 1 and leave settlements, at least to the extent that they are
consummated without the prodding or imprimatur of the trial court,
largely to the private dictates of the parties. 1 2 Existing practice, it is
argued, already allows a trial court to consider potential public and
nonparty interests when deciding to issue or modify secrecy orders.
Any attempt to limit further or to channel judicial discretion would
jeopardize the intricate balancing of interests that judges evaluate best
and would restrict the necessary flexibility to fashion appropriate se1 13
crecy orders in individual cases.

2.

Sunshine Statutes and Rules

In contrast, advocates of legislative reform question whether
courts do or can undertake the necessary balancing of public interests
and policy that should come into play in resolving confidentiality issues." a A court's self-interest in clearing its docket, its reluctance to
109 See Richard A. Rosen & Karen Steinberg Kennedy, New Developments in State
Protective Order Legislation and ProceduralRules, C915 ALI-ABA 315, 320-21 (Winter
1994) (concluding that it is "certainly better ... to leave the resolution of these delicate issues to the discretion of the court on a case by case basis").
110 Professor Arthur Miller, for example, ardently opposes any attempt to restrict
existing judicial discretion to issue or modify protective orders governing discovery.
See Miller, supra note 52, at 435-36, 467, 476. See infraParts IV.A-B for a discussion
of existing protective order practice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c).
111 See infra Part V (discussing the sealing of judicial records).
112 See infra Part VI (discussing secrecy in settlement).
113 See, e.g., Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 532 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating
that courts need "wide latitude" and "broad discretion" regarding when and what
confidentiality protection is needed and should be afforded "great deference . . . framing and administering" secrecy orders); see also ConcerningProtective Orders in Federal Litigation Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and
AdministrativePractice,1994 WL 230134, at *5 (1994) (Statement of Patrick E. Higginbotham, U.S. Judge for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals) [hereinafter Higginbotham
Testimony] (noting the "infinite degrees" of interests to be balanced in issuing a protective order); Miller, supra note 52, at 435-36 (describing existing law as affording
courts the flexibility and discretion to balance competing interests).
114 In introducing one of the many proposed, but never enacted, federal sunshine
bills, for example, Senator Herbert Kohl rejected judicial reform of Federal Rule of
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disturb the parties' mutual resolution of a controversy, and the current emphasis on settlement arguably reduce the likelihood that a
court will actually consider nonparty interests or the benefits of public
access in deciding whether to issue or modify a secrecy order." 5
This distrust of unbridledjudicial discretion motivated a push for
legislative "sunshine" reforms that began sweeping federal and state
legislatures in the early to mid-1990's."

6

While all federal and most

state attempts to enact such antisecrecy legislation ultimately failed,"

7

Civil Procedure 26(c), arguing that it would perpetuate a status quo that fails to adequately consider the public interest in cases affecting public health and safety. See
Kohl Testimony, supra note 9; see also Marianne Lavelle, Hearings Reveal Deep Divisions
Over the Issue of Court Secrecy, N.LJ., May, 2, 1994, at A12 (quoting Judge Mikva's view
that "policy issues here should be decided by policy makers, not by appointed
judges"); Larry Smith, No More Court Secrecy on DangerousProducts, HouSTON CHRON.,
Mar. 13, 1992, at B15 (stating that courts are "ill-equipped" to balance the benefit of
open information against the harm to corporations).
115 Citing a court's natural desire to clear its dockets, as well as its reluctance to
undercut a plaintiff's optimal recovery, Professor Luban argues that "jiludges are unlikely to exercise their discretion to scuttle a settlement in the name of the publicity
principle." Luban, supra note 3, at 2658; see also Weinstein, supra note 55, at 517
(suggesting that neutral ombudsman determine secrecy issues given courts' conflict
of interest in clearing their dockets).
116 See generallyMiller, supranote 52, at 430 n.7 (noting that in 1990-1991, protective order legislation was proposed in 30 states and rejected in 25); Rosen & Kennedy,
supranote 109, at 317-19 (describing "movement to restrict and channel judicial discretion" as being a subject of activity in "virtually every state"); Study Finds Web of Conflicts, Activity in Protective Order Issue, 7 BNA's CORP. COUNS. WEEKLY (BNA), Dec. 2,
1992, at 1 (surveying protective order activity in 50 states).
117 Attempts to legislate federal sunshine reform have failed at two levels, both in
Congress and with the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
CongressionalProposals. Senator Herbert Kohl unsuccessfully introduced three
substantially identical versions of a Federal Sunshine in Litigation Act [the "Act"] in
1993, 1994, and 1995. See S. 1404, 103d Cong. (1993); 140 Cong. Rec. 7719, (103d
Cong. Amend. 1930 to S. 687) (1994); S. 374, 104th Cong. (1995). The Act sought to
limit a federal district court's discretion to enter a Rule 26(c) discovery protective
order "or an order restricting access to court records in a civil case." S. 374, 104th
Cong. § 2 (1995). Before issuing such an order, a district court would need to make
"particularized findings of fact" that disclosure of information "relevant to the protection of public health or safety" would not be impeded or that a "specific and substantial interest" in the confidentiality of the particular information "clearly outweighed"
the public interest in disclosure. The party seeking confidentiality bore the burden of
persuasion, and the protective order could be "no broader than necessary to protect
the privacy interest asserted." Id. at § 2. Finally, the Act voided any agreement that
would have prohibited or restricted the parties to a federal lawsuit from disclosing
relevant information "to any Federal or State agency with authority to enforce laws
regulating an activity relating to such information." Id.
The Act, which faced strong opposition from many federal judges, the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, senators, academics, and practitioners, died in the Senate.
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Objectors argued that, among other things, the Act attempted to circumvent and
transform the federal rulemaking process from a transsubstantive and neutral activity
that considered the federal rules as a coordinated whole to a political exercise fueled
by special interest groups that sought piecemeal reforms myopically aimed at protective orders in particular categories of cases. Opponents further asserted that Senator
Kohl's legislation misperceived the function of the civil judiciary and unduly restricted necessary judicial discretion. See generally Hearing Testimony, supra note 76;
140 Cong. Rec. S13041-044, (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1994) (statement of Senator Charles
Grassley); 140 Cong. Rec. S7685-98, (daily ed.June 27, 1994); see alsoVangelisti, supra
note 77, at 171-73 (critiquing alleged circumvention of the rulemaking process).
Rules Proposals. The efforts to statutorily amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(c) prompted the Judicial Conference of the United States to undertake its own
study of discovery protective orders. Proposed amendments were first published for
public comment in 1993 and, in March of 1995, the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules submitted a modified amendment of Rule 26(c) to the Judicial Conference. See
Judicial Conference of the United States, Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, 1994 WL 880348, at *5 (Oct. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Oct. 20, 1994Jud. Conf.
Minutes]. In order to accommodate the "delicate balance of privacy and public interests" surrounding protective orders and to codify what the Advisory Committee perceived as existing practice, the proposed rule permitted the parties to stipulate to
discovery protective orders. At the same time, the proposal recognized a court's continuing authority to modify or vacate its protective orders and established procedures
and standards allowing nonparty intervention.
The proposal to permit a district court to issue a protective order "for good cause
shown or on stipulation of the parties" proved extremely controversial before the Judicial
Conference, which ultimately voted to delete the amendment's explicit approval of
stipulated protective orders and to send the proposed rule back to the Advisory Committee for further study and public comment. See Linda Greenhouse, Judicial Conference Rejects More Secrecy in Civil Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at B9; see also infra
notes 232-43 and accompanying text (further discussing amendment controversy).
The Advisory Committee, however, believed that deletion of the stipulation language
would upset the "closely laced and interrelated set of interest reconciliations" represented by the proposed rule, and, in April of 1995, submitted the amendment unchanged for public comment. Higginbotham Letter, supra note 82, at 95. After the
period for public comment expired in March of 1996, the Advisory Committee tabled
further consideration of Rule 26(c) pending a comprehensive review of the general
scope of discovery. See Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 17, 1996). See generally Bruce D.
Brown, Secrecy Dispute Heats Up, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 26, 1996, at 6.
Other FederalEfforts. Thus, efforts to increase or facilitate public access to discovery materials stalled in the formal rulemaking process as well as in Congress. A similar fate befell federal endeavors to establish guidelines for the sealing of judicial
records and for the confidentiality of settlements. See H.R. 3803, 102d Cong. (1991)
(proposing the Federal Court Settlements Sunshine Act that would have required
clear and convincing evidence of a compelling public interest to justify sealing any
settlement of a civil action in which the United States or a federal agency, department, or official was a party in interest); Oct. 20, 1994Jud. Conf Minutes, supra, at 5
(tabling proposed amendment to Rule 5 (d) that would regulate agreements to return
or destroy unfiled discovery); Apr. 28, 1994 Advisory Comm. Minutes, supra note 86, at

1999]

SECRECY

BY CONSENT

a handful of states have enacted some type of open records law governing their courts. Texas, which has enacted the broadest of these
sunshine reforms, illustrates the legislative approach to the secrecy
1 18
crisis.
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76(a) creates a presumption of
public access to "court records," which, in addition to documents filed
of record, are defined to include unfiled settlement agreements and
unfiled pretrial discovery that "have a probable adverse effect upon
the general public health or safety, or the administration of public
office, or the operation of government."1 19 These broadly defined
court records may not be sealed unless the party seeking the secrecy
order establishes (1) a "specific, serious, and substantial interest which
clearly outweighs" a presumption of public access and any adverse impact on public health or safety, and (2) the absence of any less restrictive alternative than sealing.' 20 The Texas Rule thus covers the gamut
of secrecy orders, from discovery, to judicial records, to settlements. It
further squarely places the burden of establishing the need for confidentiality on the party seeking secrecy and reigns in judicial discretion
by specifying a substantive balancing test to be undertaken pursuant
1 21
to numerous procedural safeguards.
*22 (distinguishing proposed amendment to Rule 26(c) from possible Rule 77.1 governing sealing orders that limit "public access to judicial records or proceedings").
118 Texas and Florida were among the first states to enact relatively wide-ranging
sunshine legislation-Texas, by rule of civil procedure, and Florida, by statute. See
TEx. R. Cirv. P. 76a; FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 69.081 (West Supp. 1998). The Florida statute,
which is almost as broad as the Texas rule, prohibits a court from entering any order
or judgment that "has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard or any
information concerning a public hazard," or "any information which may be useful to
members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from
the public hazard." FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 69.081(3). In addition, the Florida statute goes
further than Texas by voiding, as against public policy, any settlement provision that
conceals information concerning public hazards, id. §4, or any settlement of a claim
with a government entity. Id § 8(a). See also infra Part VI.A (discussing litigants' ability to privately contract for settlement confidentiality).
119 TEx. R. Crv. P. § 76a(2) (b)-(c). The presumption does not encompass references to monetary consideration in settlements, id. § (2) (b), "discovery in cases originally initiated to preserve bona fide trade secrets or other intangible property rights,"
id,§ (2) (c), or documents filed in camera for the purpose of obtaining a discovery
ruling, id. § (2) (a) (1).
120 Id. § 76a(1)(a)-(b).
121 Under the Texas rule, a court may not issue a secrecy order without a preceding motion, notice of a public hearing, and an open hearing in which any interested
person has the right to intervene. See id. §§ (3) & (4). For a discussion of Texas Rule
76a and the debate surrounding its enactment, see generally Lloyd Doggett &
MichaelJ. Mucchetti, Public Access to Public Courts:DiscouragingSecrecy in the PublicInterest, 69 TEx. L. Rxv. 643 (1990); Robert C. Nissen, Open Court Records in ProductsLiabil-
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Other states undertaking sunshine reform have been less ambitious than Texas. Their narrower legislation is generally limited in
scope to the sealing of judicial records, 122 to confidential settlements
124
with a government entity, 123 to particular types of public hazards,
125
or to the sharing of information in related litigation.
Although much controversy surrounded the initial enactment of
these sunshine reforms, there has been little subsequent appellate discussion or empirical review of them. Assessment of their actual effect
upon the judicial system itself, the parties, or the public in general
126
thus remains speculative at best.

ity Litigation Under Texas Rule 76a, 72 TEx. L. REV. 931 (1994); andJennifer S. Sickler
& Michael F. Heim, The Impact of Rule 76a: Trade Secrets Crash andBurn in Texas, 1 TEx.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95 (1993).
122 See, e.g., DEL. SUPER. CT. R. 9 (bb) (requiring ajudicial determination that good
cause exists for continued seal of court records); GA. SUPER. CT. R. 21.1 (establishing
procedural and substantive requirements for sealing ofjudicial records); IDAHO CT. R.
32(f) (requiring that courts make a factual finding "as to whether the interest in privacy or public disclosure predominates" before sealing judicial records in least restrictive fashion); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-5.5 (West 1989) (requiring specific balancing of
interests, findings of fact and conclusions of law before sealing judicial public record); MICH. STAT. ANN. R. 8.105(D) (Law. Co-op. 1992) (limiting court's discretion to
seal any "documents and records of any nature that are filed with the clerk"); N.Y. CT.
R. § 216.1 (requiring written finding of good cause and consideration of public interest before sealing court records).
123 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.3(b) (1995) (restricting agencies of government or
its subdivisions from entering into confidential settlements without "overriding interest"); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30.402 (Michie Supp. 1996) (prohibiting public body
from entering into confidential settlement).
124 See ARI. CODE ANN. § 16-55-122 (Michie Supp. 1997) (voiding settlement
agreements or provisions concealing environmental hazard); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.24.611 (West Supp. 1998) (restricting confidentiality provisions in a court order
or private agreement that involves product liability or hazardous substance claims).
125 See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01420.01 (Michie 1992) (providing that protective orders issued in personal injury or wrongful death cases shall not prohibit sharing of
discovery in similar or related matters). See also infra Part IV.D.2.c for a discussion of
discovery sharing as a consideration in modifying or vacating a protective order.
126 Other than one unsuccessful challenge to the constitutionality of the Florida
statute, there is a surprising paucity of caselaw surrounding even the relatively mature
Florida and Texas statutes. See Clarke, supra note 103, at 121-22 (concluding that
"the actual effect of reforms on the judicial system remains speculative" given the lack
of controversial motions or appeals in states that have enacted sunshine reforms);
Luban, supra note 3, at 2655 (characterizing criticisms of sunshine laws as mere conjecture without empirical study concerning their effect upon discovery).
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Common Law Sunshine

The common law approach taken by the United States Court of
27
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg' illustrates yet another response to the perceived secrecy crisis in our
courts. Faced with what it saw as the "current trend of increasing judicial secrecy,"'128 the Third Circuit in Pansy executed a later-described
surprising "shift from the previous practice" of routine judicial endorsement of confidentiality agreements. 129 The court criticized stipulated confidentiality orders, whether sought "at the discovery stage
or any other stage of litigation, including settlement," as potential abdications of judicial discretion to private judgment:
Disturbingly, some courts routinely sign orders which contain confidentiality clauses without considering the propriety of such orders,
or the countervailing public interests which are sacrificed by the orders. Because defendants request orders of confidentiality as a condition of settlement, courts are willing to grant these requests in an
effort to facilitate settlement without sufficiently inquiring into the
potential public interest in obtaining information concerning the
settlement agreement. 130
Dubious that confidentiality is, in fact, essential to most settlements, the Third Circuit held the general interest in encouraging settlements (so often cited in support of stipulated confidentiality
orders) insufficient to support entry of such orders.' 31 Instead, before
issuing or deciding to modify any confidentiality order, a district court
in the Third Circuit must balance both public and private interests to
determine whether "good cause" exists tojustify its entry or continued
maintenance.' 3 2 To that end, and to further circumscribe trial court
127 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994).
128 M at 789.
129 Glenmede Trust Co.v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 481 n.8 (3d Cir. 1995). See also
id. at 483 n.11; Pansy, 23 F.3d at 788-89.
130 Pansy, 23 F.3d at 785-86. The Pansycourt drew no distinction between protective orders governing discovery, sealing orders, and confidentiality orders concerning
settlements, finding that they were all "functionally similar," that they shared "comparable features," and that they implicated "similar public policy concerns." Id. at 786.
See infra Part III.A (criticizing generic treatment of secrecy orders).
131 Instead, the Pansy court required "a particularized showing of the need for
confidentiality in reaching a settlement." Pansy, 23 F.3d at 788.
132 See id at 786 ("We therefore ... conclude that whether an order of confidentiality is granted at the discovery stage or any other stage of litigation, including settlement, good cause must be demonstrated to justify the order."); id. at 790 ("The
appropriate approach in considering motions to modify confidentiality orders is to
use the same balancing test that is used in determining whether to grant such orders
in the first instance ....").
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discretion, the Third Circuit has identified a set of nonexhaustive and
nonmandatory factors that a court should consider in determining
the existence of "good cause. '133 While party reliance upon confidentiality and its "particularized" importance in effecting settlement remain proper considerations, they are not dispositive, and must instead
be weighed against a number of equally (if not more) important nonparty and public interests.1 4 In effect, then, a common law sunshine
regime governs the Third Circuit, whose courts appear increasingly
3 5
reluctant to approve the parties' mutual request for confidentiality.1

133 Glenmede Trust, 56 F.3d at 483; Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787-92. While the Third Circuit commits the "balancing of factors for and against access" to the trial court's discretion, it does not accord that determination "the narrow review reserved for
discretionary decisions based on first-hand observations." Pansy, 23 F.3d at 781 (quoting Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 800 F.2d 339,
344 (3d Cir. 1986)).
134 These public interest factors inquire whether the information is relevant to the
public health and safety or is otherwise in the public interest, whether a government
entity or public official is a party, whether the arguably confidential information
would otherwise be subject to a freedom of information request, and whether public
access would facilitate discovery sharing in other related cases. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at
787-92. Many of the private and public factors identified by the Pansy court will be
discussed at length in connection with the modification of discovery protective orders. See infra Part IV.D.2.
135 See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gould Elec. Inc., No. 95-5203, 1996
WL 383307, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 1996) (rejecting stipulated protective order absent
briefing on Pansy factors); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 155
F.R.D. 113, 115-16 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (refusing to enter stipulated protective order that
permitted parties to self-select documents entitled to confidential protection); Horgan v. Independence Blue Cross, No. 93-CV-2528, 1994 WL 24662, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
24, 1994) (elevating parties' stipulation to confidentiality order would waste judicial
resources and furnish a false sense of protection); Frupac Int'l Corp. v. M/V "Chucabuco", No. Civ. A. 92-2617, 1994 WL 269271, at *1-*2 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1994)
(refusing to endorse "generally worded non-case specific agreement worked out between the parties" because parties failed to provide court with sufficient information
to conduct balancing test); Musicom Int'l, Inc. v. Serubo, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2507, No. Civ. A. 94-1920, 1994 WL 410818, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 1994) (holding
that "broad abdication of judicial authority as . . . contemplated by the parties is
wholly inconsistent with the good cause standard"); see also Shanon P. Duffy, Rules Are
Changed on Confidentiality; Spate of FederalRulings Make ProtectiveOrders Uncertain,LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, July 11, 1994, at I (reading Pansy "to disapprove the judicial rubberstamping of stipulated protective orders" and noting "minor boomlet" in denials of
such orders in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania).
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A FUNCTIONAL TOUCHSTONE: TnE RIGHT OF PUBLIC AccEss

A.

The Need for an Individual and FunctionalAnalysis

As the Third Circuit's decision in Pansy illustrates, participants in
the confidentiality debate often broadly frame the debate to encompass secrecy orders that govern functionally dissimilar information
and materials. For example, in expansively defining "confidentiality
order" to include "any court order which in any way restricts access to
or disclosure of any form of information or proceeding," the Third
Circuit commingles "protective orders" concerning information exchanged during discovery, "sealing orders" concerning judicial
records and proceedings, and "secrecy orders" concerning settlement
terms.' 3 6 Sunshine statutes and rules likewise tend to mix the different types of secrecy orders, regulating not only filed documents and
3 7
pleadings, but also unfiled discovery and settlement agreements.
Sometimes even academics treat these varying uses of litigation confi138
dentiality as interchangeable.
Stipulated protective, sealing, and confidentiality orders do share
common attributes and, in many respects, are functionally similar. As
recognized by the Third Circuit:
Protective orders over discovery materials and orders of confidentiality over matters relating to other stages of litigation have comparable features and raise similar public policy concerns. All such
orders are intended to offer litigants a measure of privacy, while
balancing against this privacy interest the public's right to obtain
information concerning judicial proceedings. [Both protective orders and secrecy orders] are often used by courts as a means to aid
39
the progression of litigation and facilitate settlements.'
136 Pansy, 23 F.3d at 777 n.1.
137 See, e.g., Tax. R Civ. P. 76a(2). The Florida statute not only restricts the
court's entry of any order that "has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard," but also voids any private agreement that might carry a similar effect. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 69.081 (3), (4) (West Supp. 1998). Similarly, the proposed Federal Sunshine
in Litigation Act, while expressly aimed at discovery protective orders, also sought to
limit a court's discretion to enter any "order restricting access to court records in a

civil case." See supra note 117.
138 Professor Luban, for instance, regards the "underlying issues" as "very similar"
concerning "sealed settlements with the blessing of a court, secret settlements without
the blessing of a court, and predisposition gag orders." Luban, supra note 3, at 2650.
See also Janice Toran, Secrecy Orders and Government Litigants: "A Northwest Passage
Around the Freedom ofInformation Act"?, 27 GA. L. REV. 121, 124 n.21 (1992) (defining
"secrecy order.., to encompass all judicial orders that prevent document disclosure,
including protective orders in discovery and orders sealing settlements").
139 Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786.
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This functional similarity requires that a court balance common
public and private concerns before issuing these orders and that some
level of "good cause" support them. 140 As the remainder of this Article demonstrates, however, the necessary mix of balancing factors, as
well as the requisite showing of good cause, do and should fluctuate
with each of these arguably discrete uses of confidentiality.
Complex but distinct issues of public access surround stipulated
protective orders governing discovery, the sealing of judicial records,
and confidential settlements. This Article presents a functional approach that assesses stipulated confidentiality in light of the various
rationales that traditionally support the often-amorphous "right" of
public access to judicial proceedings. Under this approach, the value
given to party autonomy and the systemic benefits of settlement will
hinge upon the nature of the confidentiality order, the materials or
information it seeks to protect, and the role those materials play in
the civil courts' principal adjudicative function.
Before addressing the individualized and shifting inquiry applicable to these diverse secrecy issues, this section will examine the touchstone to any functional analysis-the right of public access to judicial
proceedings and records. After briefly discussing the source and existence of any such right, the section will probe its underlying rationales
and their applicability to civil litigation.
B. Potential Sources of a Right of PublicAccess
Three potential sources arguably give rise to a right of public access to civil judicial proceedings and the information and documents
generated in their wake. The sunshine statutes and rules previously
discussed represent one such source. As with the Freedom of Information Act applicable to federal agencies, a legislature may statutorily
provide a right of public access to particular information generated by
the litigation process or deposited with the courts.1 4 1 A future or ex140 Id. (finding that protective and confidentiality orders are functionally similar,
involve similar balancing, and require good cause).
141 The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1995), functions as a
disclosure statute aimed at curbing perceived excesses in executive branch secrecy.
The FOIA mandates disclosure of certain "agency" records requested from a government "agency." Id. § 552 (a) (3). The FOLA contains numerous exceptions, however,
see id. § 552(b), and the federal courts are expressly exempted from its coverage, see
id. § 551 (1) (B). In particular, a federal agency may withhold otherwise disclosable
information or documents that are the subject of a judicial secrecy order. See GTE
Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 377
(1980); see also infra Part IV.D.2.d (discussing how the government status of a party
might impact the decision whether to grant or modify a protective order). See gener-
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isting rule of civil procedure might similarly support increased public
access to the civil judiciary. 142 As previously discussed, however, federal efforts to provide this type of statutory access have been largely
143
unsuccessful.
The other two potential sources of public access, the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the common law,
derive from United States Supreme Court precedent exploring the
right of public access in criminal cases. The Supreme Court has
found a First Amendment right of public access to criminal trials and
certain criminal pretrial proceedings.'4 The Court has also recognized an admittedly ill-defined federal common law right to inspect
145
and copy judicial records.
In the civil context, however, the Supreme Court has never established either a First Amendment or a common law right of public acally Toran, supra note 138, at 122, for an exploration of the "conflict between the
government's perceived need for secrecy as a means of encouraging the voluntary
submission of information and the public's undeniable interest in monitoring the
health and safety activities of a government agency."
142 As discussed below, for example, a handful of courts have found that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 5 (d) provides a statutory right of public access to even unfiled
discovery. See infra Part IV.C.1.
143 See supra note 117.
144 In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the Supreme
Court found the right to attend criminal trials implicit in the First Amendment guarantees of free speech, press, and peaceable assembly. Such guarantees, according to
the Court, include the freedom to assemble, listen, and receive information and thus
.prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of
the public may draw." Id- at 575-80. See also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,
478 U.S. 1 (1986) [Press-EnterpriseM-] (excluding public access to preliminary hearing
in murder case); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) [PressEnterprise1] (allowing access to jury selection in criminal trial); Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (excluding the press and the general public
from trial involving sexual offenses against minors).
145 In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978), the Supreme
Court addressed whether the public had a right to inspect and copy the Nixon tapes,
which had been played in open court during the criminal trials of several Watergate
defendants. The Court recognized a common law right of access to judicial records,
but acknowledged the sharp controversy "over its scope and the circumstances warranting restrictions of it." Id. at 597. Although the paucity of precedent made it difficult to formulate any comprehensive definition of this common law right, the Court
agreed that the access decision "is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial
court ... to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstance of the particular case." Id- at 599. The Court thus upheld the trial court's refusal to publicly release copies of the tapes in its custody. See id. at 611. For a more complete discussion
of the common law right of access as recently applied to the sealing of civil judicial
records, see infra Part V.

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL-

74:2

cess. 146 Nor do the lower courts that have addressed this issue agree
which, if any, of these two independent sources apply to civil litigadon. 147 Fortunately, the differences in the two sources do not appear
to affect either the content of any right of public access or its articulated rationales. Instead, a court's decision to rely upon the Constitution as opposed to the common law apparently influences only the
strength of any presumption of public access and the showing of con1 48
fidentiality necessary to rebut that presumption.
Moreover, while the more rigorous First Amendment standard
might offer more "substantive protection to . . . the press and public, ' 1 4 9 it is generally regarded as more limited in scope than the com15 0
mon law, applying only to certain judicial proceedings and records.
Accordingly, while some courts base their decisions concerning public
access to litigation-generated documents and information on the First
Amendment, most are rightly reluctant to constitutionalize the issue
and, to the extent that they find any right of public access, rely upon
the more readily rebuttable common law presumption.' 5 '
146 Indeed, in Seattle Times Co. v. Rldnehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984), the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a discovery protective order, ruling that "[a]
litigant has no First Amendment right of access to information made available only
for purposes of trying his suit." See infra Part IV (discussing Seattle Times and stipulated protective orders).
147 See infra note 352 and accompanying text (discussing right of public access to
civil trials).
148 Neither a First Amendment nor a common law right of access is absolute. Instead, if a court finds a constitutional right of public access to judicial proceedings or
records, any denial of access must be necessitated by a compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988). In contrast, it is generally easier to
overcome a common law right of public access with "reasons favoring secrecy."
Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1108 (D.C. 1988); see also Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599.
This ill-defined common law right generally attaches a presumption of public access
to 'judicial records" that can be overcome if "significant countervailing interests heavily outweigh the public interest in access." Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253; see also Brazil,
supra note 27, at 1019 (describing common law right as a "controversial, ill-defined
and unevenly supported doctrine, especially as it applies to civil litigation").
149 Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253.
150 See In re Policy Management Sys. Corp., Nos. 94-2254, 94-2341, 1995 WL
541623, at *3 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1995); Stone v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855
F.2d 178, 180-81 (4th Cir. 1988).
151 In choosing to rest its decision concerning the sealing of filed materials on
common law, rather than First Amendment considerations, the state court in Mokhiber

argued that the "constitutionalization of the right to pretrial records could freeze the
law in this area of only recent first amendment development beyond the reach of
modification by either legislative act or court rule." Mokhiber, 537 A.2d at 1108. But
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It makes little sense to fret over the precise origin of any access
requirement concerning civil litigation. As discussed below, courts appear to utilize the same two-pronged analysis in determining whether
the press or public have any right to access particular litigation materials or judicial proceedings. More importantly, analogous rationales
support access under both the First Amendment and the common
law.
C. When Does a Right of Public Access Exist?
In determining whether there is a presumption of public access
to materials created in connection with civil trial and pretrial proceedings, courts frequently utilize a two-pronged analysis established by
the Supreme Court in evaluating claims of access to criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court has indicated that a right of public access
hinges upon two complementary considerations. The first, involving a
tradition of accessibility, asks whether the place and judicial process at
issue have been historically open to the press and the general public.
The second, assessing functional utility, inquires whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question. If the proceeding passes muster under these
152
two tests, a qualified right of public access attaches.
Although the Supreme Court developed this two-tiered test in
evaluating First Amendment access claims in criminal cases, lower
courts continue to extrapolate from it in determining whether a presumption of access exists in civil litigation as well. 153 Unlike criminal
proceedings that are deeply rooted in constitutional tradition, however, civil process-largely a product of legislative grace-is continually evolving. Given the changing face of civil litigation today,
particularly the move away from trial and adjudication toward pretrial
proceedings and settlement, courts should not place too heavy an emphasis upon the "tradition and history" prong of this test in evaluating
civil access claims. While tradition should play some role in the access
5 4 Asdecision, functional utility remains the primary consideration.
seeWilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570-71 (l1th Cir. 1985) (assuming common law presumption, but applying more stringent First Amendment test).
152 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Supe-

rior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605-06 (1982).
153 See, e.g., Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988) (examining
common law right of public access to civil trial exhibits); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying historical and
functional prongs with respect to the sealing of civil records).
154 But see Eugene Cerruti, "Dancingin the Courthouse": The FirstAmendment Right of

Access Opens a New Round, 29 U. RiCH. L. REv. 237, 295-96 (1995) (proposing transfor-
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sessment of functional utility, in turn, requires examination of the various rationales that arguably support public access to judicial
proceedings and documents.
D.

The Rationalesfor Public Access

Although one could question whether a test devised for assessing
public access to criminal proceedings properly translates to the civil
context, 15 5 most of the rationales supporting public access in criminal
cases apply to private disputes as well.1 5 6 Public access arguably (1)
facilitates public monitoring of the judicial system; (2) enhances public confidence in and respect for the legal process; (3) educates the
public about the justice system; and (4) ensures fair and accurate factfinding and decision-making.
Our democratic government often depends upon public participation in and access to the judicial process. In the criminal context,
public access assures the fairness of the proceedings by serving as a
check upon an overzealous or corrupt prosecutor or a biased or incompetent judge.1 57 While our adversary system of civil litigation
counters the one-sided nature of criminal proceedings, public access
to, at the very least, civil trials, would likewise help to guard against
any judicial incompetence or misconduct.158
mation of two-pronged test from one based on functional utility of access to "an instrument of court-based information").
155 In her concurring opinion in Globe Newspaper, for example, Justice O'Connor
stressed the singularly important public concern with "the manner in which criminal
trials are conducted" and cautioned against extending that decision outside the criminal context. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 611 (1982)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). The court in Mokhiber similarly refused to transfer a First
Amendment right of access to the civil pretrial arena, reasoning:
[C]ivil litigation generally deals not with the coercive power of the state exercised against an individual in satisfaction of a wrong to the public-at-large,
but, rather, concerns disputes between private parties. The parties have selected the civil courts as one of a number of acceptable dispute resolution
mechanisms. The public interest in preliminary sparring between two parties protected by the adversary system is significantly different from the public interest in preliminary criminal proceedings.
Mokhiber, 537 A.2d at 1108.
156 See Mokhiber, 537 A.2d. at 1108; see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710
F.2d at 1179 (finding the rationales supporting public access to criminal trials equally
applicable to civil case involving the sealing of'judicial records).
157 See Press-EnterpriseII, 478 U.S. at 12-13.
158 Monitoring may be particularly important in federal court, where judges are
appointed for life and impeachment is a rare and cumbersome occurrence. As noted
by the Second Circuit in United States v. Amodeo:
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Moreover, observation of fair and open decision-making inspires
public respect for the administration of justice. Indeed, even if the
public does not generally take advantage of its right to observe civil
proceedings, knowledge of its opportunity to do so fosters the appearance of fairness essential to public confidence. 159 The desire to deter
vigilantism and to channel the public concern and outrage often provoked by criminal acts make it particularly important to foster public
confidence in the administration of criminal justice. 160 While similar
communal emotions may not accompany civil misdeeds, our civil justice system likewise depends upon public support and confidence.
Party-borne court costs do not begin to defray the expense of civil
courts, which depend upon public subsidies for their existence. The
voluntary nature of the civil justice system, where parties self-select the
civil courts as one of several dispute resolution alternatives, likewise
requires public confidence if it is to prevent parties from opting out of
the system entirely.
Our system of self-government further depends upon effective
public participation in and free, informed discussion of governmental
affairs.' 61 A public trial offers citizens, often through media representatives, an "opportunity both for understanding the system in general and its workings in a particular case.' 6 2 Public access to at least
some civil proceedings would similarly promote this informed discusFederal courts exercise powers under Article III that impact upon virtually
all citizens, but judges, once nominated and confirmed, serve for life unless
impeached through a process that is politically and practically inconvenient
to invoke. Although courts have a number of internal checks, such as appellate review by multijudge tribunals, professional and public monitoring is an
essential feature of democratic control.
Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion
Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that access to civil cases
"diminishes the possibilities for injustice, incompetence, perjury, and fraud").

159 See Press-EnterpriseII, 478 U.S. at 12-13.
160 The Supreme Court has identified the "community therapeutic value" or
.community catharsis" achieved by public access to certain criminal proceedings:
"When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest
often follows. Thereafter the open processes ofjustice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion."
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980). See also Press-Enterprise 1, 478 U.S. at 12-13 (discussing the "community therapeutic value" of open
criminal proceedings); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984) (asserting that
"public proceedings vindicate the concerns of the victims and the community in
knowing that offenders are being brought to account for their criminal conduct").
161 See Globe Newspaper Co.v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604-06 (1982).
162 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572 (discussing "educative effect" of open
criminal trials). The Supreme Court has held that the press has no greater right of
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sion and educate the public concerning its civil justice system. 163 Finally, public access also arguably enhances the quality and safeguards
the integrity of the fact-finding process by discouraging perjury and
encouraging witnesses to come forward. 64 This rationale might similarly apply with equal force to civil cases. 16 5 Ironically, however, a frequent rationale for sealing civil discovery and judicial documents is
the belief that valuable testimony or information will be withheld ab66
sent a guarantee of confidentiality.
Thus, many of the rationales that support public access to pretrial
criminal proceedings arguably transfer to the civil arena as well. Certainly, those justifications carry significant weight in the decision of
most courts to presumptively open civil trials to the press and public. 167 As previously discussed, however, most civil lawsuits settle

before trial and without any definitive judicial determination of their
merits. The more difficult question then becomes whether any of
these traditional rationales (or any additional nontraditional ones)
trigger access to the larger category of suits that terminate during the
pretrial phase of civil litigation.
IV.

DiscovERY

AND STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDERS

Discovery continues to attract the lion's share of the confidentiality debate, a frequent subject of which concerns protective orders and
public access to confidential discovery materials. 68 Recently, that disaccess to judicial proceedings than the general public. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978).
163 See Leucadia,Inc., 998 F.2d at 161 (suggesting that open civil proceedings provide "public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system").
164 See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606.
165 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir.
1983) ("Openness in the courtroom discourages perjury and may result in witnesses
coming forward with new information regardless of the type of the proceedings.").
166 See, e.g., United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1052 (2d Cir. 1995) (expressing concern that public access to sealed progress reports would deter confidential
informants from cooperating with the monitoring of a consent decree).
167 See Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 22-23 (2d Cir.
1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1178; see also WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 98, § 2042 n.31 ("In general, there should be a constitutional right to
attend civil trials just as there is to attend criminal trials.").
168 The push to enact sunshine legislation in the late 1980s and early 1990s generated a wealth of commentary concerning discovery confidentiality. See, e.g., Diane L.
Bratvold, Note, Protective Orders and the Use of Discovery Materials Following Seattle
Times, 71 MINN. L. REV. 171 (1986); Richard P. Campbell, The ProtectiveOrderin Products LiabilityLitigation: Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REV. 771 (1990); Katie Eccles,
Note, The Agent Orange Case: A Flawed Interpretationof the FederalRules of Civil Procedure
Granting PretrialAccess to Discovery, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1577 (1990); Marcus, Discovery
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cussion has focused upon the extent to which a court should, or indeed, may accede to the parties' mutual desire for confidentiality in
an effort to facilitate the progression of discovery and the ultimate
settlement of the case. Stipulated protective orders that endorse the
litigants' private confidentiality agreements have become a lightning
169
rod for current debate.
This section examines the existing use of and continuing controversy surrounding confidentiality agreements and stipulated protective orders governing discovery materials that have not yet been filed
with the court in support of a request for judicial action.' 7 0 Such discovery includes documents produced in response to requests for production, interrogatory answers, and deposition testimony. As a
prelude, the section first explains the general need for confidentiality
and protective orders under our exceedingly liberal discovery regime.
It then specifically turns to stipulated protective orders and demonstrates how their current operation, characteristics, and rationales fuel
the current discovery debate. Using the functional approach to public access outlined in Part III, this section urges that the preference for
settlement and the essentially private character of discovery both call
for selective judicial endorsement, rather than kneejerk rejection, of
stipulated protective orders. The decision whether to enter or later
Confidentiality, supra note 52; Marcus, Myth and Reality, supra note 52; Miller, supra
note 52; Alan B. Morrison, Protective Orders, Plaintiffs, Defendants and the PublicInterest
in Disclosure: Where Does the Balance Lie?, 24 U. RICH. L. REv. 109 (1989).
169 See, e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 785-86 (3d Cir. 1994)
(criticizing routine signature of confidentiality orders).
170 Although the current version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d) continues the requirement that discovery be filed with the court, it permits individual districts to dispense with this requirement in order to avoid the expense associated with
the filing and storing of often voluminous discovery that is rarely used after filing. See
FED. R. Crw. P. 5(d) (permitting a court, on motion or on its own initiative, to "order
that depositions.., and interrogatories, requests for documents, requests for admission, and answers and responses thereto not be filed unless on order of the court or
for use in the proceeding"); see also FED. R. Cwv. P. 5(d) advisory committee's note to
the 1980 amendments. Accordingly, most federal judicial districts have standing local
rules that prohibit the filing of discovery unless ordered by the court. See, e.g., N.D. &
S.D. Iowa L.R. 15(a) (providing that discovery materials may not be filed); Public
Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 779 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that standing
local rule "actually reverses in part the filing presumption of Rule 5(d)"). But see infta
notes 262-63 (discussing proposed amendment to Rule 5(d) that would invalidate
such local rules and, instead, prohibit the filing of unused discovery unless otherwise
ordered by the trial court). This section of the Article solely concerns such unfiled or
unused discovery. A different analysis arguably applies once discovery materials are
appended to a motion, considered by the court, or made the basis ofjudicial decision.
See infra Part V (discussing confidentiality and judicial records).
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modify such agreed confidentiality orders, however, rests ultimately in
the trial court's extensive discretion. The section thus concludes by
examining some of the private and public considerations that are relevant to the exercise of this discretion, not only with respect to stipulated protective orders, but also with respect to sealing and
confidentiality orders that are subsequently discussed.
A.

The Scope of Discovery and the Need for Protective Orders

The extraordinarily broad scope of discovery necessitates the
availability of confidentiality agreements and discovery protective orders. As currently framed,1 7 1 the discovery regime often requires production of voluminous amounts of arguably private or sensitive
information concerning parties and nonparties alike that would not
otherwise be subject to compelled public disclosure and that might
ultimately prove inadmissible. 17 2 Unless prohibited by court order, a
171 Besides proposing to amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d), the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules has proposed several amendments to the discovery Rules
and the general scope of discovery. See infra note 172. Indeed, it was this possibility
of systemic reform that motivated the Advisory Committee to table the proposed
amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) governing protective orders. See
Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, May 17, 1996 (holding proposed
amendments to Rule 26(c) "for further consideration as part of a new project to study
the general scope of discovery... and the scope of document discovery"). The Advisory Committee's proposed amendments, however, have only recently been published

for public comment and have not been considered or approved by the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Judicial Conference of the United
States, or the Supreme Court. See Request for Comment to Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure and Evidence, (visited Sept. 29, 1998)
<http://www.uscourts.gov/review.html> [hereinafter 1998 PreliminaryDraft].
172 The current standards for discovery under the Federal Rules (and state rules
patterned upon them) are exceedingly liberal:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim
or defense of any other party ....

The information sought need not be

admissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1).

See generally Miller, supra note 52, at 463-77 (advocating
discovery protective orders as antidote to disclosure of trade secrets and confidential
commercial information under broad scope of discovery). The recently proposed
amendment of Rule 26(b) (1) would limit the scope of "lawyer-managed" discovery to
non-privileged material that "is relevant to the claim or defense of any party" asserted
in the pleadings. 1998 Preliminary Draft, supra note 171, at 40-41, 56. Upon good
cause shown, however, the trial court could broaden discovery to "any information
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action"-the presently governing standard. Id. at 40-41. The amendments would additionally clarify that inadmissible evi-
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party may disclose discovered information to whom it wishes or use
the materials for any purpose.173
To counter the potential for abuse of arguably confidential discovery, Rule 26(c) authorizes a district court, upon "good cause
shown," to issue "any order which justice requires to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense."' 74 This provision vests a district court with wide discretion to fashion appropriate protective orders concerning
confidential information obtained through discovery. 175 Courts, for

example, may restrict the disclosure of such discovery to designated
persons or forbid its use for purposes unrelated to the preparation
76
and settlement of the case at hand.
dence, even if "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,"
must be relevant in order to be discoverable. See id.at 42, 46-57. As previously discussed, these proposals to limit the scope of attorney-controlled discovery and more
actively involve the court "in regulating the breadth of discovery," id. at 55, must still
undergo an extensive review and approval process. See supra note 171.
173 SeeJepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1994);
Public Citizen, 858 F.2d at 780; Oklahoma Hosp. Ass'n v. Oklahoma Publ'g Co., 748
F.2d 1421, 1424 (10th Cir. 1984). But see Marcus, Myth and Reality, supra note 52, at
54-55 (questioning assumption that parties can use unprotected discovery for any
purpose).
174 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c). Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) identifies eight kinds of protective orders that a district court might issue, see infta note 176,
this list is non-exclusive and a court may utilize its wide discretion to order other
appropriate discovery restrictions. See WRiGHT ET AL., supra note 98, § 2036, at 489.
175 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (noting that "trial
court is in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and interests of parties affected by discovery"). Of course, a protective order will not prevent a party
from disclosing its own information or documents to others. Florida ex rel Butterworth v.Jones Chem., Inc., 148 F.R.D. 282, 288 (M.D. Fla. 1993). Nor can it constitutionally prohibit the dissemination of information gained from nondiscovery
sources. See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 37; see also infra note 212.
176 Three related pro.visions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) authorize
protective orders that limit the use and dissemination of confidential information
obtained through discovery. Rule 26(c) (5) permits the court to order "that discovery
be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court." Rule
26(c) (6), as construed, allows the sealing of depositions and other discovery responses. Finally, Rule 26(c) (7) authorizes a court to order that "a trade secret or
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a designated way." See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 98, §§ 2041-43. In addition to the powers invested by Rule 26(c), a court also
possesses inherent authority to impose confidentiality over unfiled discovery materials. See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 785 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting
court's "inherent power to grant orders of confidentiality over materials not in the
court file").
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In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,17 7 the United States Supreme
Court upheld just such a protective order against a First Amendment
challenge. In so doing, the Court shed valuable light on the "unique
character of the discovery process"17 8 and the importance of discovery
protective orders in that process. In Seattle Times, a religious group,
the Aquarian Foundation, and its head "median," Rhinehart, sued the
Seattle Times for defamation and invasion of privacy over a series of
exposes the newspaper had published regarding Rhinehart and the
Foundation. The newspaper then sought wide-ranging discovery concerning the Foundation's membership, donors, and financial affairs.' 79 At the Foundation's request, and over the newspaper's
objection, the trial court issued a protective order that confined the
use and dissemination of this information to the defamation lawsuit
and forbade the newspaper from using it in future articles concerning
Rhinehart. The newspaper objected to the protective order, claiming
it was a prior restraint violative of the First Amendment. 8 0
In rejecting that challenge and upholding a trial court's discretion to issue protective orders, the Court noted its concern with the
breadth and intrusiveness of pretrial discovery, the "sole purpose" of
which is to assist "in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of
litigated disputes."' 1 The significant potential for abuse of information gained "only by virtue of the trial court's discovery processes" and
"made available only for purposes of trying [a litigant's] suit,'

8 2

re-

quired that a trial court retain "substantial latitude" to "weigh fairly
the competing needs and interests of parties affected by discovery"
and to fashion appropriate protective orders.'8 3 Moreover, restrictions on "discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of information," given that
discovery is not conducted in public and "pretrial depositions and in177
178

467 U.S. 20 (1984).
Id at 36.

179 Because truth is a defense to a defamation claim and because Rhinehart had
alleged that the defamatory articles had adversely affected Foundation income, membership, and donations, such information satisfied the relevance standard of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) (1). See supra note 172.
180 See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 27-28.
181 Id. at 34. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, noted that the discovery rules
permitted "extensive intrusion" into the affairs of litigants and third parties, id. at 30,
and thus provided litigants an opportunity to "obtain-incidentally or purposefullyinformation that is not only irrelevant but if publicly released could be damaging to

reputation and privacy." Id at 35.
182 Id. at 32.
183 Id. at 36.
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terrogatories are not public components of a civil trial.' u 8 4 The Court

thus held that a protective order will not offend the First Amendment
if it "is entered on a showing of good cause as required by Rule 26(c),
is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if gained from other
185
"....
sources
B.
1.

The Controversy ConcerningStipulated Protective Orders

Contested and Stipulated Protective Orders

The protective order at issue in Seattle Times likely typifies the preponderance of protective orders entered by federal courts. 18 6 The order shielded specific "confidential" materials that implicated the
personal privacy, reputation, and safety of individual members and
donors of the Foundation. 187 The newspaper contested the protective
order, which the district court issued only after weighing the competing interests affected and finding good cause. This arguably contrasts
with stipulated protective orders that are commonly agreed to at the
inception of discovery, generally involve wholesale categories of confidential commercial information, and are frequently issued by courts
with little, if any, particularized review.
a.

Contested Protective Orders

Absent party agreement, discovery confidentiality is generally litigated document-by-document or request-by-request. 18 The party
seeking to limit dissemination of discovery bears the ultimate burden

of making a factually particularized showing of "good cause." 18 9 This
184 Id. at 33.
185 Id. at 37. The Court noted that "[a] litigant has no First Amendment right of
access to information made available only for purposes of trying his suit." Id. at 32.
186 Approximately one-half of all motions for protective orders examined in the
FJC Study were contested. See FJC Study, supra note 79, at 4. Moreover, a significant
percentage of protective orders were issued to protect personal information concerning individual parties and witnesses. Id. at 9.
187 The plaintiffs had argued that unprotected disclosure of the requested discovery would subject Foundation members to harassment and reprisals and would violate
the privacy rights of individual members and donors. See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at
25-27.
188 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 21.432 (describing "document-by-document adjudication" as one of two alternatives for seeking protection of
discovery materials).
189 See WRIumrr ET AL., supra note 98, § 2035, at 483-84 (describing good cause
determination as "factual matter" requiring "particular and specific demonstration of
fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements").
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entails establishing that the information implicates a cognizable property or privacy interest entitled to protection1 90 and that disclosure of
such information would work a clearly defined and serious injury.19 1
A business entity, for example, may have difficulty making this
particularized showing. Although trade secrets and other confidential
commercial information trigger Rule 26(c) protection, 192 much information exchanged in discovery will resist classification under these inherently ambiguous categories. 193 And even if the requested
discovery is sufficiently confidential, the movant for a protective order
must still establish that cognizable harm would result from its disclosure. While embarrassment to an individual mightjustify issuance of a
protective order, courts generally frown upon claims of commercial
embarrassment or damaged corporate reputation.19 4 To successfully
190 In Seattle Times, the Supreme Court recognized that while Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c) "contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule." Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 35 n.21. Commercial parties, who
arguably have no such privacy rights, more commonly seek protection of "trade secret[s] or other confidential research, development, or commercial information"
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) (7). FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c) (7).
191 See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786-77 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that good cause requires that party seeking protection must specifically demonstrate a "clearly defined and serious injury" and ultimately justify confidentiality of
"each and every document"); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529
F. Supp. 866, 889 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (asserting that court must determine whether "disclosure [would] . . . cause a cognizable harm" based on particularized showing).
192 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (7). See generally Giles T. Cohen, Protective Orders, Property Interests and PriorRestraints: Can the Courts Prevent Media Nonpartiesfrom Publishing
Court-ProtectedDiscovery Materials?, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2463, 2478-94 (1996) (discussing
property interests in trade secrets and other commercially valuable information).
193 See Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 488-93 (describing trade
secrets as a nebulous concept governed by inherently ambiguous law that is subject to
elastic definitions). Professor Marcus notes that commercial parties that are unable
to claim trade secret status often "invoke something akin to privacy interests," id. at
492, when they "rely on the more general protection" of Rule 26(c), id. at 491.
194 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986). The
Third Circuit voiced the following rationale for this sentiment:
Rule 26(c) protects parties from embarrassment as well as from disclosure of
trade secrets ....

[B]ecause release of information not intended by the

writer to be for public consumption will almost always have some tendency
to embarrass, an applicant for a protective order whose chief concern is embarrassment must demonstrate that the embarrassment will be particularly
serious. As embarrassment is usually thought of as a nonmonetizable harm
to individuals, it may be especially difficult for a business enterprise, whose
primary measure of well-being is presumably monetizable, to argue for a protective order on this ground.
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support such a claim, a business must specifically demonstrate that
divulgence of embarrassing information would significantly harm the
company's competitive or financial position. 195 A company might
find it difficult to quantify this type of bottom line damage caused by
adverse publicity surrounding the disclosure of unsubstantiated
196
discovery.
Nor will a prima facie showing of good cause, in itself, guarantee
issuance of a protective order. Rather, such a showing simply shifts
the burden to the party seeking discovery and contesting the protective order. That requesting party must establish the relevance of and
need for the requested information. 197 If both parties can satisfy
these initial burdens, the court will balance the competing interests of
persons affected by the discovery to determine if the harm from disclosure outweighs the asserted need. If so, assuming that some discov-

195 See id.; see also Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787 (requiring that embarrassment be "particularly serious" to justify protective order); Allied Corp. v.Jim Walter Corp., Civ. A. Nos.
86-3086, 95-5530, 1996 WL 346980, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 1996) (rejecting claim of
embarrassment that might "cast [a corporation] or its officers in a bad light"). But see
Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 533 n.2 (1st Cir. 1993) (suggesting that
commercial embarrassment might justify protection of discovery so long as opposing
party can obtain and use information if needed at trial).
196 See Allied Corp., 1996 WL 346980, at *6 (holding that corporation's "claimed
injury is a 'difficult to quantify' detriment to its bottom line" that "does not constitute
a precise enough showing of injury"); see also Miller, supra note 52, at 467-74 (warning that unprotected disclosure of unsubstantiated discovery could damage a business' reputation and profitability and harm entire product lines).
197 In some cases, a third party may seek to intervene in the proceedings to contest
issuance of the protective order. See infra note 294 (discussing intervention for limited purpose of contesting protective order). The extent to which a district court
should consider and balance the access interests of nonparties such as other litigants,
the press, public interest groups, or the general public, remains a hotly debated topic,
particularly in the context of stipulated protective orders. See infra Part IV.B (exploring debate concerning stipulated protective orders) and Part IV.D.2 (discussing modification factors). The district court generally possesses case-specific discretion
whether to permit the intervention, to grant the third party a hearing, or to accept or
reject these nonparty interests. See MANuAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 1,
§ 21.43, at 65 (indicating that court should consider "not only rights and needs of the
parties but also ... the existing or potential interests of those not involved in the
litigation"); Miller, supranote 52, at 435-36 (stating that existing law gives courts caseby-case discretion to accept or reject nonparty interests); see also McCarthy v. Barnett
Bank, 876 F.2d 89, 91 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that intervenors have no right to
hearing).
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ery is warranted, 198 the court will craft an appropriate protective order
restricting disclosure. 199
b.

Stipulated Protective Orders
i. Procedure

Litigating confidentiality document-by-document through narrow protective orders covering specific information and documents
can be time-consuming and costly to parties and courts alike, particularly in cases involving large-scale discovery. To expedite discovery
and avoid repeated motions for a protective order regarding every
document believed to be confidential, parties will frequently agree to,
and courts will regularly issue, umbrella protective orders.20 0 Umbrella protective orders are generally entered early in a lawsuit and, to
reap the potential benefits of such an order, are put in place before
discovery even commences.2 0 1 As described by the Manual of Complex
Litigation,umbrella orders "provide that all assertedly confidential material disclosed (and appropriately identified usually by stamp) is presumptively protected unless challenged. The orders are made without
a particularized showing to support the claim for protection, but such
a showing must be made whenever a claim under an order is
20 2
challenged."
198

In rare cases, a court may order "that the disclosure or discovery not be had."
R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
199 For a description of existing practice and procedure governing protective orders, see generally Miller, supra note 52, at 432-36; WmGrr ET AL., supra note 98,

FED.

§§ 2035-44.1.
200 Umbrella orders have become so common in cases involving large volumes of
discovery that the Manualfor Complex Litigation offers two sample confidentiality orders. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 41.36 (offering sample
confidentiality orders and acknowledgment).
201 See id. § 21.43, at 65 (emphasizing need to address protective order issues
early, preferably before discovery); see also infraPart 1V.B.l.b.iii (discussing benefits of
stipulated protective orders).
202 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 21.432, at 67. Some confusion exists regarding the terminology used to designate this type of protective order.
The Manualfor Complex Litigation uses the term "umbrella" order to describe this alternative, usually stipulated, method of protecting discovery materials. Id. § 24.432, at
67. Others refer to such an order as a "blanket" protective order. See Bayer AG &
Miles, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 456, 465-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (blanket orders
permit parties to designate confidential documents, subject to challenge by other
party). True "blanket" orders, however, tentatively protect all discovery materials until otherwise ordered by the court. See Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 532
(1st Cir. 1993) (describing various kinds of protective orders entered in civil cases).
The Manualfor Complex Litigation does not discuss blanket orders, which, to the extent
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Unlike contested protective orders, then, stipulated umbrella orders postpone, perhaps indefinitely, the obligation to make a particularized showing regarding the need for confidentiality. The order will
generally define
categories of materials that presumptively qualify as
"confidential."20 3 The producing party bears responsibility for
designating documents that it, in good faith, believes merit such confidential treatment.2 0 4 Documents and information produced under
this designation will be automatically subject to the order's confidentiality restrictions unless the requesting party contests their confidential
status.2 05 If no one disputes the confidentiality stamp, the conditions
on disclosure and use will apply without any particularized showing of
need or judicial review of the discovery. If the requesting party contests a confidentiality designation, however, the designating party
must demonstrate a specific need for confidential protection. 20 6 Only
used in litigation today, represent the exception, rather than the norm in protective
order practice.
203 The sample orders provided by the Manualfor Complex Litigationsuggest two
possible approaches to defining "confidential" materials. One approach appears to
leave to each designating party the task of determining whether a document "contains
information believed to be subject to protection under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 41.36, at 453 (Form A Confidentiality
Order). The other approach specifically enumerates in advance categories of information entitled to presumptive protection. Such categories, for instance, might include "documents containing trade secrets, special formulas, company security
matters, customer lists, financial data, projected sales data, production data" and similar confidential commercial information. Documents not so described, and for which
confidential status is subsequently sought, require individual application to the court.
See id § 41.36, at 459 (Form B Confidentiality Order). As discussed below, courts
might be less willing to enter, and more willing to modify, the first, less specific type of
umbrella order. See infra notes 282-88 and accompanying text.
204 Stipulated protective orders arguably invite over-designation by ultra-cautious
counsel afraid of producing sensitive business information. The Manualfor Complex
Litigation addresses that criticism by equating a confidential designation with a motion for protective order. Counsel certifies that designated material merits protection
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) and may be sanctioned under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a) (4) for improper designations. See MANuAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 21.432, at 67 n.141; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)
(applying sanctions provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 to the award of
expenses incurred in relation to unsuccessful motions for protective order). The
specter of sanctions thus should deter bad faith or overly broad designation. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 n.17 (3d Cir. 1986).
205 Umbrella orders will typically outline the procedures that the parties must follow in identifying, designating, and logging items subject to the order and in challenging particular confidentiality claims. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra
note 1, § 21.432, at 67-68.
206 The ultimate burden ofjustifying the confidentiality of challenged documents
thus remains on the designating party. The requesting party shoulders only the bur-
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then will the court determine the confidential status of the challenged
materials and balance affected interests.
ii.

Standard Provisions

Trial courts possess extensive latitude in designing stipulated protective orders. 20 7 Because umbrella orders are frequently the product
of the parties' agreement, however, courts will often treat them as they
do any other agreed order and defer to the parties' own resolution of
its terms. 20 8 As such, the particular confidentiality provisions of a stipulated protective order can be as varied as the parties'
20 9
imaginations.
Most stipulated umbrella orders will, at the very least, identify the
persons entitled to access confidential discovery materials and will
prohibit disclosure of such information to any other persons. 210 To
den of raising the confidentiality issue by contesting the designation of particular
documents. See Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1122 (placing "burden of proof... at all times
on the movant" and shifting "only the burden of raising the issue with respect to
certain documents"); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp.
866, 893 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that stipulated protective order "does not shift the
burden of proof, but requires that, upon objection, the party electing to classify information justify its action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"); see also
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 21.432, at 68 n.149 (relieving challenger of need to produce affidavit in order to contest confidentiality designation).
207 See Poliquin, 989 F.2d at 534 (noting that "design of the [protective] order
is ... largely within the trial court's discretion").
208 As noted by Judge Becker in Zenith Radio Corp., a court may well apply "a less
rigorous standard to consent orders" like stipulated protective orders. Zenith Radio
Corp., 529 F. Supp. at 889 n.40. For a discussion of a trial court's ability to enter a
stipulated protective order without any independent determination of good cause,
see infra Part IV.B.2.
209 The enforceability of certain contractual provisions might vary among the
courts. See infra note 405 and accompanying text (discussing freedom to privately
contract for settlement confidentiality). Moreover, as discussed below, some standard
provisions might render the stipulated protective order more vulnerable to later modification. See infra Part IV.D.
210 The parties generally cannot agree to prohibit the disclosure of information
mandated by court order or otherwise required by law. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 21.432, at 69 n.157. For instance, a stipulated protective
order could not validly prohibit the disclosure of information legally required to be
filed with a regulatory agency. To help ensure the enforceability of a stipulated protective order, then, parties should expressly except such legally required disclosures.
See, e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 791 (3d Cir. 1994) (recommending that protective order exclude material subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act); see also infra Parts IV.D.2.d (discussing public interest as a
factor in modification) and Part VI.B.3.d (examining confidential settlements that
suppress relevant evidence).
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the extent that the order authorizes use of confidential discovery by
experts or other witnesses preparing for testimony, it will typically require that the witness review and consent to its confidentiality
2 11
provisions.
The parties might further stipulate to the permissible use and dis2 12
closure of confidential information obtained through discovery.
For example, the parties would not want confidential material to automatically forfeit its protection if filed with the court or introduced
into evidence. Stipulated orders thus typically require that designated
information be filed under seal and often provide for an in camera
procedure by which the designating party can move for continued
postfiling protection. 2 13 Parties to agreed protective orders also frequently anticipate the potential relevance of the discovery to related
211 The Manualfor Complex Litigation reviews the possible universe of permissible
recipients of confidential discovery:
For example, counsel are ordinarily permitted to disclose such information
to assistants in their offices and potential expert witnesses. On the other
hand, disclosure to clients may be prohibited where, for example, the information has commercial value and the parties are competitors; alternatively,
the order may (1) limit disclosure to named individuals not involved in the
relevant corporate activity, (2) create a special class of highly confidential
documents that only attorneys and non client experts may view, (3) require
particularized record keeping of disclosures to client personnel, and (4) require individual undertakings by those receiving such information not to
misuse it.
MANUAL FOR CoMPLEx LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 21.432, at 68 n.146.

212 Any effort to judicially restrict disclosure of confidential materials obtained
outside of the discovery process might violate the First Amendment's prohibition of
prior restraints. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984) (upholding protective order that limits dissemination of information procured through discovery so long as it does not restrict disclosure of identical information "gained
through means independent of the court's processes"); cf. Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc.
v. John Labatt, Ltd., 888 F. Supp. 1427, 1442 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (requiring judicial preclearance before disclosing information that was allegedly "independently available
from a public source").
213 Under the sample confidentiality order in the Manualfor Complex Litigation, if
documents designated as confidential must be filed, "they shall be filed under seal
and shall remain sealed while in the office of the clerk so long as they retain their
status as stamped confidential documents." If such documents are introduced into
evidence at trial or other hearing, advance notice must be given to the designating
party, who may then move "for an order that the evidence be received in camera or
under other conditions to prevent unnecessary disclosure." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LTIGATION, supra note 1, § 41.36, at 455 (Form A, 1 5 & 7 ). For a discussion of how
the filing of discovery might influence access issues and analysis, see infra Part V (assessing the sealing of judicial records).
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litigation involving the producing party and either expressly permit or
21 4
prohibit the sharing of discovery in these collateral lawsuits.
Finally, litigants often desire to ensure that confidential discovery
remains confidential following the termination or settlement of the
lawsuit.2 1 5 To some extent, litigants are unable to completely accomplish such an objective, as stipulated protective orders, like other injunctions, remain subject to modification or termination by the court
at any time during or after a lawsuit.2 1 6 Subject to that caveat, however, the parties can stipulate to the order's continued validity after
resolution of their dispute,2 17 provide for liquidated damages upon
breach of the confidentiality provisions,2 18 and expressly recognize
214

The Manualfor Complex Litigation offers both options in a sample order:
Use. Persons obtaining access to stamped confidential documents under
this order shall use the information only for preparation and trial of this
litigation (including appeals and retrials), and shall not use such information for any other purpose, including business, governmental, commercial,
administrative, or judicial proceedings. [For purposes of this paragraph, the
term 'this litigation' includes other related litigation in which the producing
person or company is a party.]
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supranote 1, § 42.36, at 456 (Form A, 10). For a
discussion of discovery sharing as a factor in the decision whether to issue or modify a
confidentiality order, see infra Part IV.D.2.c.
215 As recognized by the First Circuit, "the lubricating effects of the protective
order on pre-trial discovery would be lost if the order expired at the end of the case or
were subject to ready alteration." Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 535 (1st
Cir. 1993).
216 Party intent notwithstanding, a court retains jurisdiction to modify its protective orders, even after termination of the litigation in which they are entered. Poliquin, 989 F.2d at 535 (recognizing "inherent power of the district court to relax or
terminate" its protective orders, "even afterjudgment"); see also infra Part IV.D.2 (discussing court's power to modify protective orders). A stipulated order should explicitly recognize the court's ongoing modification authority in order to avoid undue
reliance upon its current provisions. See infra Part IV.D.2.b (discussing party reliance
as factor in modification decision).
217 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrrIGATION, supra note 1, § 41.36, at 456 (Form
A,
11) ("provisions of this order shall not terminate at the conclusion of these
actions").
218 See, e.g., Culinary Foods, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 151 F.R.D. 297, 307 (N.D. Ill.
1993). Such a damages provision aims to avoid subsequent litigation concerning the
harm caused by the unauthorized disclosure. SeeJoseph A. Golden, Secrecy Clauses: A
Negotiated Restrainton FreeSpeech, 73 MICH. B.J. 550 (1994) (recommending payment of
settlement over time to monitor adherence to confidentiality restrictions). But see
Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: ContractLaw and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 261, 292 (1998) (contending that such liquidated damages clauses are unenforceable because they "would not be a reasonable estimate of the plaintiffs potential
liability").
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the trial court's ongoing enforcement jurisdiction. 2 19 An order will
further typically mandate that once a dispute is over, the requesting
party will timely return all confidential materials to the producing
220
party or destroy the materials.
iii. Benefits of Stipulated Protective Orders
Stipulated protective orders undoubtedly enhance the efficiency
of discovery in individual cases, to the benefit of both the court and
the litigants. 22 1 Protracted litigation over confidentiality delays the ultimate resolution of the lawsuit by diverting the attention of the courts
and the litigants away from issues that, unlike confidentiality, are central to the merits of the case. 222 Absent a stipulated umbrella order,

confidentiality would be litigated on a time-consuming and costly document-by-document basis and courts would be forced to resolve discovery objections that would not otherwise be made. 223 The self219 A court that lacks an independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction
may lose enforcementjurisdiction after settlement of the lawsuit unless the stipulated
protective order survives dismissal, is embodied in an order of dismissal, or the court
expressly retains enforcement jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994); see also infra Part VIA (discussing con.undrum faced by
litigants who desire to enhance enforceability of confidential settlements).
220 Poliquin, 989 F.2d at 535 ("[I] t is common to provide... for post-trial protection including the return or destruction of protected material"). For a discussion of
public access to confidential discovery after the settlement and dismissal of a lawsuit,
including criticisms frequently leveled against such "return or destroy" provisions, see
infra Part VI.B.1 and note 398.
221 See Poliquin, 989 F.2d at 535 (noting that umbrella protective orders foster "effective discovery with a minimum of disputes"); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins.
Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that stipulated protective order
.makes the discovery process in a particular case operate more efficiently"); In reAlexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 356 (11th Cir. 1987) (commenting upon the
'tremendous saving of time effected" by stipulated protective orders); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 n.18 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that umbrella
orders "encourage efficiency and allow litigation to proceed more quickly"); Standard
Chlorine of Del., Inc. v. Sinibaldi, 821 F. Supp. 232, 256 (D. Del. 1992) (requiring
parties to contest confidentiality on document-by-document basis is "extremely inefficient and burdensome to the [c]ourt').
222 See Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1122 n.18 (suggesting that umbrella protective orders
prevent the parties and the courts from "los~ing] the forest for the trees"); see also
Marcus, Myth and Reality, supranote 52, at 15 (contending that confidentiality issues
are not material to the merits of a case).
223 See In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d at 356 (acknowledging that in
complex cases "[b] usy courts are simply unable to hold hearings every time someone
wants to obtain judicial review concerning the nature of a particular document").
Any restriction on the availability of stipulated protective orders thus arguably
jeopardizes these benefits. See Higginbotham Testimony, supra note 113, at 3 (restricting
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regulating nature of agreed protective orders, in contrast, encourages
parties to work out confidentiality issues among and between themselves and to conduct discovery with a minimum of judicial
224
involvement.
Moreover, stipulated protective orders minimize discovery disputes altogether by encouraging disclosure of sensitive information
that might otherwise be protected by the court or withheld by a
party.22 5 Persons with arguable grounds for resisting discovery are
more likely to produce such information to a litigation or business
adversary if the confidentiality of sensitive materials is assured and its
disclosure is restricted. 226 Indeed, a stipulated protective order might
encourage voluntary production of a broader range of even tangentially relevant information in response to expansive discovery requests. 2 27 In addition to receiving information that might otherwise
be withheld as nonresponsive, then, the requesting party avoids any
risk that a district court might deny discovery of certain confidential
or irrelevant information altogether. 2 28 Further, as long as the requesting party can use the confidential materials in the preparation,
protective orders would increase the burden and expense of discovery and impose
significant burdens on court system); Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52,
at 484-85 (contending that increased public access would "foment... opposition to
broad discovery" and "disrupt cooperative exchange of information between the parties"); Miller, supra note 52, at 467, 483-84 (restricting protective orders or facilitating their modification or vacatur would "impose a superfluous and inordinate work
burden on courts" and jeopardize cooperative discovery); Vangelisti, supranote 77, at
177-78 (restricting protective orders would tax judicial resources and halt discovery).
224 See Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1122 n.18 (noting that extensive judicial involvement
would deter "parties from themselves conducting discovery to a significant extent");
Videon Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., No. Civ. A. 91-4202, 1995 WL
395925, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 1995) (enforcing stipulated protective order "reinforces each party's ability to freely enter and control the content of such protective
agreements"). For a discussion of the self-regulatory nature of the discovery process,
see infra Part IV.C.2.
225 See Poliquin,989 F.2d at 535 (describing the "lubricating effects" that stipulated
protective orders have on pretrial discovery).
226 See United Nuclear Corp., 905 F.2d at 1427 (asserting that umbrella orders "may
encourage disclosures that otherwise would be resisted").
227 See In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d at 357 (noting that stipulated
protective orders "encourage maximum participation in the discovery process"); Martindell v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 295 (2d Cir. 1978) (describing
protective order as encouraging "full disclosure of all evidence that might conceivably
be relevant").
228 See Marcus, Myth andReality, supranote 52, at 21-23 (attributing risk of nondisclosure as one danger flowing from presumptive public access to discovery); Miller,
supranote 52, at 467, 483-84 (predicting that sunshine reforms could potentially lead
to denial of discovery altogether).
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settlement, or trial of his case, he need not undertake the burden of
229
challenging their confidential status.
Stipulated protective orders thus extricate both the court and the
litigants from the need to litigate confidentiality when neither party
desires to do so. In so doing, such orders expedite discovery, conserve
judicial and litigant resources, and encourage fuller participation in
discovery. Further, by facilitating the cooperative exchange of information (information that might not otherwise be produced), stipulated protective orders pave the way toward the ultimate settlement or
resolution of the lawsuit. In short, stipulated umbrella protective orders assist in fulfilling the 'Just, speedy, and inexpensive detennination of every action"-the mantra of our civil justice system.
2.

The Continuing Controversy: Stipulated Protective Orders and
"Good Cause Shown"

Until fairly recently, this interest in facilitating settlement or expediting discovery was thought to provide "good cause" sufficient to
justify issuance of a stipulated protective order.23 0 A number of courts
and commentators, however, have begun to challenge this assumption
and, in the process, question the propriety of such orders.23 l
The current controversy over agreed protective orders recently
came to a head over the ill-fated effort to amend Rule 26(c) to authorize issuance of protective orders either "for good cause shown or on
229

See Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 501 (contending that

plaintiff's ability to prepare a case "makes burdensome inquiry into confidentiality"
unwarranted and unnecessary).
230 In In reAlexanderGrant & Co. Litigation,for example, the Eleventh Circuit cited
the efficiency benefits that result from and that justify issuance of stipulated umbrella
orders in complex cases:
We conclude that in complex litigation where document-by-document review of discovery materials would be unpracticable, and when the parties
consent to an umbrella order restricting access to sensitive information in

order to encourage maximum participation in the discovery process, conserve judicial resources and prevent the abuses of annoyance, oppression

and embarrassment, a district court may find good cause and issue a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c).
In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d at 357.
231 See, e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 788 (3d Cir. 1994)
(holding that general interest in encouraging settlement will not constitute good
cause); see also Marcus, Myth and Reality, supra note 52, at 18-21 (contending that
presumptive access to discovery would threaten to eliminate stipulated protective
orders).
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stipulation of the parties.' 232 Proponents of that amendment, including
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, argued that it simply mirrored
existing practice, under which courts routinely issue agreed protective
orders without any independent or rigorous determination of "good
cause. '233 Stipulated protective orders arguably exist in order to avoid
the particularized scrutiny and complex interest balancing associated
with contested orders. 23 4 Moreover, if stipulated protective orders are
to achieve their maximum potential, they should be entered at the
inception of the discovery process, a point at which it is very difficult
to make any more than a threshold showing of good cause concerning
23 5
general categories of as-yet-to-be requested or produced materials.
Under this view, then, party consent to the terms of a protective order
232 See supra note 117 (discussing proposed amendment as part of failed federal
sunshine reform).
233 See Apr. 20, 1995 Advisory Comm. Minutes, supra note 82, at 9-10 (stating that
proposed rule "recognizes well-established current practice"); Higginbotham Letter,
supra note 82, at 96 ("In the advisory committee's view, it is not the case that the
language would change present practice."). In refusing to delete the "on stipulation"
language after its rejection by the Judicial Conference, the Advisory Committee emphasized that a judge need not enter an agreed protective order and could "insist
upon a showing of good cause beyond the stipulation." Higginbotham Letter, supra
note 82, at 96.
Some commentators argue that party agreement eliminates the need to show
good cause, which standard thus applies only to contested protective orders. See
Vangelisti, supranote 77, at 182 (arguing that good cause standard "does not impose
an independent obligation . . . in the absence of a contest"). Others contend that
while party agreement does not obviate the good cause standard, the parties can stipulate that good cause exists or that no countervailing third party or public interests
apply to their discovery. See Videon Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., No. Civ.
A. 91-4202, 1995 WL 395925, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 1995) (stating that by freely
consenting to the protective order, "each party agreed that there was good cause present for the entry of the order"); see also Patrick S. Kim, Note, Third-PartyModification of
Protective Orders UnderRule 26(c), 94 MICH. L. Rv. 854, 854 n.4, 859 n.27 (1995) (arguing that parties' stipulation that "their privacy and property interests are strong
enough to warrant [stipulated protective] order" is "functionally equivalent" to formal
showing of good cause).
234 The advisory committee feared that any mandatory good cause requirement
would necessitate "extensive satellite litigation" involving the balancing of public and
private interests. Oct. 20, 1994Jud. Conf Minutes, supra note 117, at 7; see also Higginbotham Letter, supra note 82, at 96 (citing danger that court would need to convene
public interest hearing before entering stipulated protective order); Marcus, Discovery
Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 500-02 (advocating umbrella protective order that
makes detailed judicial scrutiny unnecessary and unwarranted); Rosen & Kennedy,
supra note 109, at 328 (predicting that distrust of stipulated protective orders may
necessitate "mini-trials" at case threshold).
235 Marcus, Myth andReality, supranote 52, at 20 (contending that strict scrutiny of
access issues at stipulation stage would be "time-consuming" and "unworkable").
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should suspend, at least temporarily, the litigant's obligation to make
a particularized showing regarding the propriety of or need for confidentiality, as well as the court's need to convene a full-blown good
cause hearing.23 6 That showing and judicial determination can be
more accurately and efficiently made later when either the requesting
party challenges the confidential designation of particular materials
or an intervening third party seeks to modify the confidentiality
23 7
order.
It is unrealistic, however, to regard stipulated protective orders as
merely a temporary dispensation of good cause. As long as the party
seeking disclosure can freely use the protected discovery in the trial or
settlement of his case, he has little incentive to contest a confidentiality designation. 23 8 Unless a third party moves to intervene in order to
contest issuance or modification of the agreed order, a large amount
of discovery designated by the parties as confidential will indefinitely
remain subject to the order's restrictions on dissemination and use
without any judicial review whatsoever. In most cases, then, a court
will never make a good cause determination concerning the discovery
materials subject to stipulated protective orders.
Many regard any such dispensation or even suspension of the
good cause requirement as a departure from existing practice and a
236 The district court in Westchester Radiological Ass'n v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
GreaterNew York, Inc., enunciated this view of stipulated protective orders as temporary
or interim dispensations of good cause:
[T]he [pirotective [o]rder can be viewed as providently granted, if it is interpreted as an order designed as a temporary measure, to facilitate discovery
by protecting documents from immediate disclosure, without requiring a
showing of good cause, but contemplating a subsequent lifting of the order
in appropriate circumstances if the proponents of confidentiality fail to continue to show good cause for protection.
Westchester Radiological Ass'n v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., Inc., 138
F.R.D. 33, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Rosen & Kennedy, supra note 109, at 328 (suggesting interim protective order that would defer question of permanent protective
order until trial on the merits).
237 The advisory committee considered the stipulation option an essential counterweight to the proposed expansion of the right to intervene and modify stipulated
protective orders because of a "public interest" in the discovery. See Higginbotham
Letter, supra note 82, at 96.
238 See supra note 229 and accompanying text. Moreover, even if a good cause
determination is later required upon challenge, the requesting party bears the burden of contesting particular documents subject to the designation. See Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 893-94 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (shifting burden to party seeking "wholesale declassification" of documents subject to umbrella order).
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blatant violation of the express terms of Rule 26(c).239 Under this
literal stance, Rule 26(c) authorizes a district court to issue a protective order only for "good cause shown." It does not carve out any
exception, temporary or otherwise, for stipulated orders. Even if the
parties agree to the terms of a protective order, then, they must still
demonstrate good cause to justify its issuance. 240 Nor should the litigants be permitted to stipulate to the existence of good cause, given
that they may not, indeed probably will not, consider or protect nonparty interests in their discovery, the public interest in information
relevant to public health or safety, or the increased costs of litigating
related lawsuits. Instead, under this view, the court retains a duty
to conduct an independent inquiry into the existence of good
cause, 24 1 an inquiry which entails evaluation and balancing of both
private and public, party and nonparty interests. 242 If good cause is

239 Judge Gilbert S. Merritt, ChiefJudge of the Sixth Circuit and Chairman of the
Chief Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference that rejected the "on stipulation" language, criticized that proposal as "depart[ing] from the long-established
practice of judges issuing protective orders only for 'good cause.'" Richard B.
Schmitt, Judicial Conference Kills ProposalTo Broaden Protective Order Use, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 15, 1995, at B4.
240 SeeJepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1994).
241 See id.This duty is arguably analogous to that involved in a court's decision to
enter a consent decree or approve a class action settlement. Professor Miller, for
example, has characterized stipulated protective orders as presenting an "essentially
non-adversarial situation" in which the court "must assume the duty of making an
independent inquiry" akin to that made with respect to class action settlements.
Miller, supra note 52, at 492 n.322. According to Miller, the issuance of protective
orders must never be "routine, let alone automatic, even when ... supported by all
the parties." Instead, the judge, as "neutral arbitrator," rather than the parties, must
determine what, whether, and to whom discovery must be disclosed in the interest of
public health and safety. Id. at 491-93. But see Arthur R. Miller, Effective Rulemaking
Damaged by Politics,N.L.J., May 1, 1995, at A21 (arguing that proposed amendment to
Rule 26(c) "made no changes to the 'good cause' showing that must be made for
issuing a protective order absent a stipulation").
242 See, e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 785-86 (3d Cir. 1994)
(lamenting courts' routine entry of stipulated protective orders "without considering
the propriety of such orders, or the countervailing public interests"); Leucadia, Inc. v.
Applied Extrusion Tech., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 1993) (relying "in first instance on the district courts to protect the legitimate public interest ...from overly
broad and unjustifiable protective orders agreed to by the parties for their self-interests"); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gould Elec. Inc., Nos. Civ. A. 95-5203, 962890, 1996 WL 383307, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 1996) (rejecting stipulated protective
order absent briefing on public and private balancing factors); Musicom Int'l, Inc. v.
Serubo, 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2507 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (refusing to issue stipulated
protective order without considering Pansy factors).

1999]

SECRECY BY CONSENT

not so established, the discovery should not merit judicial protection.243

Thus, to the extent that they dispense with or dilute the "good
cause" standard, stipulated protective orders arguably abdicate judicial responsibility for supervising discovery and improperly permit the
litigants themselves to control public access to discovery based upon
self-, not public, interest. 244 Accordingly, a growing number of courts

regard stipulated protective orders with increasing suspicion and almost kneejerk rejection. To these courts, a generalized interest in
encouraging settlement will not, in itself, constitute good cause. 245
Nor will broad, unsubstantiated stipulations regarding the existence
of good cause or the need for protection suffice.2 46 Instead, these
courts require a particularized showing that specific documents or, at
the very least, categories of documents, 24 7 constitute trade secrets or
other confidential information entitled to protection and that the un243 SeeJepson, Inc., 30 F.3d at 858-59 (criticizing trial court's failure to independently determine if discovery contained confidential information or if good cause
existed for its protection); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139,
147-48 (2d Cir. 1987) (suggesting that umbrella protective order would be improvidently granted if entered without a judicial determination of good cause).
244 See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir.
1996) (criticizing stipulated protective orders that authorize the filing of documents
under seal as judicial abdication of authority over discovery); Glenmede Trust Co. v.
Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 485 (3d Cir. 1995) (refusing to permit parties to control
issuance of protective order); Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co. v. George Hyman Constr. Co.,
155 F.R.D. 113, 116 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (seeking to avoid "judicial discretion yielding to
private judgment" by refusing to enter stipulated protective order in dispute between
private commercial parties); Musicom Int'l, Inc., 22 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 2501
(characterizing entry of stipulated protective order without necessary balancing as
"broad abdication ofjudicial authority" whereby "exercise of private judgment would
be given force by the public sanction of contempt").
245 See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 755; Rosen v. Fidelity Fixed Income Trust, No. Giv. A. 952365, 1995 WL 684864, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 1995) (both finding general interest
of encouraging settlements insufficient to justify entry of agreed umbrella order).
246 See Rosen, 1995 WL 684864, at *2 (declining to enter stipulated umbrella order
based upon "unsubstantiated allegation" that "discovery ... is likely to involve the
disclosure of confidential information, and that there is good cause for preserving the
confidentiality of such information"); Frupac Int'l Corp. v. M/V "Ghucabuco," No.
Civ. A. 92-2617, 1994 WL 269271, at *1-*3 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1994) (refusing to enter
stipulated protective order based upon "generally worded, non-case specific agreement" with "virtually limitless standards").
247 In FrupacInternational for example, the court required the parties to address
specific information, rather than general categories of documents, in their stipulated
protective order. See FrupacInt'l Corp., 1994 WL 269271, at *2; cf Lepage's, Inc. v. 3M,
No. Civ. A. 97-3983, 1997 WL 736866, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1997) (approving stipulated protective order containing specific and scheduled categories of protected information with supporting party declarations).
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restricted disclosure of those materials would cause specific cognizable harm.2 48 Thus, while the parties remain free to negotiate
confidentiality restrictions, 249 many judges, out of fear of having their
hands tied by the litigants' wishes, refuse to convert the parties' private agreement into a court order subject to enforcement by judicial
250
contempt.
C. Functional Utility and Public Access to Discovery
The changing face of civil litigation impacts the above-described
controversy concerning stipulated protective orders. The central importance of discovery in our civil justice system and the increasing judicial involvement in that process arguably call for presumptive public
access to and expanded public scrutiny of even unfiled discovery.
Before examining the considerations that can guide a court in deciding whether to enter or modify a stipulated protective order, then,
one must determine whether party autonomy and the importance of
settlement-values that underlie agreed confidentiality ordersshould contend with any presumption of public access to discovery.
248 See Glenmede Trust Co., 56 F.3d at 484 (holding that general allegations of embarrassment or injury to reputation and client relationships are "insufficient to justify
judicial endorsement of an umbrella confidentiality agreement"); Jepson, Inc., 30 F.3d
at 859-60 (holding that proponent of protective order never made showing that information in deposition constituted a trade secret or confidential information); Beckman Indus., Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting
that proponent of "overinclusive" blanket order never established, through "specific
examples or articulated reasoning," any need to protect depositions); Rosen, 1995 WL
684864, at *1 (requiring that parties demonstrate "particularized showing of the need
for confidentiality"); FrupacInt'l Corp., 1994 WL 269271, at *2 (requiring parties to
establish the relevance of the materials, the need for their protection, and what general/specific interests in disclosure will be sacrificed by the order); Horgan v. Independence Blue Cross, No. Civ. A. 93-CV-2528, 1994 WL 24662, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24,
1994) (refusing to sign stipulated protective order concerning information that was
not "confidential" within the "narrow circumstances" authorized by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(c)(7)).
249 See FrupacInt'l Corp., 1994 WL 269271, at *1-*2 (encouraging parties to enter
confidentiality agreement, but refusing to endorse a stipulated protective order).
This freedom of contract assumes, of course, that secrecy agreements are not illegal,
violative of public policy, or otherwise unenforceable. See infra note 405 and accompanying text (discussing litigants' freedom to contract for confidentiality).
250 See City of Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d at 130, 138 (2d Cir. 1991) (Pratt, J.,
concurring) (arguing that courts should "carefully and skeptically" review stipulated
protective orders in order to avoid converting private agreement into court order
subject to enforcement by contempt); see also No Secrets, N.LJ., Mar. 27, 1995, at A20
(allowing parties to stipulate to protective order would curtail judge's discretion and
prevent court from defending public health and safety "in contradiction to the wishes
of the parties").
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Under the Supreme Court's two-pronged test for public access, the
existence of any such presumption hinges upon whether a tradition of
privacy still surrounds the discovery process and, more importantly,
whether a presumption of openness would further any of the ratio251
nales that support a right of access.
1. Tradition of Accessibility: Private Versus Public Nature
Tradition views discovery as a private affair between the litigants
that takes place outside of public view. 252 Under this conception, dis-

covery is not intended to function as a source or clearinghouse of public information. 253 Instead, the "sole function" of discovery is to "assist
' 25 4
in the preparation and trial, or the settlement of litigated disputes.
Accordingly, a court can restrict the dissemination of discovered information in an effort to eliminate or reduce any nonlitigation consequences, such as invasions of privacy, competitive injury, or damaged
reputation, that would not otherwise exist but for the compelled disclosure. 25 5 Under this litigation-oriented, dispute resolution model,
discovery is a traditionally private activity to which the public has no
2 56
presumptive right of access.
251 See supra Parts III.C-D (discussing Supreme Court's two-pronged test and the
rationales supporting public access).
252 In Seattle Times, the Supreme Court reviewed both historical and modem practice to conclude that discovery does not occur in public and therefore does not constitute a "public component of a civil trial." Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33
(1984).
253 See Wyeth Lab. v. United States District Court of Kansas, 851 F.3d 321, 324
(10th Cir. 1988) (holding that court lacked authority to compel private parties to file
discovery to create DTP public library); see also Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra
note 52, at 469, 478-84 (contending that discovery should not serve as source of information for general public or government agencies); Marcus, Myth and Reality, supra
note 52, at 53 (rejecting information-gathering as legitimate purpose of discovery);
Miller, supra note 52, at 487-89 (arguing that courts are inappropriate and underfunded institutions to function as "information clearinghouse [s]").
254 Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 34-35; see also Marcus, Myth and Reality, supranote 52,
at 15, 54-55 (asserting that discovery rules compel disclosure of information for use
only in connection with the litigation and to assist in trial preparation).
255 In Seattle Times, Justice Powell noted that the newspaper gained the information it sought to publish "only by virtue of the trial court's discovery processes," and
only for the purpose of trying its lawsuit. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32. The government thus had "a substantial interest" in preventing the various abuses "that can attend the coerced production of information" under its legislatively prescribed
discovery rules. Id. at 35-36.
256 See Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 533 (1st Cir. 1993) (describing
discovery as "presumptively private phase of litigation"); United States v. Kentucky
Utils. Co., 927 F.2d 252, 254 (6th Cir. 1991) (asserting that discovery documents "are
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Juxtaposed against this view are the growing number of courts
and commentators that regard discovery as a public, presumptively
open activity that is imbued with a public interest and that generates
public goods. 25 7 Although most acknowledge the absence of any First
Amendment or common law right of access, 258 these authorities find a

statutory presumption of public access to discovery created by Federal
Rules 5 (d) or 26(c).259 Moreover, while the litigants admittedly drive
not a part of the public court records and, absent discovery, would have remained
private"); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988)
(contrasting summary judgment proceedings with privately conducted discovery); see
also Higginbotham Testimony, supra note 113, at 3 (stressing importance of maintaining
"essential litigation oriented and private role of discovery"); Kim, supra note 233, at
864-65 (asserting that "litigants have strong privacy interests in pretrial discovered
materials" and "have right to expect that discovered information will not be disseminated"); Vangelisti, supranote 77, at 176-77 (distinguishing between private discovery
and public records).
257 Professor Luban, for example, embraces this public conception, arguing that
"[d] iscovery material is a public good which is 'purchased' by one litigant and should
be made available for other litigants to avoid unnecessary multiplication of expense."
Luban, supra note 3, at 2653. Luban similarly contends that discovery can achieve
public goods by serving as a "public warning" and informing "public debate." Id.See
also supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing public goods created by
adjudication).
258 In Seattle Times, the Supreme Court found no First Amendment right of access
to pretrial civil discovery subject to a protective order entered upon a showing of
good cause. See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 37. While stipulated protective orders arguably obviate the good cause showing, the consensual restrictions on dissemination
should waive any First Amendment concerns. But see Garfield, supra note 218, at
347-62 (exploring the possibility that some "contracts of silence" might violate the
First Amendment). In addition, unfiled discovery is not a judicial record subject to
any common law right of access. See McCarthy v. Barnett Bank, 876 F.2d 89, 91 (11th
Cir. 1989). Thus, neither the First Amendment nor the common law grants any right
of access to unfiled discovery materials. See Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858
F.2d 775, 788 (1st Cir. 1988); In reAlexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 353-54
(l1th Cir. 1987).
259 In holding discovery presumptively open to public scrutiny absent a protective
order, the Second Circuit, in In re "Agent Orange"Product Liability Litigation,found that
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(c) and 5(d) created a statutory access right. See
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 1987). The court
there reasoned that unless a presumptive right of access existed, there would be no
need for a movant under Rule 26(c) to demonstrate good cause. See id. at 145-46.
Moreover, the court read Rule 5(d) to manifest a substantive policy decision to grant
public access to discovery materials. See id, at 146-47. See supranote 170; infra notes
262-63 (discussing Rule 5(d)'s filing requirement); see also Public Citizen, 858 F.2d at
780-81, 789-90 (stating that while Rule 5(d) did not create any right of access, Rule
26(c) suggests that "pretrial discovery must take place in the public unless compelling
reasons exist for denying the public access"); Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 111
F.R.D. 653, 660 (D.D.C. 1986) (acknowledging that "Federal Rules create a statutory

1999]

SECRECY BY CONSENT

discovery, it is the governmental authority that backs the publicly
funded process that actually compels the production of information
that would not otherwise be revealed. 2 60 Under this increasingly popular view, discovery should take place in and be available to the public, except insofar as limited by a protective order. Accordingly, any
restriction on public access can only be justified for "good cause
shown," a determination that encompasses interests beyond those of
2 61
the immediate litigants.

While this contemporary public conception of discovery may presage a crack in our traditional view of the process as private, discovery
remains a largely cloistered activity that should not be considered subject to any statutory presumption of access. Federal Rule 5(d) expressly excuses the filing of discovery with the court and most judicial
districts in this country prohibit such filing by local rule.2 62 Discovery

requests, responses, and depositions thus generally are not publicly
available and, for the most part, are never considered or utilized by
the court. Although the filing of discovery might be appropriate in
some cases of public interest,2 63 Rule 5 (d) merely gives the trial court
presumption in favor of open discovery"); Resnik, supra note 4, at 1494 n.85 ("As
interpreted, both FRCP 26(c) and 5(d) make discovery available to third parties absent court orders, which should only preclude access upon a showing of 'good

cause.'").
260 Indeed, it is this specter of public sanction that arguably motivates litigants to
utilize formal discovery, rather than exchanging information outside of the system.
See Luban, supra note 3, at 2654 n.140 (arguing that public ownership of even unfiled
discovery materials "result[s] from invocation of public authority by litigants"). But
see Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 470-73 (rejecting argument that
use of public resources makes discovery public).
261 See Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980) (presuming that pretrial discovery must take place in the public unless compelling reasons to
deny public access exist); Westchester Radiological Ass'n v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of
Greater N.Y., Inc., 138 F.R.D. 33, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that absent showing of
good cause, discovery "should be publicly available whenever possible"); Omega
Homes, Inc. v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 656 F. Supp. 393, 403 (W.D. Va. 1987) (indicating that raw fruits of discovery "should be available to the public" except to the
extent limited by Rule 26(c)).
262 See supra note 170. The "collective wisdom reflected in so many local rules"
prompted the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to propose amending Federal Rule
5(d) so that it too would forbid, rather than merely excuse, the filing of discovery. If
eventually approved, that amendment would obviate this source of public access and
further buttress the traditionally private nature of discovery. See 1998 Preliminay

Draft, supra note 171, at 15-16, 25-26.
263 See FED. R. Cr. P. 5(d) Advisory Committee's notes to 1980 amendment (recognizing that discovery "materials are sometimes of interest to those who may have no
access to them except by a requirement of filing, such as members of a class, litigants
similarly situated, or the public generally"). Even the proposed amendment of Fed-
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discretion to control this potential source of public information; it
2 64
does not create any statutory right of access.
Nor does Rule 26(c), authorizing protective orders for "good
cause shown," create any such presumption. Denying a protective order will not guarantee public access to discovery materials. Although
the parties may freely disseminate the information that they obtain
through discovery and that is not subject to any protective order, they
certainly are not required to do so. As courts have recognized, the public has no right of access to discovery in the hands of private litigants,
and a court cannot compel parties to a confidentiality agreement to
disseminate unfiled discovery.2 65 By stipulating to a protective order,
then, litigants simply choose to exercise their right not to publicly distribute their discovery. Thus, neither current practice nor the discovery Rules themselves establish any presumption of access to unfiled
discovery or alter the traditionally private nature of those materials.
2.

Functional Utility: Party Autonomy Versus Judicial Involvement

The tradition of accessibility forms only one part of the access
inquiry, however. The more pertinent and difficult question concerns
whether increased public disclosure of pretrial discovery would significandy advance any of the fundamental values served by the right of
public access. The inherent tension between our commitment to
party autonomy, on one hand, and the increased judicial involvement
in discovery, on the other, complicates this inquiry.
Discovery is a self-executing process that takes place outside of
the public view with a minimum of judicial involvement and oversight. 26 6 Its self-regulating nature affords litigants significant flexibileral Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d) would permit the trial court to order the filing of
discovery "to ensure public access to information of interest to the public." 1998
PreliminaryDraft, supra note 171, at 161.
264 See Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 n.19 (1984) (holding that,
notwithstanding Rule 5(d), discovery is not a traditional source of public information); see also Kim, supra note 233, at 863 (contending that "Rule 5 'seeks to insure a
full exchange of the written communications among the litigants,' not to create a
public access file for the general public").
265 See Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v. Greenblatt, 964 F.2d 1227, 1232-33 (1st
Cir. 1992) (holding that nonparty cannot access discovery when none of the parties
wish to share it); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 780 (1st Cir.
1988) (recognizing that public has no right to access discovery held by private party
litigants, who are free, but not required, to publicly release it); Oklahoma Hosp. Ass'n
v. Oklahoma Publ'g Co., 748 F.2d 1421, 1425 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that court
cannot compel parties to stipulated protective order to publicly distribute unfiled
discovery).
266 Professor Yeazell notes the self-regulating nature of discovery today:

1.999]

SECRECY BY CONSENT

ity to modify discovery procedures and to stipulate to less expensive
and time-consuming methods of acquiring information and documents. 267 Indeed, the most recent amendments to the discovery Rules
encourage such self-regulation by mandating that the parties formulate discovery plans 268 and attempt to privately resolve discovery disputes before seeking court intervention. 2 69 In short, our discovery
system continues to emphasize and highly value party autonomy.
At the same time, however, the trial court shoulders the ultimate
duty and discretion to oversee the discovery process. 2 70 To the extent
that party control can actually impede or delay discovery, the Rules
expressly charge the court with streamlining and, when necessary,
propelling the process. 27 ' The liberal scope of discovery and the po[L] awyers skirmish without immediate judicial supervision .... [Discovery is
a] cooperative venture among the adversaries, who, guided by the Rules,
explore the facts. Lawyers conduct discovery without any but the slightest
judicial supervision unless something goes wrong. So long as things remain
in this state, discovery has virtually disappeared from the judicial arena.
Yeazell, supra note 6, at 651 (citation omitted); see also Luban, supra note 3, at
2647-48 (describing discovery as "a contact sport with an absentee umpire"); Marcus,
Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 468 ("In the great majority of civil
cases ....
information exchange ... takes place out of the public eye and without
involvement by the judge, who learns about the material disclosed only when it is
presented to the court at trial or in a motion.").
267 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 29, which permits modification of discovery
procedures and limitations by written stipulation, was amended in 1993 to afford litigants greater opportunity "to agree on less expensive and time-consuming methods to
obtain information" without prior court approval. FED. R. Crv. P. 29 Advisory Committee's note to 1993 amendments.
268 See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(f) (requiring early meeting of counsel in order to, among
other things, "develop a proposed discovery plan").
269 The 1993 amendments to the discovery rules added a certificate of conference
as a prerequisite to a motion for a protective order, see FED. R_ Civ. P. 26(c), a motion
to compel, see FED. R. Crv. P. 37(a) (2), and a motion for sanctions for failure to
answer interrogatories or respond to requests for production, see FED. R. Civ. P.
37(d). See also Frupac Int'l Corp. v. M/V "Chucabuco," No. Civ. A. 92-2617, 1994 WL
269271, at *1 (E.D. Pa.June 15, 1994) (linking this amendment to "recent legal trend
toward conserving judicial resources by allowing parties to resolve many discovery issues privately").
270 See Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31 (1984) (rejecting constitutional
right to disseminate discovery as "unwarranted restriction on the duty and discretion
of a trial court to oversee the discovery process"); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers
Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing district court's "responsibility
to oversee the discovery process").
271 The Federal Rules vest broad discretion in the district court to control the
methods, frequency, extent, and timing of discovery. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P.
16(b) (3)-(4), 16(c) (6), 26(b) (2), 26(c); see also Miller, supra note 52, at 447-50 (stating that discovery amendments recognize that "discovery regime cannot operate on a
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tential for its abuse further intensify the need for early and vigorous
judicial involvement in discovery, including tighter supervision to
curb, and more stringent sanctions to deter, such abuse.2 72 Although
discovery remains an essentially party-driven activity, then, it operates
against a background of earlier, intensified and ongoing judicial oversight, management, and control.
Because the courts today play an increasingly active role in the
management and supervision of discovery, expanded access to the discovery process would arguably aid the public in monitoring and understanding this judicial function. Such enhanced public
understanding, however, would come, if at all, from access to the
court's discovery decisions and the materials on which they are based.
Unfiled discovery that is never presented to or utilized by the court
would not advance even this purpose. That is, while access to the raw
fruits of discovery might educate the public about the litigants themselves or the subject matter of their dispute,2 73 it sheds little light on
the court's determination of the parties' substantive rights for the simple reason that there has been no such determination. Nor does such
access facilitate the fairness or accuracy ofjudicial fact-finding or decision-making, again because no such fact-finding or decision-making
has occurred.
Moreover, when a court schedules a discovery deadline or imposes discovery sanctions, or limits the number or length of interrogatories or depositions, it acts in the capacity of a referee, oftentimes an
absentee referee, who gets involved on an as-needed and when-requested basis. The litigants are the players who continue to self-exeself-executing basis" and therefore call for "increased judicial management and
streamlining of discovery").
272 The Federal Rules authorize an extensive panoply of sanctions to combat discovery abuse. See, e.g., FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(g) (unjustifiable certification of discovery
responses and disclosures); FED. R. Crv. P. 30(d) (improper deposition conduct); FED.
R. Crv. P. 37 (discovery sanctions generally); see also Miller, supra note 52, at 447-50
(describing evolution of discovery rules as "designed to impose stricter control over
discovery and provide judicially applied remedies to curb abuse"). Indeed, the "almost universal" belief "that the cost of discovery disputes could be reduced by greater
judicial involvement and that the earlier in the process that judges became involved,
the better," underlies the recently proposed amendments to the discovery rules. 1998
PreliminaryDraft, supra note 171, at 3. The Advisory Committee thus proposes to distinguish the scope of attorney-managed discovery from that of court-controlled discovery in order "to involve the court more actively in regulating the breadth of
discovery in cases involving sweeping or contentious discovery." Id. at 55 (Proposed
Committee Notes to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1)).
273 One can question how well increased access to discovery would perform even
this function, given that neither the parties nor the court ever tests the reliability of
the vast amount of information obtained in discovery.
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cute and self-police the process. Although public access might inspire
confidence in the court's managerial competence or impartial umpiring, the primary purpose of an access presumption-to ensure fair,
2 74
accurate, and unbiased decision-making-would not be served.
Finally, functional utility gauges whether public access confers a
significant positive benefit on the particular process at issue. Discovery primarily facilitates the trial or settlement of litigated disputes.
Presumptive public access to unfiled discovery would arguably impede
this objective.
The discovery Rules compel litigants to produce information and
documents not otherwise available or subject to disclosure in order to
ensure fair and accurate decision-making if the case is to be resolved
on its merits or, as more typically happens, to afford the parties a realistic appraisal of their case from which they can assess settlement. 275
Altering these prime objectives to include public warning or debate
ignores the exceedingly liberal scope of discovery that can require disclosure of a vast amount of private, irrelevant, and potentially unreliable information. 276 To the extent that discovery forms the basis of
judicial decision-making, it will be filtered through relevance and admissibility standards and be subject to the common law presumption
of access to judicial records.2 77 To the extent that unfiled discovery
facilitates the litigants' decision to settle their dispute, however, it con-

274 See United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that
documents that pass between the parties in discovery "play no role in the performance of Article HI functions" and thus lie beyond presumption of public access); West

Virginia v. Moore, 902 F. Supp. 715, 717-18 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (refusing to classify as
judicial records unfiled depositions that were never used to determine litigants' substantive rights); Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 111 F.R.D. 653, 660 (D.D.C.
1986) (finding that disclosure of pretrial discovery would not serve purpose of pre-

sumption); see also Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 458, 473-77,
478-84 (contending that neither the insights that access "might afford the public
about the operation of the civil justice system" nor the public's interest in the subject
matter of discovery justifies a shift from traditionally private view of discovery).
275 See April 28, 1994 Advisory Comm. Minutes, supra note 86, at 4 (suggesting that
discovery aims to facilitate accurate decisions and resolve disputes).
276 As noted by the Second Circuit in Amodeo, "[T]he temptation to leave no stone
unturned in the search for evidence material to ajudicial proceeding turns up a vast
amount of not only irrelevant but also unreliable material." Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1048.
277 In Seattle Times, the Supreme Court partially based its "private" view of discovery on the broad relevance standard and the assumption that discovered information
will be screened for admissibility at trial. Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33
(1984); see also infra Part V (discussing public access to filed discovery).
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tributes to an equally private process-settlement-to which the pub2 78
lic has no similar right of access.
In sum, no tradition of accessibility surrounds the discovery process. More importantly, access to discovery that is never filed with or
considered by the court does not materially advance the purposes of
public access. Because no presumption of access should attach to
such discovery, litigant autonomy and the efficient resolution of the
particular dispute should continue to guide a court in considering
279
whether to enter a stipulated protective order.
D.

Considerationsin Issuing or Modifying Stipulated Protective Orders

Because the court retains responsibility for monitoring the discovery process, 28 0 and has the discretion, under Rule 5 (d), to order
that discovery be filed, the court should not feel hamstrung by party
stipulations concerning confidentiality. In order to safeguard the integrity of the discovery process, a court can and should exert some
preliminary control over the terms of the agreed order. Such control
would balance the desire to expedite discovery and respect litigant
autonomy against the recognition that there are some instances in
which other litigants or the public in general might have a need to
access some, if not all, of the discovery. Moreover, even if the stipulated protective order is granted, the court retains the authority to
later vacate or modify its terms in light of numerous case-specific
factors.
1.

"Good Cause"

Rule 26(c) expressly requires that "good cause" support a court's
issuance of a protective order. Existing practice notwithstanding, the
Rule does not distinguish between contested and stipulated orders
and thus does not except agreed protective orders from this prerequisite. The parties' stipulation accordingly cannot dispense with or substitute for the court's independent determination of good cause.
At the same time, however, a court issuing a stipulated protective
order should not be required to engage in the kind of particularized
278 Parties settle cases for any number of reasons, many of which are unrelated or
only peripherally related to their merits. For a discussion of public access to the litigants' settlement negotiations and agreements, see infra Part VI.

279 See infra Part IV.D.1 for a discussion of the extent to which a court can consider these values in assessing whether "good cause" supports issuance of a stipulated
protective order.
280 See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 35 n.20 (noting substantial governmental interest
in "protecting the integrity of the discovery process").
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review or complex interest balancing associated with contested protective orders. Such an approach would negate the many benefits
gleaned by early entry of agreed umbrella orders, particularly in the
increasingly typical case that involves a significant amount of discovery. Indeed, at the advent of the process when most stipulated protective orders are entered, parties may find it virtually impossible to make
a factually particularized showing concerning anticipated, but as yet
unrequested, discovery. A court may likewise find it infeasible to balance hypothetical, potentially applicable interests yet to be identified
through adversarial development.
Further, a court should not refuse to enter an agreed order simply because the litigants remain free to negotiate privately a confidentiality agreement concerning their discovery. Aside from the difficulty
of computing damages attributable to breach of such an agreement,
contractual penalties will not likely deter such breach as effectively as
court-ordered restrictions that are subject to judicial sanction or the
pain of contempt. 28 ' Moreover, litigants may hesitate to produce sensitive personal or commercial information to an adversary without an
advance, albeit preliminary, indication as to whether the court will
protect that material if the agreement is breached. In other words, a
private confidentiality agreement will not expedite the free-flow of discovery to the same extent as a confidentiality order.
The court can accommodate these competing concerns by insisting on a threshold showing of good cause prior to entering a stipu-.
lated protective order. 2s2 Although a particularized document-bydocument showing cannot be made, unsubstantiated, abstract claims
281 Courts possess wide discretion to punish litigants who violate the confidentiality restrictions of a stipulated protective order. They can hold the violating party in
civil contempt and assess attorneys' fees and court costs. See, e.g., Grove Fresh Distrib., Inc., v.John Labatt, Ltd., 888 F. Supp. 1427, 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Poliquin v.

Garden Way, Inc., 154 F.R.D. 29, 30-32 (D. Me. 1994); Colaprico v. Sun Microsystems,
Inc., Civ. No. 90-20610 SW, 1994 WL 514029, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 1994); Kramer
v. Boeing Co., 134 F.R.D. 256 (D. Minn. 1991). In some circumstances, the court may
find the violator to be in criminal contempt and assess a fine payable to the govern-

ment. See GroveFresh,888 F. Supp. at 1452; see also Cordray, supra note 5, at 62 (distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt). A court unwilling to hold a litigant in
contempt of court may nevertheless censure a party for disclosing confidential information in breach of an umbrella order and without leave of court. See Chemical Bank
v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 154 F.R1D. 91, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Finally, particularly egregious violations may even result in the dismissal of a claim. See Hi-Tek Bags, Ltd. v.
Bobtron Int'l., Inc., 144 F.R.D. 379, 383 (C.D. Cal. 1992), rev'd on stip., 887 F. Supp.
230 (C.D. Cal. 1993); see also Garfield, supranote 218, at 289 (noting "that contractual
remedies are somewhat ill-suited to remedy breaches of contracts of silence").
282 See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 n.17 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(suggesting threshold showing to support entry of umbrella protective order).
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about a general need for confidentiality concerning unspecified discovery should not suffice. For example, a stipulation that baldly asserts that "discovery will likely involve the disclosure of confidential
information, whose confidentiality there is good cause to preserve,"
should probably fail to establish good cause even for the entry of a
stipulated protective order.283 At the very least, parties should define
"confidential information" with a reasonable degree of specificity 284

and then identify specific categories or types of materials that discov285
ery will likely generate and that arguably satisfy that definition.
Given the heightened emphasis upon party autonomy in discovery,
the fact that Rule 26 (c) implicitly protects a wide spectrum of unspecified privacy interests, 28 6 and the inherently private nature of the discovery process, a court should afford the litigants significant latitude
28 7
in devising these confidential categories.
Additionally, our current procedural system places a significant
premium on the expeditious resolution of disputes and the efficient
administration ofjustice. That interest, which motivates so many currentjudicial reform efforts, cannot be lightly dismissed or entirely dis283 Rosen v. Fidelity Fixed Income Trust, No. Civ. A. 95-2365, 1995 WL 684864, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 1995). See also supra note 246 and accompanying text.
284 Many courts will require a specific violation of the clear terms of a stipulated
protective order before they will hold a litigant in contempt. See, e.g., Grace v. Center
for Auto. Safety, 72 F.3d 1236, 1241 (6th Cir. 1996) (reversing civil contempt for violation of ambiguous stipulated protective order); Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Jeffries &
Co., Inc., No. 89 C 2216, 1992 WL 186057 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 1992) (refusing to hold
attorney in contempt for violating ambiguous protective order that did not clearly
define the term "confidential information").
285 See, e.g., Lepage's, Inc. v. 3M, No. Civ. A. 97-3983, 1997 WL 736866, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 19, 1997) (entering stipulated protective order based upon parties' declarations concerning specific and scheduled categories of protected information).
286 See Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 n.21 (1984) (finding "privacy"
and "other rights or interests" "implicit in the broad purpose and language" of Rule
26(c)); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c) (setting forth non-exhaustive list of potential
protective orders).
287 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) merely provides a nonexhaustive list of
the potential protective orders that a court may issue "to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." Thus, a
court need not restrict corporate litigants to the unnecessarily narrow categories of
"trade secret[s] or other confidential research, development, or commercial information" itemized in Rule 26(c) (7). Compare Marcus, Myth and Reality, supra note 52, at
10 n.45 (arguing that "parties may devise their own version of confidentiality" to govern materials that might not otherwise qualify for protection under Rule 26(c)) with
Horgan v. Independence Blue Cross, Civ. A. No. 93-CV-2528, 1994 WL 24662, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 1994) (contending that "narrow circumstances" authorized by Rule
26(c) (7) furnish "predictable guideposts" for courts).
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counted in assessing good cause. 288 The lubricating effect of a
stipulated protective order in a given case, in other words, should
rightly factor into a trial court's independent determination of good
cause.
As part of its duty to safeguard the integrity of the discovery process, however, the trial court retains broad discretion concerning even
stipulated protective orders and thus need not feel irrevocably bound
by the parties' agreed terms. For instance, although the parties can
rightly insist that confidential discovery be filed under seal to retain its
confidential status, they should not be permitted to use such a provision to circumvent the stricter standards that govern the sealing of
judicial records.2 8 9 Moreover, if the court can anticipate the possible
need for or relevance of the protected discovery in pending or future
related litigation, the court can veto any provision that prohibits outright the sharing of the materials in collateral litigation. 290 Finally,
and as discussed below, a court always retains the inherent power to
modify or dissolve its protective orders, either sua sponte or on motion of a party or interested nonparty. This power extends to stipulated orders, which, to prevent undue and unwarranted reliance on
the permanence of the confidentiality restrictions, should explicitly
recognize both the power and possibility of such modification. 29 1
288 Some would argue that a concern with the efficient administration ofjustice is
not cognizable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). See Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 822 F.2d 335, 342-43 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that Rule 26(c) focuses on
individual harm rather than efficient case management). Rule 26(c), however, expressly permits a court to protect a party or person from undue burden and expense.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Moreover, courts must construe all of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, including Rule 26(c), "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. CIV. P. 1. See also United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford
Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990) (asserting that Rule 26(c) promotes the
'overriding goal" of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1).
289 The order, for example, can temporally limit such a seal unless the party seeking continued protection can rebut the common law presumption of public access to
judicial records. See infra Part V.
290 The Manualfor Complex Litigation, for example, offers the court the option of
defining "this litigation" to include "other related litigation in which the producing
person or company is a party." MANUAL FOR CoMiPLEX LrIGATION, supra note 1,
§ 41.36, at 456 ( 10). See also supranote 214. A court might wish to explicitly include
such a provision in the stipulated order to expressly put the parties on notice of the
possibility that a court might order the sharing of their confidential discovery in related cases. See infra Part IV.D.2.c (discussing discovery sharing as a factor in the
modification of stipulated protective orders).
291 See infra Part IV.D.2.b (discussing party reliance (or lack thereof) as a factor in
a court's modification decision).
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Modification of Stipulated Protective Orders

A court retains the inherent authority to modify or terminate its
protective orders at any time, even after judgment on the merits or
settlement. 292 Such modification can occur sua sponte or via motion
by a party to the protective order, a person bound by its terms,

293

or a

intervenor. 294

nonparty
The power to modify acts as a safety valve that
permits a court to tighten, relax, or terminate confidentiality restrictions in light of changed circumstances, public interest concerns, or
nonparty interests. 295 This safety valve assumes particular importance
in the context of stipulated umbrella orders, which, by definition, are
generally entered without extensive, if any, balancing of affected interests. Indeed, the uncontested nature of stipulated protective orders
and the absence of any judicial determination of good cause with respect to specific documents arguably make such confidentiality orders
296
particularly vulnerable to subsequent modification.
292 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 21.432, at 69, 72
(describing stipulated protective order as always subject to modification or termination even after judgment or settlement); see also Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989
F.2d 527, 535 (1st Cir. 1993) (recognizing court's inherent power "to relax or terminate the order, even afterjudgment"); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905
F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting court's power to modify even after dismissal
of underlying suit). Although a court retains authority to modify its protective orders,
it cannot expand them after dismissal to impose new, affirmative discovery obligations. See Poliquin, 989 F.2d at 532 n.1; United Nuclear Corp., 905 F.2d at 1428; Public
Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 781 (1st Cir. 1988).
293 See generally Cohen, supra note 192 (discussing circumstances under which a
protective order can bind nonparties).
294 Federal courts have reached a growing consensus that permissive intervention
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) is the appropriate vehicle by which nonparties can move to modify or dissolve a protective order. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 98, § 2044.1 (indicating that a "considerable body of law" supports intervention
for limited purpose of modifying protective order). Because intervention in such
cases only aims to modify or dissolve a protective order and does not purport to adjudicate or re-litigate the underlying merits, many courts have relaxed the standing,
timeliness, and commonality requirements otherwise applicable to permissive intervention. See, e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 778 (3d Cir. 1994);
Beckman Indus., Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1992);
Public Citizen, 858 F.2d at 783-84.
295 In Poliquin, the First Circuit recognized the importance of this inherent authority, stating: "This retained power in the court to alter its own ongoing directives
provides a safety valve for public interest concerns, changed circumstances or any
other basis that may reasonably be offered for later adjustment." Poliquin,989 F.2d at
535.
296 SeeJepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 859 (7th Cir. 1994)
(cautioning that stipulated protective orders should not be given binding effect and
requiring court to balance affected interests at time motion to modify is made); Beck-
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Courts divide over who bears what burden concerning a motion
to modify or dissolve a protective order. 29 7 Some, relying upon the
presumptive correctness of trial court action or the court's and parties' reliance upon agreed restrictions, require that the party seeking
modification demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances" or "compelling need" to justify access to protected discovery. 298 Such a standard
effectively insulates the protective order from subsequent alteration.
In contrast, a greater and growing number of authorities place the
burden of demonstrating "good cause" for continued confidentiality
upon the party or parties opposing modification. 299 According to
man Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at 476 (holding that reliance upon stipulated blanket order
could not, in itself,justify refusal to modify upon reasonable request for disclosure);
Public Citizen, 858 F.2d at 790 (finding blanket protective order "peculiarly subject to
later modification").
297 See generally Omega Homes, Inc., v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 656 F. Supp. 393,
403 (W.D. Va. 1987) (noting split in circuits regarding who bears burden of showing
good cause for continued protection); Toran, supranote 138, at 153-54 & nn.167-75
(discussing inconsistency and confusion surrounding standards for modifying secrecy
orders).
298 See, e.g., United States v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 927 F.2d 252, 255 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that "outsider" reporter must demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances"
and "compelling need" to justify vacatur of a stipulated dismissal order that required
destruction of discovery documents); Martindell v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,
594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that parties can rely upon protective order
absent a showing of improvident issuance, extraordinary circumstances, or compelling need by third-party intervenor); Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 151 F.R.D. 338,
342-43 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (placing burden on party seeking to modify protective order
to show intervening circumstances that had eliminated any prejudice or potential
prejudice to original parties); Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp. v. Dory, 130
F.R.D. 389, 392 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (finding that parties seeking modification of stipulated protective order failed to make sufficient "extraordinary showing").
Even in these circuits, however, confusion exists concerning whether the "extraordinary circumstances" test applies in all cases of modification or is limited to
cases where the government, with extensive investigative powers, intervenes. In Bayer
AG & Miles, Ina, for example, a New York district court attempted to reconcile the
diverging standards for modification within its own Second Circuit. Bayer AG &
Miles, Inc., v. Barr Labs., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 456, 460-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The court
found that the standard for modification of a stipulated protective order varies depending on who is seeking to modify and for what reason. For instance, a nonparty
governmental intervenor with substantial investigatory powers must demonstrate extraordinary circumstances and compelling need to warrant modification. See id. at
460-61. In contrast, when a nonparty seeks to modify a protective order and gain
access to information in the public interest, the burden remains on the party seeking
continued confidentiality. See id. at 460, 462. Finally, the court held that a party to a
stipulated protective order cannot later renege on its agreement unless it can show
good cause for modification. See id. at 466-67 n.16.
299 See Beckman Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at 475 (rejecting extraordinary circumstances
test when disclosure is necessary to meet the needs of other parties in pending litiga-
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many of these courts, because the parties never made any showing of

"good cause" to support issuance of a stipulated protective order, continued maintenance of confidentiality depends upon a particularized
and present demonstration that cognizable harm will result from
300
modification.
Ultimately, the appropriate standard for modification of a stipulated protective order lies between these two extremes. Because discovery protective orders derive from Rule 26(c), the "good cause"
touchstone should continue to guide trial courts in their determination of whether to continue, modify, or terminate their confidentiality
provisions. That is, in determining whether to modify a stipulated
protective order, a trial court must make a present determination of
good cause, and the burden should remain on the party seeking continued protection under that order. That burden, however, should be
tempered by the essentially private nature of the discovery process and
the absence of any presumption of public access thereto. 30 1 Moreover, stipulated protective orders should rest upon at least a threshold
showing of good cause and thus should not perfunctorily be lifted
upon any "reasonable request" or "minimal" showing of need. 30 2 Instead, whether good cause continues to support confidentiality requires the court to balance the original parties' reliance upon the
protective order and their need for continued secrecy against the movant's need for disclosure of the protected discovery and any broader
public interests favoring or disfavoring modification.3 03 A discussion
of some of the factors potentially involved in such a balancing follows.
don); Public Citizen, 858 F.2d at 790 (rejecting extraordinary circumstances test (at

least for non-governmental intervenors) and applying instead the good cause standard of Rule 26(c)); Wilkv. American Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980)

(requiring person who seeks continued protection to show tangible prejudice to substantive rights).
300 See cases cited supra note 296.
301 Indeed, a good deal of the confusion surrounding the appropriate modification burden can be attributed to the fact that most courts, in choosing a standard, fail
to differentiate between discovery protective orders, sealing orders, and secrecy orders concerning settlements. See Toran, supra note 138, at 153 (noting that courts'
choice of standard does not depend upon the type of secrecy order being modified).
302 See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 790 (3d Cir. 1994) (concluding that even minimal need for protected materials justifies access absent significant
harm to legitimate secrecy interest); Beckman Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at 476 (holding
that "reliance on a [stipulated] protective order... could not, without more, justify
refusal to modify when there is a reasonable request for disclosure").
303 In Pansy, for example, the Third Circuit required that the party seeking modification articulate both a reason to modify the secrecy order and a need for the protected materials and that the party seeking continued closure demonstrate some
harm to a secrecy interest. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 790. The trial court must balance
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a.

- 359

Modification by Party to Stipulated Order

While the placement of the burden of proof on modification
should not vary with the identity of the person seeking modification,3 0 4 that factor should weigh in the court's determination of good
cause. For example, because of the injunctive nature of a stipulated
protective order, even a party to such an order can subsequently move
to modify it in light of changed circumstances. That party may not
appreciate the public interest or safety implications of confidential
discovery until after it has been produced and viewed in context with
other discovered information.3 0 5 By the same token, however, a party
who agrees to confidentiality restrictions, and thereby induces broad
discovery thereunder, should not lightly be permitted to subsequently
avoid those limitations and disseminate that discovery, particularly
when that party could have foreseen the need to modify at the time it
negotiated the stipulation. 30 6 A party's previous consent to a stipulated protective order tacitly acknowledges the existence of good
cause and the assumption that discovery was for use in that case
alone.30 7 That initial consent, together with the party's failure to exerthese competing interests to determine whether good cause continues to support a

secrecy order. I& See also MANUAL

FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION,

supra note 1, § 21.432,

at 70 (suggesting that court consider "requesting party's need for the information" in
the modification decision).
304 But see supranote 298 (discussing one court's decision to vary standards based
upon who seeks modification).
305 See Apr. 28, 1994 Advisory Comm. Minutes, supra note 86, at 4 (noting that party
may not recognize the public interest impact until the "fruits of discovery have been
uncovered").
306 See Elm Energy & Recycling (U.K.) Ltd. v. Basic, No. 96 C 1220, 1996 WL
596456, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 1996) (stating that nonparty may show good cause for
modification easier than party); Bayer AG & Miles, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 162 F.R.D.
456, 464-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that party's prior consent to stipulated protective
order weighs against modification, especially if need to modify was foreseeable); Davis
v. Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp., No. 93 C 5177, 1995 WL 534294, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 5, 1995) (noting that stipulated protective order should be "accorded great
weight" and should not be retroactively modified by plaintiff "absent exceptional circumstances"); Viskase Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 90 C 7515, 1992 WL 13679, at
*3-*4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 1992) (requiring that "plaintiff... make a substantial showing of good cause to relieve it of the burden of the agreed [p]rotective [o]rder, particularly when the proposed modification relates to a matter within the parameters of
reasonable foresight at the time of the parties' agreement"); Omega Homes, Inc. v.
Citicorp Acceptance Co., 656 F. Supp. 393, 404 (W.D. Va. 1987) (refusing to endorse
tactic of inducing broad discovery and then attempting to avoid agreed restrictions).
307 See BayerAG &Miles, Inc., 162 F.R.D. at 464 (viewing stipulation as demonstrating parties' implicit acknowledgment of good cause); Omega Homes, Inc., 656 F. Supp.
at 403-04 (denying plaintiff's request to modify stipulated protective order that mani-
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cise its contractual right to challenge its opponent's specific designa08
tions, should weigh against modification.
b.

Party Reliance

Courts differ regarding the importance of party reliance as a factor in modification of stipulated protective orders.3 0 9 Obviously, parties would be unwarranted in regarding such an order as an absolute
shield against further disclosure of their discovery. A confidentiality
designation does not bind the court and is subject to challenge by the
opposing party. Materials produced pursuant to such a designation
have not received particularized judicial (or likely even party) scrutiny
and one can never know how a court would rule if a designation were
put to the test. Moreover, confidential discovery may be needed for,
or made the basis of, judicial decisions-thereby subjecting that discovery to the more stringent standards applicable to the sealing of
judicial records. Finally, and as previously stated, courts always retain
the inherent, often explicit, authority to modify or terminate their
protective orders. For these reasons, a growing number of courts discount party reliance significantly, if not completely, in deciding
whether to modify a stipulated protective order.3 1 0
Party reliance, however, should remain a central concern of
courts in the modification decision. Aside from the resulting unfairness to the litigants, failure to accord reliance at least some weight in
the modification decision would, in the long run, undercut the sysfested a "shared and explicit assumption that discovery was for the purpose of one
case alone").
308 Judge Becker aptly voiced this sentiment in Zenith Radio Corp.: "plaintiffs cannot now attempt to undo what they have willingly wrought; having made their bed,
they must sleep in it." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp.
866, 894 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see also Videon Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,
1995 WL 395925, No. Civ. A. 914202, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 1995) (placing a
"higher burden" upon party to stipulated protective order to justify modification);
BayerAG &Miles, Inc., 162 F.R.D. at 466, 466 n.16 (denying modification because of
party's failure to challenge specific designations); Viskase Corp., 1992 WL 13679, at *3
(refusing to consider "whether material [was] properly designated" because plaintiff
never challenged its confidential designation).
309 See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 789-90 (3d Cir. 1994)
(describing split of authority concerning the weight to be accorded party reliance).
310 See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 790 n.26 (finding less party reliance with umbrella orders); Beckman Indus., Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir.
1992) (discounting party reliance on "overinclusive" blanket protective order); Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 154 F.R.D. 91, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (doubting party
reliance upon blanket stipulated protective order); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
98, § 2044.1 (acknowledging that stipulated protective order constitutes a "less forceful basis for reliance").
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temic benefits of stipulated protective orders by reducing future litigants' confidence in them. 31 ' To guard against routine,
unsubstantiated claims of reliance, courts can insist upon a showing of
actual and reasonable reliance, 3 12 both at the time of entering the
stipulation and at the time of disclosure.3 13 The mere production of
discovery pursuant to the protective order, then, is not, in itself, dispositive. 314 Instead, the court must determine whether the stipulation
reasonably induced such production. In making this determination,
the foreseeability of modification at the time of discovery, rather than
20/20 hindsight, should guide the court.
A number of factors can inform this assessment of reasonable reliance. A primary consideration negating reasonableness, for example, is the prospect or pendency of related litigation involving one or
more of the parties at the time they negotiate and enter a confidentiality stipulation. Thus, repeat players, like products liability defend311 In suggesting that a court consider party reliance, the Manualfor Complex Litigation notes:
If a party freely disclosed information without contest based on the premise
that it would remain confidential, subsequent dissemination may be unfair
and may, in the long run, reduce other litigants' confidence in protective
orders, rendering them less useful as a tool for preventing discovery abuse
and encouraging strenuous objections to discovery requests.
supranote 1, § 21.432, at 70 n.159; see also BayerAG
& Miles, Inc., 162 F.R.D. at 467 (emphasizing need to send message that litigants can
rely upon blanket stipulated protective orders); Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co.,
111 F.R.D. 653, 660 (D.D.C. 1986) (finding public interest in disclosure outweighed
by "judicial system's and the public's interest in encouraging reliance on protective
orders to speed the resolution and reduce the expense of litigation"). But see Frupac
Int'l Corp. v. M/V "Chucabuco," No. Civ. A. 96-2617, 1994 WL 269271, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
June 15, 1994) (characterizing stipulated protective orders as "actually illusory as a
presumed worthwhile tool upon which either party can rely regarding their genuine
concern about confidentiality and anticipated Court protection").
312 See WRiCHT ET AL., supranote 98, § 2044.1 (suggesting that courts focus on the
reasonableness of reliance given that "litigants may lard the record with routine
claims of reliance").
313 For instance, no reliance should attach to materials produced prior to entry of
the stipulated protective order. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 822 F.2d 335,
345 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding no justifiable reliance concerning documents produced
before entry of blanket protective order); Westchester Radiological Ass'n v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., Inc., 138 F.R.D. 33, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding no
party expectations concerning testimony or documents produced prior to confidentiality order).
314 See Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 497-98 (proposing that
party resisting modification demonstrate "actual reliance," rather than mere fact that
material was produced).
MLANUAL FOR CoMP=EX LITIGATION,
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ants or governmental agencies, arguably cannot reasonably expect
3 15
their discovery to be exclusively contained in one lawsuit.

Disclosure of the discovered information to governmental agencies, who may well be subject to freedom of information requirements, also undercuts a party's reliance. 31 6 Likewise, and as discussed
below, the presence of the government as a party to the litigation
might, in itself, imbue the case with a "public interest" that belies reli31 7
ance on continued confidentiality.
Another consideration is whether the parties' behavior during
discovery was consistent with reliance on the stipulated order. For example, did the protective order, in fact, expedite the free flow of information that might not otherwise have been voluntarily producedone of the principal benefits of stipulated orders? Or, did the parties,
in spite of the umbrella order, continue to object to the production of
318
information in response to legitimate discovery requests?
A parallel consideration concerns the nature of the discovery produced pursuant to the confidential designation. Although the parties
should be afforded significant latitude in devising the categories of
materials subject to designation, they cannot legitimately expect that a
court will, when asked to modify that order, preserve the confidentiality of discovery that would not likely merit the protection of a contested protective order. On the other hand, a party that produces,
without objection, privileged or irrelevant materials that fall outside
the scope of discovery or information that would likely be deemed
315 See id. at 498 (indicating that court's willingness to allow discovery sharing in
collateral litigation defeats reasonable reliance); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 98,
§ 2044.1, at n.33 (asserting that reliance is less reasonable if collateral litigation is
pending or threatened); see also supra note 290 and accompanying text (discussing
court's ability to craft protective order in anticipation of discovery sharing).
316 See Miller, supranote 52, at 500 (noting that disclosure of information to public entity may negate reliance).
317 See infra Part IV.D.2.d (examining public interest as a factor in modification
decision).
318 See Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supranote 52, at 497-98 (advocating a pre-

sumption of reliance raised by "cooperative and open-handed behavior in discovery"
that can be rebutted by the "showing of obstructive behavior"); WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 98, § 2044.1, at nn.28, 29, 33 (proposing that reasonable cooperation should
create a presumption of reliance); see also Bayer AG & Miles, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc.,
162 F.R.D. 456, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (considering fact that party produced over six

million pages of documents with only limited objections to broad discovery requests
in reliance on blanket stipulated protective order); Mirak v. McGhan Med. Corp., 142
F.R.D. 34, 40 (D. Mass. 1992) (noting that party "opened its doors to freewheeling

document inspection . . . without reference to issue of relevancy, privilege, and/or
admissibility").
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inadmissible, demonstrates cognizable reliance that should support
continued protection.3 19
c.

Discovery Sharing

As previously discussed, the parties to an agreed protective order
might anticipate the potential relevance of their discovery to pending
or future litigation and will often, via that order, prohibit its disclosure
in these collateral cases. 320 The desire to shield oneself from other
potential claims, however, does not alone justify issuance of a protective order,3 2 1 and such a provision will not necessarily protect against
limited divulgence of discovery relevant to other lawsuits. Indeed, one
of the most compelling reasons to modify a stipulated protective order
3 22
is to permit the sharing of discovery in related litigation.
Discovery sharing, while arguably undermining the efficiency of
discovery in the immediate lawsuit, potentially avoids the wasteful duplication of discovery in collateral litigation, thereby ultimately advancing the efficient resolution of disputes.3 23 Moreover, a court
319 Materials that might subject a party to mere commercial embarrassment or
that do not qualify as a "trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information," FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (7), then, are particularly vulnerable to
modification requests. In contrast, reliance on a protective order would be particularly great with regard to the production of a trade secret or the testimony of a witness
who fails to invoke an applicable Fifth Amendment privilege. See Beckman Indus.,
Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 475 (9th Cir. 1992).
320 See supra notes 214, 290 and accompanying text.
321 See Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 485 (3d Cir. 1995) (warning that courts should not act as a shield to potential claims); In Re Dual-Deck Video
Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 10 F.3d 693, 696 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing purpose of stipulated protective order as ensuring the "[p3rivacy of proprietary information, not immunity from suit"); Elm Energy & Recycling (U.K.), Ltd. v. Basic, No. 96 C
1220, 1996 WL 596456, at *17-*18 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 1996) (holding that mere possibility of discovery sharing in other litigation does not demonstrate good cause under
Rule 26(c)); Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 160 F.R.D. 625, 628-29 (D. Kan. 1995) (refusing to
amend stipulated protective order to prohibit dissemination of non-confidential discovery to other litigants suing IBP).
322 See Marcus, Myth and Reality, supranote 52, at 41-46 (characterizing discovery
sharing as "the most important justification for granting nonparties access to discovery information"); WRi-Trr T AL., supra note 98, § 2044.1, at n.25 (describing discovery sharing as "most forceful" ground for modification of protective order); REPORT
OF FEDERAL COURTS STUY COMMITTEE 1990, at 102 (indicating that courts should be
prepared to prevent duplicative discovery in collateral litigation).
323 See United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427-28 (10th
Cir. 1990) (crediting countervailing efficiency interest of "saving time and effort in
the collateral case"); Kerasotes Mich. Theaters, Inc. v. National Amusements, Inc., 139
F.R.D. 102, 106 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (noting conflicting interests of expediting discovery in case before court and sharing discovery in related litigation).
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generally can accommodate the confidentiality interests of the litigants before it by conditioning discovery sharing upon the intervenors' consent to the terms of the original protective order and to the
court's enforcement jurisdiction.3 2 4 For these reasons, courts appear
especially willing to relax restrictions on the dissemination of discov325
ery to permit its use in other related cases.
The feasibility of discovery sharing, however, should not automatically merit modification.3 26 A court must still balance the litigants'
mutual desire and need for confidentiality, the interests of the persons who seek information arguably relevant to other cases, and the
costs and benefits in efficiency to both the case at hand and the collateral litigation.
For instance, parties stand a better chance of successfully opposing discovery sharing if they can demonstrate that it would cause them
to suffer some tangible injury to a cognizable privacy or property in-

324 See Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 896 (7th Cir.
1994) (holding that secrecy concerns could be accommodated by including consumer class within protective order's parameters); Beckman Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at
475 (proposing to minimize fear of disclosure in other suits by subjecting intervenors
to restrictions in stipulated protective order); United Nuclear Corp., 905 F.2d at
1427-28 (accommodating concern with disclosure to general public by subjecting collateral litigants to stipulated restrictions); Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 151 F.R.D.
338, 345 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (conditioning modification on submission to the court's
continuingjurisdiction and to the terms of the order that limited dissemination of the
protected discovery and required its return).
The Manualfor Complex Litigationsuggests that a court can further minimize potential prejudice by crafting the modified order to circumscribe persons with access to
the released information and by redacting confidential materials unnecessary to the
collateral case. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 21.432, at 70.
325 See, e.g., Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc., 24 F.3d at 896 (modifying protective order to
permit consumer class action plaintiffs to obtain discovery in similar litigation against
orange juice manufacturers); Beckman Indus., Inc., 966 F.2d at 476 (permitting access
to deposition transcripts of employees of defendant insurance company concerning
the drafting and interpretation of environmental impairment policies at issue in
pending state litigation against insurer); United Nuclear Corp., 905 F.2d at 1427-28
(amending protective order in case settled three years earlier to permit use of discovery in collateral litigation); Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1296 (7th
Cir. 1980) (modifying uncontested protective order to permit sharing of 100,000 documents and 100 depositions in similar litigation).
326 See Marcus, Myth and Reality, supranote 52, at 43 (suggesting "workable guidelines" for discovery sharing as opposed to "rule of automatic access"); Miller, supra
note 52, at 497 (rejecting per se rule). But see Kim, supranote 233, at 866 (proposing
per se rule that would always justify modification to permit discovery sharing among
similarly situated litigants willing to submit to protective order).
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terest. 327 Additionally, the parties manifest greater reliance on the
protective order if they could not reasonably anticipate any need to
share their discovery at the time they negotiated the stipulation or
produced discovery thereunder.3 28 Finally, because a court's primary
task is to resolve the dispute of the litigants before it, the extent to
which modification would impair the discovery process in that case
3 29
must factor into its balancing.
A stipulated protective order will not necessarily preclude other
litigants from obtaining equivalent information through independent
discovery in the collateral lawsuits. 330 Modification should essentially
327 See Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc., 24 F.3d at 896 (holding that efficiency concerns
justify discovery sharing unless party opposing modification can demonstrate tangible
prejudice to substantial rights that outweighs benefits of modification).
328 See Omega Homes, Inc. v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 656 F. Supp. 393, 404
(W.D. Va. 1987) (refusing to allow plaintiff to renege on stipulated protective order
when parties did not propose or anticipate discovery sharing either when they negotiated the order or when defendant disclosed information); see also Marcus, Discovery
Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 497 (suggesting denial of access when "sharing idea
only surfaces after disclosure has occurred").
329 In Poliquin,for example, the First Circuit rejected a request to modify a protective order in order to permit discovery sharing in collateral litigation. Poliquin v.
Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 535 (1st Cir. 1993). The Court reasoned that while
discovery sharing factors into modification, "[a]bsent an immediate threat to public
health or safety, the first concern of the court is with the resolution of the case at
hand." 1d. Given the benefits of protective orders and the costs of impairing the
discovery process, a court "retains broad discretion to protect discovery material, despite the burden of rediscovery imposed on future litigants in future cases." Id.
330 See Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506, 526 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that collateral litigants could protect their interest in materials by filing discovery request in
collateral lawsuit); Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v. Greenblatt, 964 F.2d 1227,
1232-33 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting that parties who do not wish to share discovery need
not do so and that intervenor could seek information through its own discovery).
Protective orders present thorny procedural issues when related litigation exists
in several states and in both federal and state legal systems. Discovery sharing encompasses the situation where collateral litigants intervene in a related lawsuit in order to
access discovery already produced pursuant to a stipulated protective order. Alternatively, collateral litigants can seek information covered by another court's protective
order through independent discovery in their own lawsuit. See Kalinauskas v. Wong,
151 F.R.D. 363, 366 (D. Nev. 1993) (discussing two options).
In the first instance, the court considering modification must determine the discoverability of the protected discovery in the collateral litigation. See infra notes
331-33 and accompanying text. Yet, the collateral court appears better situated to
judge the relevance and need for the information in the related case. See United Nuclear Corp., 905 F.2d at 1428-29 (cautioning that questions of relevance or privilege
must be addressed by collateral courts); Superior Oil Co. v. American Petrofina Co. of
Tex., 785 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1986) (indicating that question of discoverability was one
for court in collateral state proceeding). Conversely, in the case of independent discovery, the court must determine whether to recognize a protective order entered by
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aim to place the collateral litigants in the position that they would
otherwise occupy only after duplicating the parties' discovery requests.

331

Thus, the relevance and discoverability of the protected dis-

covery in the collateral proceedings bears greatly on the decision to
modify, as there is no right of access to privileged or irrelevant materials. 332 Such relevance, in turn, hinges upon the degree of overlap in
another court-a court which is arguably better positioned to evaluate the original
justification for its order and the repercussions of changing it. See In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 945 F.2d 1221, 1225-26 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that sealing court was "obviously best situated to evaluate the original need for the [stipulated protective] order
and the ramifications of changing it"); Culinary Foods, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 151
F.R.D. 297, 303 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (suggesting that defendant go to issuing court to
enforce protective order or expand its protection); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITiGATION, supranote 1, § 21.432, at 70 n.161 (proposing that issuing court should normally determine "the effect given the earlier protective order"). Both situations may
require formal or informal communication between the different courts. See MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 21.432, at 71 & n.164 (suggesting the possibility of "informal communication" between courts to accommodate competing
interests).
A comprehensive discussion of the inter-system and interstate ramifications of
confidentiality orders exceeds the scope of this article. In drafting and issuing stipulated protective orders, however, courts should require that any party served with a
discovery request to produce protected material in another proceeding provide notice thereof to the designating party. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION,
supra note 1, § 41.36, at 455 (suggesting sample provision).
331 The Seventh Circuit regards this as the operative factor. In Wilk, that court
held that "where an appropriate modification.., can place private litigants in a position they would otherwise reach only after repetition of another's discovery, such
modification can be denied only where it would tangibly prejudice the substantial
rights of the party opposing modification." Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d
1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Videon Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,
Civ. A. No. 91-4202, 1995 WL 395925, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 1995) (condoning
discovery sharing when collateral litigation "would eventually exchange the same
material").
332 SeeJepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 860-61 (7th Cir. 1994)
(permitting disclosure of depositions that were relevant and discoverable by ITC in
collateral proceeding); Wilk, 635 F.2d at 1300 (indicating that no right of access exists
concerning privileged or irrelevant information); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supranote 1, § 21.432, at 70 n.160 (finding "little need to require redundant
discovery proceedings" when collateral litigant "would be entitied to obtain [information] in the other litigation"); Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 458,
493-98 (advocating discovery sharing when material is both relevant and properly
discoverable in collateral litigation).
Authorities diverge concerning who bears the burden concerning the discoverability of the protected materials in the collateral litigation. Compare Grove Fresh, 24
F.3d at 896 (stating that party opposing modification must demonstrate that intervenors are not entitled to discovery because of privilege or relevance) with Marcus, Myth
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facts, parties, and issues between the suit covered by the protective
333
order and the collateral proceedings.
Moreover, modification should favor only bona fide litigants able
to demonstrate a legitimate need for the protected discovery in pending litigation.3 3 4 Discovery sharing should not fuel fishing expeditions
by prospective litigants contemplating future lawsuits.3 35 Nor should
courts sanction backdoor attempts to circumvent discovery limits in
336
other cases.

Finally, discovery sharing should not justify modification unless it
will result in a significant saving of time and expense in the collateral
proceedings. 3 37 If sharing will avoid needless duplication of discovery
and Reality, supranote 52, at 43-44 (contending that collateral litigant should demonstrate its right to obtain the materials in the collateral litigation).
333 Cases that derive from a single accident or event, for example, present a very
strong case for discovery sharing. See Miller, supra note 52, at 498-99 (describing
spectrum of relationships bearing upon modification); see also Videon Chevrolet, Inc.,
1995 WL 395925, at *3 (evaluating whether complaints were "founded on virtually
identical allegations"); WLIG-TV, Inc. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 879 F. Supp. 229,
235-36 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (assessing whether a sufficient identity of parties and overlap
of issues existed to justify modification of stipulated protective order to permit use of
discovery in pending administrative action). But see Kerasotes Mich. Theaters, Inc. v.
National Amusements, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 102, 106 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (adopting a very
broad relevancy standard that does not require factual identity).
334 See Wig, 635 F.2d at 1300 (stating that other litigant must be "bona fide" and
not merely seek to use modification as a device to exploit discovery in original case);
Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 151 F.R.D. 338, 343-44 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (evaluating
relevance of documents and the intervenor's need for them in preparing related case
for trial).
335 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrArIATION, supra note 1, § 21.432, at 71 & n.163
(suggesting greater possibility that information is sought for a "fishing expedition" or
other improper purpose "when related litigation . . . [is] merely anticipated rather

than pending"); Miller, supra note 52, at 499 (arguing that persons merely contemplating suit must demonstrate extraordinary need to justify modification).
336 See In re Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Prod. Liab. Litig., 664 F.2d 114, 117
(6th Cir. 1981) (reminding courts to be sensitive to abuse of federal discovery process); Elm Energy & Recycling (U.K.), Ltd. v. Basic, No. 96 C 1220, 1996 WL 596456,
at *7-*8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 1996) (approving discovery sharing except when used as a
sham to assist discovery in another forum or to circumvent discovery limits in a different court).
337 See Stack v. Gamill, 796 F.2d 65, 68 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying intervention to
modify protective order when collateral litigants had already conducted substantial
discovery and simply believed that some materials had not been produced in their
own lawsuit); Videon Chevrolet, Inc., 1995 WL 395925, at *3 (requiring movant to
demonstrate that sharing of discovery "will prevent repetitive and inefficient discovery"); MANUAL FOR CoMPLEx LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 21.432, at 71 (suggesting that
court evaluate whether modification would save significant time and expense); see also
Miller, supra note 52, at 497.
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that would otherwise take place in sufficiently related cases, however,
and if the intervenors submit to the terms of the protective order and
agree to use the shared discovery only in the preparation, settlement,
or trial of the collateral litigation, fairness and efficiency weigh heavily
in favor of modification.
d.

Public Interest

An argument frequently advanced in favor of modification is the
claim that the protected discovery concerns issues of communal importance and that its disclosure would thus serve the "public interest.13 3 8 Because the public interest in disclosure probably does not
factor heavily into the threshold showing that can justify issuance of a
stipulated protective order, a court should balance that factor against
competing privacy interests in deciding whether to lift the order's restrictions. Discerning those cases where discovery legitimately implicates this rather amorphous "public interest," and gauging the
appropriate weight to accord it, however, can be daunting, if not insurmountable, tasks that implicate the very tensions that underlie the
3 39
confidentiality debate itself.
In answering these questions, a court must divine a very fine line
between idle public curiosity (an illegitimate concern) and licit public
interest. 340 Two discrete public interests, interests that seem to dominate recent sunshine reforms, can inform a court's discretion in this
regard, however. Discovery is most commonly said to implicate a public interest in disclosure where it concerns either public health and
safety or the administration of public office and the operation of
government.
Some lawsuits potentially implicate public health and safety more
than others. For example, product liability lawsuits involve allegedly
338 The Manual for Complex Litigation, for instance, directs courts to balance the
"public interest served ... by release" of the protected information in deciding
whether to modify a protective order. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note
1, § 21.432, at 70.
339 Weighing the public interest in disclosure arguably clashes with the equally
strong public interest in fair and efficient settlement of disputes, the traditional deference to party autonomy in discovery, and the problem-solving view of the judiciary.
See supraPart 1.B; see also Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 469 (argu-

ing that line between "public law" and "private law" litigation blurs in many cases);
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 32, at 2667 n.24 (noting difficulty of identifying particular disputes worthy of public interest).
340 See Marcus, Myth and Reality, supra note 52, at 51 (arguing that public interest
exception "does not apply to purely private activity that has generated great public

interest"); Miller, supra note 52, at 467 (criticizing reform proposals as failing to distinguish between interests of curiosity or voyeurism and legitimate public concerns).
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defective products distributed to consumers at large. Likewise, toxic
torts involving damage to the environment or hazardous substances
affect a class of individuals broader than the immediate litigants. At
the same time, the duty of protecting the public from both these dangers rests principally in other branches of government (which are presumably better qualified than the courts to evaluate such risks) and
there may be no need to release confidential discovery, at least to the
degree requested, as additional protection. 34' Moreover, the impact
of discovery upon public safety can be especially difficult to assess
without prejudging the merits of a case, or after a case has been setfled and dismissed.3 42 Despite these difficulties, a court should determine whether continued confidentiality of particular discovery will
have a probable (not merely possible) and significant adverse effect
upon public health and safety that cannot otherwise be averted with3 43
out modifying or terminating the protective order.
Discovery that bears upon the administration of public office or
the functioning of government can likewisejustify vacating or relaxing
confidentiality restrictions. Thus, the presence of a public official or
government entity as a party to a case, while not dispositive, might
signal a situation where public interest outweighs the litigants' need
for secrecy. 344 Governments and government officials stand apart
from private litigants in that they represent and serve a public constituency, even in litigation.3 45 To the extent that discovery in such a case
would educate the public or inform societal debate concerning the
government as official actor, a public interest may well be served by its
disclosure.3 46 For much the same reason, a court should hesitate to
341 See Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 480 (contending that
many public interests are likely to already be subject to "public regulation and scrutiny by other branches of government").
342 A court must necessarily make some determination that a safety risk exists
before deciding whether it must be publicly disclosed. See id. at 481-82 (questioning
"ability of courts to discern whether discovery materials bear on public safety").
343 Obviously, not all confidential discovery in a products liability or environmental case poses a probable and significant risk to public health and safety. Given the
presumptively private nature of discovery, a court should not cast too broad a net in
ordering disclosure. Moreover, a court may be able to accommodate any legitimate
public safety concerns by a careful crafting of the modified order.
344 See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 785-86 (3d Cir. 1994) (indicating that public interest is "particularly legitimate and important" where one of the

parties is a public entity or official).
345 See Toran, supranote 138, at 127 (contending that government's "very identity
derives from the populace it serves" and thus makes it unique from the typical private
litigant).
346 See, e.g., Wiggins v. Burge, 173 F.R.D. 226, 230 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (striking confidentiality designation of police internal investigation regarding allegations of police
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continue a confidentiality order that would block disclosure of information that would otherwise be publicly available under federal or
3 47
state freedom of information laws.

Of course, the instances in which the public interest in disclosure
can appropriately override the litigants' interest in secrecy are ultimately case-sensitive and thus too varied to enumerate here. 348 In
making the modification decision, however, a court should be mindful of its principal function of resolving concrete disputes of the litigants before it. While this goal can be stretched to permit discovery
sharing among other litigants, it might not justify modification on behalf of the public at large aimed at remedying all manner of societal
woes.
E.

Conclusion RegardingDiscovery

Stipulated protective orders governing unfiled discovery serve valuable public, as well as private, interests. These orders guard against
abuse of the very liberal scope of discovery, while facilitating the efficient resolution of disputes. Because discovery concerns a traditionally (perhaps even presumptively) private phase of litigation, the
importance of party autonomy and the significant public interest in
torture); Savitt v. Vacco, No. 95-CV-1842 (RSP/DRH), 95-CV-1853 (RSP/DRH), 1996
WL 663888, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1996) (requiring the filing of deposition of state
attorney general in case 'challenging hiring practices in state attorney general's office); see also Marcus, Myth and Reality, supra note 52, at 50-53 (acknowledging that
nonparty access to discovery might be justified in "very rare" case involving public
interest in governmental acts).
347 Freedom of information laws generally do not apply to the courts or to confidentiality orders issued in actions where the government is a party. See supranote 141
and accompanying text; see also Pansy, 23 F.3d at 791-92 (viewing accessibility of information under freedom of information laws as significant factor militating against entering or maintaining confidentiality order). See generally Toran, supra note 138, at
177, 181-82 (cautioning courts to consider impact of confidentiality orders upon
present and future freedom of information requests).
348 For example, many courts will relax a protective order to further a law enforcement interest. See, e.g., Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 154 F.R.D. 91, 93
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that legitimate law enforcement need for information outweighs the need to avoid embarrassment); Westchester Radiological Ass'n v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., Inc., 138 F.R.D. 33, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (modifying
protective order to permit Blue Cross to disclose evidence of Medicaid fraud to federal government). Accordingly, many jurisdictions have adopted a per se rule that
permits a grand jury subpoena to trump a civil protective order. See, e.g., In re Grand
Jury Subpoena (Meserve & Hughes), 62 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena (Williams), 995 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1993); In re GrandJury Subpoena, 836
F.2d 1468 (4th Cir. 1988). But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Doe), 945 F.2d 1221
(2d Cir. 1991) (refusing to adopt per se rule).
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settlement should occupy center stage in a court's threshold decision
to enter an agreed protective order. The court's ongoing duty to supervise discovery, however, in tandem with its independent obligation
to determine good cause, require that the court exercise its discretion
in initially issuing the order and that it later balance affected- private
and public factors in deciding whether to maintain confidential protection. In some instances, broader public interests may well override
the litigants' mutual desire for secrecy.
V.

SEALING OF JUDICIAL RECORDS

As previously described, stipulated protective orders routinely
provide that if discovery stamped "confidential" must be filed with the
court in connection with a motion or other court application, it shall
be filed under seal and will remain sealed pending contrary order of
the court.3 49 Likewise, and as discussed further in Part VI, the parties
might ultimately settle their lawsuit contingent upon the sealing of all
or part of the court's file in the case.35 0 When a confidentiality agreement dictates closure of the judicial record, however, the interests in
party autonomy and the efficient administration of justice may need
to yield to the often greater public interest in fair and open judicial
35 1
proceedings.
Unlike discovery, a trial is a presumptively public phase of a civil
lawsuit to which a common law, if not a constitutional, right of access
349 See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing typical sealing provision
in stipulated protective orders). Without such a requirement, a party could circumvent the confidentiality stipulation simply by attaching the protected discovery to a
pleading or motion or by introducing it in a pretrial hearing. See, e.g., Davis v. Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp., No. 93 C 5177, 1995 WL 534294, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
5, 1995) (refusing to permit a plaintiff to "undermine the entire confidentiality agreement" and effectively "undesignate" confidential documents by filing them as exhibits
to a motion to enforce subpoena and then disseminating motion with attachments to
prospective class members); Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 151 F.R.D. 338, 342 (S.D.
Iowa 1993) (recognizing that "public good" of protective orders would be "substantially disserved" if confidentiality of documents could be stripped by their introduction in civil trial); Standard Chlorine of Del., Inc. v. Sinibaldi, 821 F. Supp. 232, 256
(D. Del. 1992) (noting that absence of sealing provision in umbrella order 'would
make the confidentiality stipulation worthless and hollow since confidential information discovered in this litigation then could be disclosed simply by including it in a
'pleading'" filed with court).
350 See infra Part VI.B.2.a (examining settlements conditioned upon the sealing of
judicial records).
351 See Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 477 & n.125 (recognizing

that public access to discovery filed with pretrial motions raises "qualitatively different" and more difficult issues than access to unfiled discovery).
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attaches.3 52 Moreover, and again unlike the raw fruits of discovery, a
judicial officer has presumably screened evidence prior to its intro353
duction at trial to determine its relevance and admissibility.
Notwithstanding the existence of a stipulated protective order, then, if
confidential documents or deposition testimony are admitted into evidence during trial, without any objection or request that they be
3 54
sealed, the designating party likely waives their confidential status.
Even with such a request, and notwithstanding the litigants' agreement, the exceptionally strong presumption of public access to civil
trials dictates that "only the most compelling showing" of a need for
closure will justify the sealing of testimony or documents introduced
355
at trial.
352 See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1068 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding First Amendment right of public access to civil trials); Westmoreland v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that First Amendment
secures the public and press a right to access civil proceedings); In re Continental Ill.
Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying policies supporting right to
access criminal trials to civil cases); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710
F.2d 1165, 1177-81 (6th Cir. 1983) (vacating seal of records based upon common law
and First Amendment right of public access to judicial proceedings); see also supra
Part III.D (examining rationales underlying the right of public access).
353 As discussed below, the right of public access to judicial records, while bolstered by the admissibility of discovery, does not depend upon it. See infra note 369
and accompanying text.
354 See Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that BIC
waived whatever right to confidentiality it had under a protective order when it failed
to raise documents' confidentiality at the time they were introduced into evidence);
National Polymer Prods., Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 641 F.2d 418, 421-22 (6th Cir.
1981) (finding waiver of right to further restrict disclosure once discovery was released in open trial). But seeJochims, 151 F.R.D. at 341 n.6 (refusing to find that party
waived confidential status of materials that were introduced as exhibits in open court
at sparsely attended trial that would be difficult to replicate without transcript).
355 Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 533 (1st Cir. 1993). In Poliquin,
the distinction between presumptively private discovery governed by protective orders
and the presumptively public trial affected by sealing orders convinced the First Circuit to vacate the sealing of an entire videotaped deposition and interrogatory answers admitted at trial. See id. at 534.
The Manualfor Complex Litigation suggests several methods by which parties can
attempt to avoid the loss of confidentiality caused by the introduction of protected
discovery at trial. The stipulated protective order can require that a party who plans
to introduce confidential discovery into evidence at trial or a hearing notify the
designating party in advance so that he can move for continued protection. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 41.36, at 455. Parties can also stipulate
to "material nonconfidential facts to avoid the need to introduce confidential material into evidence." Id. § 21.432, at 72. Finally, parties can move under Federal Rule
of Evidence 403 to bar the admission of confidential discovery, arguing that the undue prejudice from its disclosure outweighs its minimal relevance. See id.; see also
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As discussed in Part I, however, trial no longer holds center stage
in our civil justice system, which instead focuses increasingly and
predominantly upon events that occur instead of or before trial. Confidential discovery thus more often enters the public record in support of or in opposition to a pretrial motion to the court. The extent
to which the parties' confidentiality agreement and the court's discovery protective order support the sealing of these pretrial motions and
their attachments has generated much debate, but no consensus of
opinion.
Most courts recognize a strong presumption of public access to
'Judicial records" that can be rebutted only by significant countervailing interests favoring nondisclosure.3 55 Courts widely diverge,
however, in defining what constitutes a 'judicial record" and in applying that definition to the multitude of various pleadings, motions, and
requests that come before a court for consideration. Courts further
divide concerning the appropriate weight to accord the presumption
of public access and in identifying the competing interests sufficient
to rebut the presumption and warrant sealing ofjudicial records. This
Part of the Article offers a sliding scale functional approach to help
resolve these lingering dilemmas.
Poliquin, 989 F.2d at 534 (suggesting that, if necessary, trial court can utilize Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 to exclude marginally relevant, sensitive information).
356 Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 551 (3d Cir. 1994) (describing "heavy
burden" of articulating compelling countervailing interests sufficient to rebut "strong
presumption" of openness); Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016
(11th Cir. 1992) ("Absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances set forth by the
district court in the record.., the court file must remain accessible to the public.");
Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding
that common law right of access must be heavily outweighed by significant countervailing interests to justify sealing of judicial records); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805
F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that absent exceptional circumstances, materials
important to a court's adjudication of a important substantive right must be open to
public scrutiny); Picard Chem. Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Perrigo Co., 951 F. Supp.
679, 691 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (stating that "only the most compelling reasons [would]
justify non-disclosure ofjudicial records").
The Eighth Circuit, while recognizing that a presumption of public access tojudicial records exists, refuses to make it a "strong" one. Instead, that circuit leaves the
decision whether to seal judicial records to the trial court's discretion after balancing
the various competing interests. See Webster Groves Sch. Dist. v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co.,
898 F.2d 1371, 1376 (8th Cir. 1990); Independent Sch. Dist. No. 283, St. Louis Park,
Minnesota v. S.D., 948 F. Supp. 892, 898 (D. Minn. 1996); Jochims, 151 F.R.D. at
341-42. The Fifth Circuit may likewise accord the presumption less weight than most.
See Belo Broad. Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 434 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981) (characterizing common law presumption as only "one of the interests" that a court must
balance in sealing records).
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What Constitutes a Judicial Record?

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, a
document's status as a 'Judicial record" hinges upon the "technical
question of whether [it] is physically on file with the court."3 57 In the
majority of other circuits that have wrestled with the issue, however,
"the mere filing of a document with a court does not render the document judicial."3 5 8 Instead, these other courts tie the definition of a
judicial record to the purpose underlying the presumption of public
access-public monitoring or oversight of the judicial system.3 59 They
accordingly utilize a functional, albeit more ambiguous, approach
that turns upon a document's use and the role it plays in the adjudica3 60
tive process.
357 Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 782 (3d Cir. 1994). Thus, in the
Third Circuit, "there is a presumptive right of public access to pretrial motions of a
nondiscovery nature, whether preliminary or dispositive, and the material filed in
connection therewith." Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157,
164 (3d Cir. 1993). By the same token, if a document is not physically on file with the
court, "it is not a 'judicial record.'" Pansy, 23 F.3d at 782. But see id.at 783 (acknowledging that a more "persuasive and perhaps desirable rule" would hinge judicial status of record "on the use the court has made of it rather than on whether it has found
its way into the clerk's file").
358 In re Policy Management Sys. Corp., Nos. 94-2254, 94-2341, 1995 WL 541623, at
*4 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1995).
359 In Amodeo, the Second Circuit explained the purpose of the access presumption as "based on the need for federal courts, although independent-indeed, particularly because they are independent-to have a measure of accountability and for the
public to have confidence in the administration ofjustice." United States v. Amodeo,
71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995); see also FTC v. Standard Fin. Management Corp.,
830 F.2d 404, 412-13 (1st Cir. 1987) (characterizing common law presumption as
"basic to the maintenance of a fair and open judicial system and to fulfilling the public's right to know"); Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 n.7 (7th Cir.
1980) (explaining that common law right checks judicial abuses).
360 See In re Policy Management Sys. Corp., 1995 WL 541623, at *4 (holding that a
"document becomes a judicial document when a court uses it in determining litigants' substantive rights," and that "a document must play a relevant and useful role
in the adjudication process in order for the common law right of public access to
attach"); Amodeo, 44 F.3d at 145 (holding that "item filed must be relevant to the

performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process in order for it
to be designated ajudicial document"); Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice

Co.,

24 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1994) (discussing press' right of access to "judicial
decisions and the documents which comprise the bases of those decisions"); Standard
Fin. Management Corp., 830 F.2d at 409 (ruling that "relevant documents which are
submitted to, and accepted by, a court of competent jurisdiction in the course of
adjudicatory proceedings, become documents to which the presumption of public
access applies"); Anderson, 805 F.2d at 13 (limiting common law presumption to
"materials on which a court relies in determining the litigants' substantive rights");
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1180-81 (6th Cir. 1983)
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Under such a functional approach, materials used by a court in
granting summary judgment, a dispositive motion that adjudicates the
legal merits of a case and that essentially substitutes for trial, present
the clearest example ofjudicial records presumptively subject to public scrutiny.3 6 1 At the opposite end of the spectrum lie discovery motions and documents submitted for in camera review as part of a
discovery dispute. Requests for a court to compel, prohibit, or circumscribe disclosure do not seek disposition of any substantive rights
and are "actually one step further removed in public concern from
the trial process" than the raw fruits of discovery themselves. 362 As
such, courts generally do not classify discovery motions and their attachments as judicial records or recognize any presumption of public
363
access applicable thereto.

Beyond these two extremes, however, matters become decidedly
uncertain. 364 Motions less central to merits determinations, such as
(noting the public interest in "evidence and records ... relied upon in reaching
Oudicial] decisions"); WiLk, 635 F.2d at 1299 n.7 (reasoning that common law right of
access "should only extend to materials upon which ajudicial decision is based").
361 In Rushford, the Fourth Circuit chastised the trial court for failing to make
sufficient findings to justify sealing a summary judgment record, which included
three documents protected by a discovery protective order. See Rushford, 846 F.2d at
254. While the protective order facilitated privately conducted discovery, summary
judgment materials "lose their status of being raw fruits of discovery" because they aid
the court in adjudicating substantive rights and thereby "substitute for a trial." IL at
252; see alsoJoyv. North, 692 F.2d 880, 894 (2d Cir. 1982) (subjecting report of special
litigation counsel filed in derivative lawsuit to right of public access because it formed
the basis of the court's grant of summary judgment).
362 Anderson, 805 F.2d at 11-13. Such materials have not yet even been determined to be discoverable. See id.
363 See United States v. Wolfson, 55 F.3d 58, 59-61 (2d Cir. 1995) (refusing to
unseal documents submitted for in camera inspection decades earlier and held not
discoverable); Anderson, 805 F.2d at 11 (finding it "clear... that there is no right to
public access to documents considered in civil discovery motions").
Even the Third Circuit, which uses a technical filing test, refuses to catalog discovery motions asjudicial records subject to any presumptive right of access. See Leucadia 998 F.2d at 165; (declining to find a presumptive right of public access "to
discovery motions and their supporting documents"); Allied Corp. v. Jim Walter
Corp., Civ. A. Nos. 86-3086, 94-5530, 1996 WL 346980, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 1996)
(acknowledging absence of any common law or First Amendment right of public access to "discovery motions filed with the court or to the raw fruits of discovery").
364 See Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 477 n.115 (suggesting
that discord surroundingjudicial records "shows that there are genuine areas for disagreement concerning the access issues raised in civil litigation"); Miller, supranote 52,
at 440 & n. 58 (conceding that stronger public access arguments surround dispositive
motions, but describing existing case law as "in some disarray"); WmiGHT ET AL., Supra
note 98, § 2042, at nn.28-34 (stating that while merits resolutions strongly favor ac-
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documents that a court examines, but does not rely upon in making a
decision, or materials submitted to, but never considered by a court,
all continue to perplex courts in their quest to categorize judicial
records. For example, how should courts treat materials submitted in
support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment that is
ultimately denied? Do such documents "play a useful and relevant
role in the adjudicative process" even though the court, in denying
3 65
summary judgment, essentially declines to decide the case's merits?
Should a presumption of public access attach to confidential discovery
filed in connection with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim-a motion that, unlike one for summary judgment, looks no
farther than the factual allegations in a complaint to assess whether
they invoke a legal claim for relief?3 66 What about motions for a precess, it "cannot be said that courts have developed a clear test" concerning access to
motions less central to the merits).
365 While courts unanimously classify materials relied upon by a court in granting
summary judgment as judicial records, they disagree on the status of documents that
support a denialof summary judgment. Compare In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding no presumptive right of
access to materials submitted in connection with denied motion for summary judgment) with Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 139 F.R.D. 50, 56
(D.NJ. 1991) (unsealing confidential discovery materials submitted in connection
with denied summary judgment motion); see also Marcus, Myth and Reality, supranote
52, at 48-49 (suggesting that denial of summaryjudgment may not justify public access because it involves no decision on the merits).
366 The Fourth Circuit's split decision in In Re Policy Management Systems Corp. illustrates this confusion. See In Re Policy Management Sys. Corp., Nos. 94-2254, 94-2341,
1995 WL 541623 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1995). In that case, the Fourth Circuit examined
the propriety of sealing confidential discovery produced under a stipulated protective
order and submitted by a plaintiff in opposition to a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss.
Notwithstanding the dispositive nature of the motion, which the district court had
partially granted, the panel majority held that the "documents did not achieve the
status ofjudicial documents" and that no First Amendment or common law presumption of access thus attached. Id. at *4.The majority noted that unlike a motion for
summary judgment, which requires a court to examine the entire summary judgment
record, "[a] motion to dismiss tests only the facial sufficiency of the complaint." 1d.
Because the district court did not, and indeed could not, consider or rely upon the
discovery attachments in ruling on the dismissal motion, "the documents played no
role in the court's adjudication of the motion" and thus retained their status as discovery materials. Id.
In dissent, Judge Michael argued that "documents... filed in connection with a
potentially dispositive motion" must carry a presumptive right of access or else the
trial judge could act as "unchallengeable censor" of the public record. Id.at *6
(Michael, J., dissenting). Moreover, because a motion to dismiss "measure[s] the factual allegations in the complaint against the legal theory invoked," the court's decision thereon determines substantive rights and thus carries a "presumption of
openness." Id.
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liminary injunction that, while prefatory to any final determination of
substantive rights, nevertheless judge a party's probable success on the
merits?3 6 7 Is an evidentiary ruling upon the admissibility of confidential discovery sufficiently "relevant to the performance of the judicial
function" to justify a presumption of public access to that discovery?
The en vogue analysis yields varying answers to these questions
due, in part, to the vagueness of its principal component-the 'judicial function" to which it is indexed. A definition limited to dispositive merits determinations takes too narrow a view of the adjudicatory
process, which in modem process frequently consists of a host of preliminary or nondispositive determinations.3 68 At the same time, an
interpretation that effectively encompasses everything submitted to
the court would include matters never subject to any judicial review
whatsoever.
A proper definition of 'Judicial records" must avoid putting definitional blinders upon the public's right to observe and oversee its
court system, while limiting that right to materials that bear sufficiently upon a judicial function. 'Judicial records" should include
materials submitted for the court's consideration that are "relevant
and useful" to the multifaceted, decision-making role of courts today.
This means that documents or testimony can qualify as 'Judicial
records" even if they do not form the basis of a court's decision on the
merits, and even if the court ultimately determines not to consider or
rely upon them. Otherwise, a judge could censor the public record,
and thereby shield herself from public scrutiny, simply by ruling documents or testimony inadmissible or by declining to consider or rely
upon them. If the right of public access is to serve as a check upon
367 In Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, the Seventh Circuit gave conflicting signals
regarding the status of a brief containing confidential salary information that the defendants had filed in opposition to a motion for temporary restraining order. See
Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026 (7th Cir. 1996). Because the defendants had agreed not to apply the disputed Medicaid reimbursement rules pending
resolution on the merits, the trial court never ruled upon the injunctive request. The
Seventh Circuit held that because the trial court had not relied upon the state's brief
in deciding the TRO application, "[tihe principle that materials on which ajudicial
decision rests are presumptively in the public domain... [was] not in play." Id. at
1031. The Seventh Circuit nevertheless criticized the trial court's sealing of the entire
brief, holding that only the irrelevant salary information should have been redacted.
See id. at 1032.
368 But see Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 477 & n.125 (suggesting that inquiry should focus on decision-making role of the court and whether a
motion results in a decision on the merits); Marcus, Myth and Reality, supranote 52, at
49 (advocating for public access when discovery forms the "basis for decision on the
merits").
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the judiciary, it cannot be contingent solely upon the judge's view of
369
the significance, relevance, or admissibility of any given document.
For similar reasons, the 'judicial" status of a particular record
should not necessarily depend upon the outcome of the motion or
request to which it is attached. The presumptive right of access is "immediate and contemporaneous" and attaches the moment the evi370
dence becomes a part of the judicial record.
B.

The Weight of the Resulting Presumption

One hazard of broadly defining 'Judicial records" to comprise
anything relevant or useful to a court's decision-making is that a court
might regard all such records as generating the same near-irrebuttable presumption of public access. Under the prevailing all-or-nothing approach, if material qualifies as a judicial record, the resulting
presumption of public access is "strong," the rebuttal burden "heavy,"
and the competing interests required to justify sealing "exceptional"
or "compelling." In contrast, if something does not rise to the level of
a judicial record, no presumption of access whatsoever will attach.
Courts would be better served by focusing instead on the weight
that should be accorded the presumption of public access. That is, a
preferable alternative would broadly define judicial records, but then
calibrate the weight of the resulting presumption to the core judicial
369 As noted by the dissenting justice in In re Policy Management Systems Corp., in
deciding to reject or ignore documents submitted in connection with a motion, a trial
court nevertheless considers them: "[I]t is the public's function to evaluate the
judge's performance and to determine whether the documents should have been
used in deciding the motion." In re Policy Management Sys. Corp., 1995 WL 541623, at
*6-*7 (Michael, J., dissenting); see also Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 139 F.R.D. 50 at 58 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding that court's preliminary refusal to consider inadmissible summary judgment materials formed the basis of its
denial of summary judgment and thus was subject to presumptive right of access);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 899 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (asserting that even inadmissible materials submitted in connection with a motion for summary judgment are subject to right of access).
370 As explained by the Seventh Circuit in Grove Fresh, "a necessary corollary to the
presumption is that once found to be appropriate, access should be immediate and
contemporaneous. The newsworthiness of a particular story is often fleeting. To delay or postpone disclosure undermines the benefit of public scrutiny and may have
the same result as complete suppression." Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh
Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Picard Chem. Inc. Profit Sharing
Plan v. Perrigo Co., 951 F. Supp. 679, 691 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (suggesting that "policy
underlying public access to judicial records would be furthered by immediate access
to those records" the "moment" they become part of the judicial record); Republic of
the Philippines, 139 F.R.D. at 60 (holding that right of access attaches when motion is
pending and thus does not depend upon its outcome).
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function of determining a litigant's substantive rights. 37 1 The strength
of the presumption would hinge upon the role the disputed materials
play in that central function and the extent to which access would
facilitate its public oversight. Indeed, the Second Circuit recently
adopted such a sliding scale approach, stating:
We believe that the weight to be given the presumption of access
must be governed by the role of the material at issue in the exercise
of Article IIIjudicial power and the resultant value of such information to those monitoring the federal courts. Generally, the information will fall somewhere on a continuum from matters that directly
affect an adjudication to matters that come within a court's purview
3 72
solely to insure their irrelevance.
Rather than nitpicking the definition ofjudicial records, a definition which, if erroneously applied, can further insulate the courts
from public scrutiny,3 73 this approach varies the weight of the presumption of public access. The greater a role the disputed materials
play in the determination of the litigants' substantive rights, the
stronger the resulting presumption. The farther removed from a merits determination that documents and testimony fall, the weaker the
37 4
ensuing presumption.
371 As noted by the Second Circuit in Amodeo, the determination of the litigants'
substantive rights lies "at the heart of Article III" and the adjudicative process. United
States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995).
372 Id- Amodeo concerned reports periodically filed under seal by a court officer
appointed under a RICO consent decree to investigate allegations of union corruption. The court officer was under no filing obligation and reportedly would not have
filed the progress reports had she known they could be made public. Because the

trial court reviewed the investigative reports to monitor the performance of the court
officer under the consent decree, they were "relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process." The Second Circuit thus did not
hesitate in classifying the officer's reports as judicial records subject to a presumptive
right of public access. See id. at 1045-46. That presumption was "weak," however,
because the investigative reports bore "only a marginal relationship to the performance of Article III functions." Id at 1051-52.
373 The presumption of access that attaches to judicial records simply increases
the litigants' burden to justify closure. The fact that a document may not qualify as a
judicial record, however, does not require that a court grant the litigants' request that
it be sealed. Good cause must still support continued court-ordered protection. See
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994) (requiring that
good cause support confidentiality order concerning unfiled settlement); see also
supra Part IV (examining public access issues surrounding confidential discovery).
374 See Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1049-50. According to the Second Circuit:
Where testimony or documents play only a negligible role in the performance of Article III duties, the weight of the presumption is low and amounts
to little more than a prediction of public access absent a countervailing reason. Documents that play no role in the performance of Article III func-
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Thus, documents or testimony introduced at trial or that form
the basis of a summary judgment or other merits determination carry
an exceptionally strong presumption of public access that can be overcome only by the most compelling of competing considerations. In
contrast, procedural matters unrelated or only tangentially related to
a decision on the merits would call for a much lower and more readily
rebuttable presumption of public access. The weight to accord the
presumption applicable to documents or testimony that fall "in the
middle of the continuum" necessarily falls to the judgment of the
375
court to be exercised on a case-specific basis.
C. Rebutting the Presumption
Even the strongest of presumptions of public access to judicial
records can be overridden by sufficiently compelling competing interests.

76

In order to justify sealing of judicial records, however, the

party requesting it must demonstrate a present and ongoing need to
protect the confidentiality of particular testimony or documents that
outweighs the presumptive interest in public disclosure.3 7 7 This entails demonstrating that the information sought to be sealed "is the
kind of information that the courts will protect" and that "disclosure
will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking
8 78
closure."
tions, such as those passed between the parties in discovery, lie entirely
beyond the presumption's reach.
Id. at 1050.
375 Id. at 1050. The court in Amodeo indicated that tradition can inform this requisite exercise ofjudgment: "Where such documents are usually filed with the court and
are generally available, the weight of the presumption is stronger than where filing
with the court is unusual or is generally under seal." Id.
376 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. For example, in Doe v. Shapiro, an
AIDS employment discrimination lawsuit, the district court granted a stipulated motion to seal the defendant's motion for summary judgment whose legal theory required disclosure of the details of the plaintiff's personal life. See Doe v. Shapiro, 852
F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. Pa. 1994). The court characterized the "narrowly tailored" request to seal the single motion as "reasonable" and "humane." Id. at 1258.
377 See Amodeo, 44 F.3d at 147-48 (placing burden on party seeking seal "to
demonstrate that the interests favoring non-access outweigh those favoring access");
Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 166-67 (3d Cir. 1993)
(requiring that party seeking to maintain secrecy make a document-by-document
showing of current competitive harm).
378 Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 551 (3d Cir. 1994); see also FTC v. Standard Fin. Management Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 412 (1st Cir. 1987) (requiring a "compendium of chapter and verse" reciting cognizable, specific, and severe harm from
disclosure); Department of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 924 F. Supp. 449,
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The secrecy interests sufficient to rebut the presumption of access to judicial records are highly case-specific. For some courts, however, only the most compelling individual privacy interests or the most
confidential of commercial information-trade secrets-can overcome the exceptionally strong presumption that most courts indiscriminately accord all judicial records.379 Claims of commercial
embarrassment or damaged corporate reputation will not qualify and
even confidential commercial information may not suffice.38 0 Moreover, confidentiality agreements that require the sealing of judicial
records arguably supersede a court's nondelegable, supervisory authority over its own records and proceedings.3 8 1 Many courts thus refuse to factor into their sealing calculus a party's reliance on such a
provision and will accord the corresponding interest in settlement lit38 2
tle, if any, countervailing weight.
487 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting "blanket claim[s]," "stereotyped or conclusory statements," and "unparticularized assertion[s]" regarding the need for confidentiality).
379 See StandardFin. Management Corp., 830 F.2d at 412 (recognizing that in some
cases, privacy rights of individuals and third parties can limit presumptive right);
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179-80 (6th Cir. 1983)
(prohibiting courts from sealing judicial records, even pursuant to confidentiality
agreement, unless "legitimate trade secrets" are involved); Republic of the Philippines
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 139 F.R.D. 50, 61-62 (D.NJ. 1991) (requiring that Westinghouse assert interest almost to the level of a trade secret to justify sealing). But see
Leucadia, Inc., 998 F.2d at 166 (recognizing that trade secrets and other confidential
business information may be shielded);Jochims v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 151 F.R.D. 338,
340 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (contending that the need to protect confidential business information relevant to competitive standing can override right of access).
380 See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding that private litigants' interest in protecting their vanity or their commercial self-interest failed to justify the sealing of materials supporting motion to
amend complaint); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1179-80 (rejecting
bald assertion of reputational harm); Republic of the Philippines, 139 F.R.D. at 61-62
(dismissing claims involving mere confidential business information or commercial
embarrassment).
381 See Amodeo, 44 F.3d at 147 (holding that trial court erroneously delegated its
authority to redact confidential information from judicial records).
382 See Procter & Gamble Co., 78 F.3d at 227 (noting that protective order cannot
permit parties to control public access to court papers); Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 710 F.2d at 1180 (cautioning that confidentiality agreement will not bind the
court regarding the sealing of judicial records); Wilson v. American Motors Corp.,
759 F.2d 1568, 1571 (1lth Cir. 1985) (contending that interest in settlement did not
permit parties to agree to seal public records); Greater Miami Baseball Club Ltd. Partnership v. Selig, 955 F. Supp. 37, 39-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (refusing to accord parties'
pre-deposition designation any weight given the lack of justifiable reliance that the
deposition would remain sealed). But seeJochims, 151 F.R.D. at 342 (suggesting that
court can balance harm to "efficient administration of justice" if "no assurance of
continued protection for confidential business information" can be given).
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Rather than entirely discounting these "lesser" competing interests, however, a court should again consider the role the particular
judicial records play in the adjudication of the litigants' substantive
rights. If the disputed judicial records form the basis for a court's
decision on the merits, only exceptional circumstances that implicate
the most compelling of personal or property interests should justify
closure of the judicial records. Party reliance should not override the
presumption, as the litigants cannot reasonably expect a court to perpetually shield from public scrutiny the materials on which it bases its
substantive decisions. Even a settlement conditioned upon sealing
generally will not rebut the very strong presumption applicable in
those cases.
In contrast, if access to particular records would only minimally
benefit public monitoring of the principal adjudicative function, the
383
resulting presumption of public access becomes merely predictive.
In such cases, a court might justify the sealing of confidential commercial information that does not amount to a trade secret so long as it is
the kind of information that courts routinely protect.3 8 4 Moreover, if

the presumptive right of access is low, it is appropriate for a court to
consider the litigants' mutual desire for confidentiality, their actual
and reasonable reliance on the sealing provision, and its role in
achieving settlement.3 8 5
383 See United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995).
384 See Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 551 (3d Cir. 1994). Courts thus probably still cannot justify sealing judicial records to prevent commercial embarrassment
or to protect corporate vanity. See Siedle v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 147 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir.
1998); see also supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
385 The balancing of competing interests might additionally encompass the intended use of the information by the person seeking access. A court may exercise its
supervisory authority over its own records to prevent them from becoming "a vehicle
for improper purposes." Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598
(1978). Although the motive of the person seeking access to sealed records should
not affect the records' status as 'Judicial," it should factor into whether competing
interests override the presumptive right of public access. See Amodeo, 71 F.3d at
1050-51. For example, a court can seal judicial records sought only to fulfill a personal vendetta or to gain commercial, as opposed to litigation, advantage. See Nixon,
435 U.S. at 598 (indicating that person improperly used judicial records to gratify
private spite, make libelous statements, or harm opponent's competitive standing);
Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1051 (suggesting that "how the person seeking access intends to
use the information" bears upon the "nature and degree of injury" from its disclosure). Similarly, a court might decide to maintain a seal over stamped confidential
discovery that an opposing party filed in bad faith to evade stipulated restrictions on
disclosure. See supra note 349; see also In re Policy Management Sys. Corp., 1995 WL
541623, at *7 (4th Cir. 1995) (Michael, J., dissenting) (asserting that balancing test
should encompass good or bad faith of person filing documents).
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D. Bolstering the Presumption
Of course, a court may also find that considerations, in addition
to the presumption, require public access to the court's file. As with
issuance or modification of a discovery protective order, for instance,
the presence of the government as a party to a lawsuit intensifies the
need for access to the court's files.3 8 6 In such cases, "the public's right

to know what the executive branch is about coalesces with the concomitant right of citizenry to appraise the judicial branch."3 87 Sealing
might similarly contravene the public interest if the lawsuit implicates
significant public health or safety concerns.3 88 As with unfiled discovery, however, a court might experience difficulty identifying these or
other cases that fall within a broader public interest.38 9 Finally, the
pendency of related litigation strongly militates against sealing judicial
records. In such instances, long-term judicial efficiency may benefit if
these other courts and litigants are fully privy to the proceedings.3 90
E.

Conclusion RegardingJudicialRecords

In sum, a broad definition ofjudicial records, in conjunction with
a presumption of public access whose weight varies with a document's
role in the core adjudicative function, can guide a court in deciding
whether to seal all or part of its file in a case. 3 91 While the public
policy favoring settlement probably cannot justify sealing records on
which a court bases its substantive decisions, then, that interest can
support closure of records only minimally or peripherally relevant to
the court's decision-making. As with unfiled discovery, however, the
interests of other litigants or the broader public can enhance even a
weak presumption and require denial of a joint request to seal.
386 See supra notes 344-47 and accompanying text (discussing government status
of litigant as factor in modification of stipulated protective order).
387 FTC v. Standard Fin. Management Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir. 1987).

388 See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1180-81
(6th Cir. 1983) (finding strong public health interest in suit alleging errors in program testing tar and nicotine levels in cigarettes).

389

See supraPart IV.D.2.d (examining public interest as a factor in modifying stip-

ulated protective orders).

390

See, e.g., Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1015 (11th Cir. 1992)

(vacating seal of record to permit access by litigant in related pending case). For a

discussion of the considerations relevant to a court's decision whether to modify a
stipulated protective order to permit the sharing of discovery in related, pending litigation, see supra Part IV.D.2.a.
391 For a discussion of the difficulties that settling litigants might (and should)
experience in convincing a court to seal an entire court file, see infra Part VI.B.2.d.
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CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS

Thus far, this Article has focused on the presettlement uses and
limits of litigation confidentiality-protective orders designed to facilitate the efficient and expeditious progress of discovery and sealing
orders intended to preserve the confidentiality of discovery and other
materials filed of record with the court. Confidentiality, however, is
also critical to the ultimate settlement of many civil lawsuits. Secrecy
undoubtedly facilitates the settlement process, and in some cases,
compromise could not be reached without some assurance of its
392
confidentiality.
Litigants possess extensive freedom to privately contract for settlement secrecy and may enforce their confidentiality agreement in a
separate suit for breach of contract.39 3 Thus, many confidential settlements can and do occur without any involvement of the court or any
judicial review or approval of their terms or their fairness. 3 94 As discussed previously, however, courts today are increasingly involved in
the settlement process, with many actively encouraging, if not strongarming, civil litigants to compromise their disputes.3 9 5 Likewise, many
litigants are not content to rely upon contractual confidentiality
392 See Luban, supra note 3, at 2656 (recognizing that some settlements will collapse without confidentiality); Miller, supra note 52, at 429 (asserting that confidentiality is "not only acceptable, but essential" to settlement); Weinstein, supranote 55, at
510-11 (noting that many mass tort cases could not otherwise settle without secrecy
agreement). But see Ispahani, supra note 93, at 119 (asserting that settlements will
occur even without confidentiality because they benefit all parties); Schneider, supra
note 93, at 111 (predicting that elimination of secret settlements will have no impact
upon settlement frequency or amount).
393 See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 788 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting
that even if litigants cannot demonstrate good cause to support confidentiality order,
they possess "option of agreeing privately to keep information concerning settlement
confidential, and may enforce such an agreement in a separate contract action");
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Newman & Holtzinger, P.C., 992 F.2d 932, 936-37 (9th
Cir. 1993) (holding that protective order does not foreclose existence of separate and
independent nondisclosure agreement that renders parties directly liable to each
other for breach of its terms). But see Garfield, supra note 218, at 266 (recommending that courts refuse to enforce contracts of silence "when the public interest
in access to the suppressed information outweighs a legitimate interest in
enforcement").

394 Various exceptions to this general rule ofjudicial indifference to settlement do
exist. For instance, a court must approve the settlement of class actions certified
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Similarly, actions
"wherein a receiver has been appointed shall not be dismissed except by order of the
court." FED. R. Civ. P. 66.
395 See supra Part I.B.l.a (discussing the push toward judicial promotion of
settlement).
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clauses and additionally seek judicial imprimatur of their compromise, either by filing it for approval with the court or requesting that it
be otherwise embodied in a court order containing confidentiality or
sealing provisions. Given that public access hinges upon the need to
monitor the judicial process and that judicial records are presumptively open to public scrutiny, however, this trend toward increased
judicial participation in what has heretofore been a private process
3 96
arguably bodes for expanded public access to civil settlements.
This final section discusses some of the public access issues that
surround secret settlements. It first explores the litigants' ability to
contractually shield their settlement and the factual and documentary
evidence underlying it from public scrutiny. It concludes by examining the extent to which courts can or should sanction such confidentiality in pursuit of the strong public policy favoring settlement.
A.

Confidentiality Through PrivateAgreement

Although the extent of judicial participation in settlement may
vary, settlements, by definition, require party agreement and ultimately are a matter of private contract. To the extent that confidentiality is a settlement objective, litigants will provide for it in various
ways in their agreement. 397 For example, settlements often seek to
maintain the nondisclosure provisions of stipulated protective orders
and might reiterate the postdismissal obligation to return or destroy
confidential documents received in discovery.3 9 8 Subject to court ap396 See supra Parts V (judicial records) and I1.D (rationales supporting public access); see also Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 505 n.285 (admitting
that increased role ofjudiciary in promoting settlement "may one day provide a basis
for allowing the public to observe judges at work on this effort"); Miller, supra note
52, at 485-86, 486 n.290 (refusing to rule out public access in cases involving "significant judicial participation in the [settlement] process").
397 In rarer cases, the litigants might come to terms concerning everything but
settlement secrecy. In such instances, the parties might compromise their dispute
without a confidentiality agreement, anticipating that one of them would request a
confidentiality order from the court. A court, however, is unlikely to issue a secrecy
order over one party's objection. See, e.g., Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,
Civ. A. No. 87-2110-EEO, 1993 WL 142006, at *3-*4 (D. Kan. Apr. 28, 1993) (rejecting contested request for sealing order as "prior restraint" upon public disclosure
of settlement).
398 See, e.g., Banco Popular de Puerto Rico v. Greenblatt, 964 F.2d 1227, 1229 (1st
Cir. 1992) (examining stipulated protective order embodied in agreed judgment);
United States v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 927 F.2d 252, 253 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1991) (discussing stipulated dismissal that required destruction of unfiled discovery).
Agreements to return or destroy discovery after settlement often draw criticism to
the extent that they potentially facilitate destruction of evidence relevant to pending
or future lawsuits. Ethical rules default to state law on this issue by prohibiting lawyers
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proval, litigants might further condition their compromise on the
sealing or continued sealing of particular documents or of the court's
entire file in the matter.39 9 Litigants commonly agree not to disclose
the existence of their settlement or its terms, conditions, or amount,
and may further resolve not to voluntarily disclose factual information
relevant to their underlying dispute. 40 0 Finally, to enhance and facilitate enforcement of confidentiality provisions, a settlement contract
might authorize the recovery of liquidated damages, attorneys' fees,
40 1
and costs for breach of settlement.
Parties can maximize (but not ensure) the confidentiality of their
settlements and minimize (if not eliminate) judicial involvement
from "unlawfully" destroying (or counseling others to destroy) materials "that have
potential evidentiary value." See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(a). In
a few states, a party who intentionally destroys evidence can be sued for the tort of
"spoilation." See, e.g., Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska
1986); Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1984).
Otherwise, absent a court order, litigants have no obligation to preserve discovery
documents after dismissal and expiration of any right to appeal. See Public Citizen v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 781 (1st Cir. 1988). This current state of affairs has
prompted some to urge guidelines requiring the post-dismissal maintenance of discovery records. See MANuAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 41.36, at 456
(proposing that producing party retain one copy of confidential materials before requesting their destruction); see also Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 121, at 664 (suggesting that obligation to retain discovery should parallel guidelines for maintaining
court records); Weinstein, supranote 55, at 519-20 (advocating court review of agreements requiring return of files to defendants). But see Apr. 20, 1995 Advisory Comm.
Minutes, supra note 82, at 9-10; Oct. 20, 1994Jud. Conf. Minutes, supra note 117, at 5
(tabling proposal to prohibit agreements to return or destroy unfiled discovery unless
producing party retains materials and corresponding discovery requests for five years
after discovery concludes); Marcus, Discovery Confidentiality, supra note 52, at 497
n.236 (characterizing provision requiring return and retention of discovery as
"overkill").
399 See, e.g., Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1014 (11th Cir. 1992)
(noting that defendant "agreed to settle the case for an amount exceeding any of its
previous settlement offers in exchange for [plaintiffs] agreement that the record be
sealed"); City of Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 1991) (conditioning
settlement of case on sealing of court file).
400 See, e.g., Wendt v. Walden Univ., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1542, No. CIV.
4-95-467, 1996 WL 84668 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 1996) (addressing confidential settlements that prohibited former employees from disparaging University or disclosing
any aspect of their confidential settlement); Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363 (D.
Nev. 1993) (assessing sealed confidential settlement that prohibited plaintiff from discussing any aspect of her employment with defendant).
401 For a discussion of the advantages of including a stipulated damages clause in a
confidentiality agreement, see supra note 218. But see Garfield, supra note 218, at 292
(suggesting that court could impose "significant damage limitations for breaches of
some contracts of silence" or refuse to enforce liquidated damages provisions).
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therein simply by filing a stipulation of dismissal with the court and
relying exclusively on such contractual assurances of secrecy. 40 2 Be-

cause a stipulated dismissal does not call for the exercise of any judicial discretion and cannot, unless requested, be judicially
conditioned, a court cannot order the litigants to file their settlement
agreement (and thereby risk making it a judicial record) 40 3 or to
40 4
otherwise publicly disclose its terms.
Moreover, although a handful of sunshine laws regard certain secret settlements as violative (at least potentially) of public policy,40 5
litigants generally possess wide latitude to contract for settlement confidentiality. Contractual nondisclosure provisions, however, merely
prohibit the parties to the contract from voluntarily disseminating information relevant to their settlement. A private confidentiality agreement will not bind nonparties, does not create any evidentiary
privilege, and might not justify withholding protected information in
the face of a freedom of information request or a court order compel-

402 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) (1) (ii) provides that "an action may be
dismissed by the plaintiff without order of the court... by filing a stipulation of
dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action." FED. R. Cry. P.
41 (a) (1) (ii); see also Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 905 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that
Rule 41(a) (1) (ii) anticipates that court will have "no role to play in settlement unless
requested by the parties, or unless the settlement is embodied in a court order by
agreement of the parties and the court");Janus Films, Inc. v. Miller, 801 F.2d 578, 582
(2d Cir. 1986) (stating that normally court stands "'indifferent' to the terms the parties have agreed to" and "plays no role whatever" in their settlement).
403 See infra Part VI.B.2.c (discussing status of filed settlements as judicial records);
see also Resnik, supra note 4, at 1495 (indicating that third party cannot access settlement that is not filed or approved by the court).
404 See Smith, 881 F.2d at 904-05 (holding that court lacked post-dismissal authority to order litigants to publicly disclose terms of settlement in "publicized case against
public officials"); Daines v. Harrison, 838 F. Supp. 1406, 1409 (D. Colo. 1993) (refusing to deprive parties of right to unconditional dismissal by ordering disclosure of
unfiled settlement).
405 The Florida sunshine statute, for example, declares that "[a]ny portion of an
agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect of concealing" either a "public
hazard" or a government settlement "is void, contrary to public policy, and may not
be enforced." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(4) & (8) (a) (West Supp. 1998); see also ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-55-122 (Supp. 1995) (voiding settlements that restrict disclosure concerning the "existence or harmfulness of an environmental hazard"); WASH. REv.
CODE § 4.24.611 (Supp. 1996) (making private agreement settling or terminating a
product liability or hazardous substance claim voidable by the court); Garfield, supra
note 218, at 275, 332 (criticizing inadequacy of existing law regulating confidential
settlements that keep important information from reaching the public and characterizing contract precedent concerning enforceability of such agreements as "sparse").
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ling its production in other proceedings. 40 6 While a court will likely
enforce bargained-for secrecy in a suit between the parties to the contract, then, it may not necessarily enforce the litigants' private confidentiality agreement against third parties with a right to access the
confidential information.

40 7

In addition, litigants who rely exclusively on contractual confidentiality provisions potentially limit their enforcement options. A
confidentiality order that embodies the parties' settlement converts a
private agreement into a court order that will serve as a "powerful
means of maintaining and enforcing secrecy.

' 40 8

An unconditional,

stipulated order of dismissal, in contrast, forfeits contempt of court as
an additional deterrent to breach. 40 9 Moreover, unless an independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction exists, litigants will surrender subsequent federal oversight of their agreement if the order of
dismissal fails to embody their compromise or otherwise retain jurisdiction to enforce it.410 In such cases, litigants faced with an actual or
406 Indeed, the settlement agreement risks violating public policy unless it expressly excepts and excuses subsequent court-ordered or legally required disclosures.
See Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 367 (D. Nev. 1993) (holding that plaintiff
was not subject to contractual penalties in settlement that expressly excepted courtordered release of information). In addition, even a court order of confidentiality
may not stave off later court-ordered disclosures. See supra note 330 and infra note
441 and accompanying text (discussing the enforcement of confidentiality orders in
other courts).
407 As stated by the court in Mike v. Dymon, Inc.: "Confidentiality is generally not
grounds to withhold information from discovery. Confidentiality does not equate to
privilege.... That plaintiff may have a contractual legal obligation not to reveal confidential information .. . is not a valid objection to the requested discovery." Mike v.
Dymon, Inc., Civ. No. 95-2405-EEO, 1996 WL 606362, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 17, 1996);
see also Brazil, supra note 27, at 1026 (cautioning that private confidentiality agreements will not bind nonparties with respect to discovery or trial and might not be
enforced by federal courts determined "to make sure that all the evidence that will
help the jury ascertain the truth is accessible").
408 City of Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 1991) (Pratt, J.,
concurring).
409 Unless provided otherwise, a private agreement will not merge with a confidentiality order and generally "may be enforced without affecting the order or interfering
with the court's enforcement of that order." Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Newman &
Holtzinger, P.C., 992 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 1993). Violation of a confidentiality
order may make the parties liable to the court for sanctions, while breach of the
agreement makes the parties "directly liable to each other." Id. at 936-37.
410 In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, the Supreme Court indicated that if a court embodies a "settlement contract in its dismissal order (or, what
has the same effect, retain [s] jurisdiction over the settlement contract)," "a breach of
the agreement would be a violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce
the agreement would therefore exist." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
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threatened breach of their compromise are left to bring an independent enforcement action, suing for private damages, injunctive relief,
or both. 41 '
B. Judicial Oversight of Settlement Secrecy
Thus, a number of motives may drive some litigants to more
deeply involve the court in their confidential settlements. Some may
wish to facilitate and enhance enforcement of their compromise, particularly if they foresee a dispute concerning its terms or a need for
future judicial recourse. 412 Others may hope that a court order will
further shield their agreed confidences from the prying eyes of third
parties, either by recognition of the confidentiality order in other
courts or as an exception to statutorily required disclosures. 415 In addition to their settlement contract, then, litigants frequently request
the court to issue a confidentiality order that either approves and incorporates their agreement or at least references and retains jurisdic414
tion over it.

511 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1994). "Absent such action, however, enforcement of the settlement agreement is for state courts, unless there is some independent basis for federal jurisdiction." ML See generally Cordray, supra note 5 (discussing Kokkonen).
411 See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 378 (discussing enforcement of settlement agreement
"through award of damages or decree of specific performance"); Pansy v. Borough of
Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 788-89 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that option of enforcing
confidential settlement in separate contract action is "more arduous" than resorting
to court's contempt powers); Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 905 (10th Cir. 1989)
(holding that absent a confidentiality order, unauthorized disclosures must be remedied by individual contract action, rather than contempt of court).
The Circuits split concerning whether a party can move under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) (6) to set aside an order of dismissal and reopen- a dismissed
case for breach of the settlement agreement that induced the dismissal. See Kokkonen,
511 U.S. at 378 (noting circuit split and distinguishing enforcement of settlement
from "merely reopening the dismissed suit" because of breach of agreement); Digital
Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994) (holding that district court's
vacatur of dismissal for breach of settlement agreement did not justify immediate appeal under collateral order doctrine); see also Cordray, supra note 5, at 50-61 (favoring reinstatement of suit for breach of settlement).
412 See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d
339, 344 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing this as a reason why litigants may file their settlement
and forgo a stipulated dismissal).
413 See infra Part VI.B.3.d (examining confidentiality orders that might suppress
evidence) and supranotes 141 & 347 and accompanying text (discussing confidentiality orders as exception to freedom of information laws).
414 Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 (a) (1) (ii) does not permit a court
to sua sponte condition the parties' stipulated dismissal, a court "is authorized to embody the settlement contract in its dismissal order (or, what has the same effect, retain
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The parties' agreement in this regard, however, will not bind the
court, and a confidentiality order, if entered, need not be coextensive
with that agreement. Instead, the court possesses discretion whether
to reserve or later terminate continuing jurisdiction over a confidential settlement or to sanction a secrecy agreement via court order.4 15
1.

Unfiled Discovery

Many of the considerations that inform the exercise of this discretion have already been discussed. For instance, factors relevant to the
decision whether to modify or vacate a stipulated protective order
should similarly guide the decision whether to continue nondisclosure requirements governing unfiled designated discovery in an
agreed judgment or order of dismissal. 4 16 No presumption of public
access attaches to such materials. And, although there is no longer
any need to expedite discovery, the strong systemic interest in settlement, together with the litigants' actual and justifiable reliance upon
the postsettlement maintenance of the stipulated protective order,
4 17
can continue to supply the necessary "good cause."
2.

Sealing Orders

In contrast, and also as previously discussed, courts should take a
more critical view of settlements conditioned upon the sealing ofjudicial records, to which a presumption of public access attaches. 418 Depending upon the weight of that presumption, the interest in
facilitating settlement may well fall short of that necessary to rebut the
presumption and justify sealing.
jurisdiction over the settlement contract) if the parties agree." Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at
381-82.
415 See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 382 (placing decision whether to retain jurisdiction
within the court's discretion); Arata v. Nu Skin Int'l, Inc., 96 F.3d 1265, 1268-69 (9th
Cir. 1996) (holding that court is under no obligation to reserve jurisdiction in accordance with the parties' settlement and has discretion, even if it initially retains jurisdiction, to later terminate it); see also infra Part VI.B.3 (offering guidance concerning
exercise of judicial discretion).
416 See supra Part IV.D.2 (discussing factors relevant to issuance or modification of
stipulated protective orders).
417 See Miller, supra note 52, at 486 (asserting that if "effectiveness of the protective order cannot be relied upon, its capacity to motivate settlement will be
compromised").
418 See supra Part V (examining the sealing ofjudicial records).
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Sealing the Entire Record

For instance, the aim of achieving settlement should not warrant
the indiscriminate sealing of the entire record in a case.4 19 Because
both the status of a document as a judicial record and the strength of
the resulting presumption vary with what role that document plays in
the adjudicative process, the sealing decision necessarily requires particularized judicial review. 420 The litigants, in turn, must "itemize for
the court's approval which documents have been introduced into the
42 1
public domain."
Although the litigants' reliance upon a sealing provision and its
importance in achieving settlement may override the low presumption
of public access that attaches to documents that bear only marginally
upon the determination of their substantive rights, they cannot rebut
the stronger presumption that applies to records more central to the
merits. Yet, these latter types of judicial records are the ones most
likely to motivate litigants to condition their settlement on the sealing
of the entire record. 422 Since a court should opt for the least restric419 See Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434-35 (9th Cir. 1995) (reversing
district court's seal of entire record pursuant to parties' compromise for failure to
articulate supporting reasons); Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 551 (3d Cir.
1994) (describing burden on party seeking to seal entire record as especially heavy);
Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (l1th Cir. 1992) (finding it
"immaterial" that sealing of entire record was "key negotiated element" of court-facilitated settlement); Crothers v. Pilgrim Mortgage Corp., No. 95 Civ. 4681 (SAS), 1997
WL 570583, at *6-*7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 1997) (holding that interest in settlement did
not justify sealing of court's file without particularized judicial review).
420 To facilitate appellate review of a decision to seal, a trial court should clearly
articulate the countervailing considerations that override the presumption of access.
See Hagestad,49 F.3d at 1434 (insisting that court base decision to seal upon factually
articulated and compelling reasons, not hypothesis and conjecture); United States v.
Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 1995) (directing that any restriction on access to
judicial records be supported by specific findings); Miller, 16 F.3d at 551 (requiring
that court make specific findings, provide an opportunity for third parties to be
heard, and articulate countervailing interests to be protected); Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1176 (6th Cir. 1983) (requiring that courts
articulate findings of fact and conclusions of law before sealing).
421 Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir.
1994); see also Doe v. Methacton Sch. Dist., 878 F. Supp. 40, 43 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (recommending that parties should move to seal specific documents rather than court's
docket and entire record).
422 In Wilson v. American Motors Corp., for example, the defendant requested the
sealing of the entire record pursuant to a court-facilitated settlement after the jury
had rendered adverse findings via special interrogatories. Wilson v. American Motors
Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1.569 (l1th Cir. 1985). The trial court granted the litigants'
stipulated request to seal the record, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed. While the
appellate court acknowledged the public interest in encouraging settlement, it re-

392

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 74:2

tive alternative to sealing 423 and since litigants must demonstrate a
particularized need for continued confidentiality, 424 only exceptional
circumstances should warrant such wholesale closure.
b.

Sealing Court-Sponsored Bargaining

Qualitatively different access issues arise when the litigants seek to
shield from public view their judicially sponsored settlement negotiations or the final product of that bargaining-the settlement agreement itself. In cases of public interest, for example, the media or
other interested third parties may request access to settlement conferences with the court or to court-annexed alternative dispute resolution techniques like summary jury trials. 425 Assuming that the
common law presumption of public access attaches to judicial proceedings as well as judicial records, 426 one could argue that the need
to monitor our judiciary at work requires that the public be given acgarded the defendant's "desire to prevent the use of [the] trial record in other proceedings," id. at 1571, and the defendant's "attempted suppression of a jury verdict"
in order to evade collateral estoppel, as "contrary to the most basic principle of American jurisprudence" and thus an inadequate justification for sealing the record, id. at
1572 n.4.
423 Before sealing, a court should consider available alternatives, such as redaction
of the confidential information, and fashion the least restrictive option. See Siedle v.
Putnam Ins., Inc., 147 F.3d 7, 12 n.6 (1st Cir. 1998) (recommending that trial court
institute sealing procedure whereby only privileged material would be redacted and
sealed); Methodist Hosps., Inc. V. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1032 (7th Cir. 1996) (instructing district court to redact confidential salary information from brief and to
unseal remainder); In re Policy Management Sys. Corp., Civ. Nos. 94-2254, 94-2341,
1995 WL 541623, at *7, n. 4 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1995) (Michael, J., dissenting) (approving district court's redaction of trade secret and propriety information before it unsealed motion to dismiss); Methacton Sch. Dist., 878 F. Supp. at 42 (stating that court
failed to take "the least restrictive course" when it sealed docket and entire record).
424 See supra notes 297-303 and accompanying text (discussing modification
burden).
425 See, e.g., In re Cincinnati Enquirer, 94 F.3d 198 (6th Cir. 1996) (involving a
newspaper's seeking a writ of mandamus against a district court in order to permit
public access to summary jury trial in class action arising from prison riots); B.H. v.
McDonald, 49 F.3d 294 (7th Cir. 1995) (public guardian challenges court's decision
to hold nonpublic in-chambers conferences to discuss implementation of consent decree in suit brought by Illinois Department of Children and Family Services); United
States v. Town of Moreau, 979 F. Supp. 129 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (newspaper and reporter
request access to settlement conferences and position papers in CERCLA lawsuit involving town water supply); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hess, 859 F. Supp. 1411 (D.
Utah 1994) (congressional committee seeks financial information submitted by defendants to RTC as part of settlement negotiations).
426 See Town of Moreau, 979 F. Supp. at 134 (noting that "it is not clear that the
common law right of access is applicable to judicial proceedings although some
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cess to the "cluster of dispute processes" over which courts today
4 27
preside.
Settlement techniques, like in-chambers settlement conferences
and summary jury trials, however, do not constitute a public component of a civil trial. Such settlement proceedings enjoy no historical
428
right of access and, in fact, are traditionally closed to the public.
More important, although courts today actively encourage and, to
varying degrees, facilitate settlements, settlement proceedings present
no issue for adjudication by the courts. 4 29 As stated by one jurist, a
"court can exercise all of its Article III powers to determine a case or
controversy without ever convening a settlement conference" 4 80 or
mandating the litigants to participate in a summary jury trial. Because
court-facilitated settlement proceedings play a negligible role in the
adjudication of the litigants' substantive rights, then, any presumptive
43 1
right of access should carry little, if any, weight.
A closed bargaining forum fosters the full ventilation of views and
the give-and-take necessary to achieve compromise. 43 2 Negotiation itself may depend upon court assurances of confidentiality, and public
access to settlement conferences and summary jury trials could thus
courts have suggested that it is"); see also supraPart III.B (discussing common law right
of public access).
427 Galanter & Cahill, supra note 11, at 1390 (arguing that "courts do more than
adjudicate" by presiding "over a cluster of dispute processes").
428 See In re Cincinnati Enquirer, 94 F.3d at 199 (equating summary jury trial to
settlement proceedings which are "historically closed procedures"); Town of Moreau,
979 F. Supp. at 134 (noting that "[s]ettlement conferences are not now and have
never been part of the public process of litigation").
429 See In re Cincinnati Enquirer, 94 F.3d at 199 (holding that summary jury trial
"does not present any matter for adjudication by the court, but functions to facilitate
settlement"); McDonald, 49 F.3d at 300 (noting that court will not be "adjudicating
anyone's rights or enforcing any provision of the consent decree" in settlement
conference).
430 Town of Moreau, 979 F. Supp. at 134-35.
431 As stated by the district court in United States v. Town of Moreau:
[I] t cannot be said that discussions of compromise among parties to a lawsuit, even with a judge in attendance, play a large role in the exercise of
Article IIIjudicial power. The presumption of public access in the case of
settlement conferences is therefore very low indeed, if not nonexistent.
Town of Moreau, 979 F. Supp. at 135.
432 See McDonald,49 F.3d at 301; Town of Moreau, 979 F. Supp. at 135. Confidential
settlement negotiations are arguably even more crucial in cases of significant public
interest where litigants may be reluctant to publicly state what may be no more than a
bargaining position. See Town of Moreau, 979 F. Supp. at 135 (doubting whether public
settlement conference in case of significant concern "would ever permit the type of
give and take that would lead to an agreed resolution").
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undermine their core purpose of promoting settlement. 433 The significant governmental interest in the judicial promotion of settlement, then, likely outweighs the negligible presumption of public
access that may apply to court-sponsored settlement techniques, and
can supply the good cause necessary to judicially seal such
43 4
proceedings.
c.

Sealing Settlements

A confidentiality order that seals court-sponsored settlement
techniques merely permits the litigants to negotiate in private. The
necessary balancing of private and public interests, however, arguably
shifts when the parties reach a final accord and request court assistance to ensure its confidentiality. For instance, if the settling parties
file their settlement with the court, they may lose control over its continued secrecy.
Litigants presumably do not file their agreement unless they want
the court to take some action concerning it-either by issuing a confidentiality order incorporating its terms or, at the very least, a dismissal
order retaining jurisdiction to enforce the accord. Thus, filed settlements are relevant, at least peripherally, to the decision-making role
of the courts and, therefore, probably do constitute judicial records
435
that are subject to a presumptive right of public access.
433 See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 904 (6th Cir.
1988) (stating that "public access would be detrimental to the effectiveness of the
summary jury trial in facilitating settlement"); Town of Moreau, 979 F. Supp. at 136
(warning that public settlement conference "would be the death knell of settlement
negotiations" in cases of vital public interest); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hess, 859 F.
Supp. 1411, 1412 (D. Utah 1994) (noting that access to settlement negotiations might
"undermine the amicable resolution of disputes").
434 See McDonald, 49 F.3d at 301, 303 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (asserting that
"public has no right to follow the negotiators into the negotiation room," even when
"judge himself plays the role of mediator"); Town of Moreau, 979 F. Supp. at 133-36
(indicating that good cause supported closed settlement conferences upon which further negotiations depended); Resolution Trust Corp., 859 F. Supp. at 1413 (justifying
continued maintenance of confidentiality order with need to promote "judicially supervised settlement of litigation"); see also Resnik, supra note 4, at 1494 (finding no
express public right of access to court-sponsored ADR).
435 In the Third Circuit, the mere filing of a settlement with the court automatically renders it ajudicial record subject to a strong presumption of public access. See
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 800 F.2d 339,
344-45 (3d Cir. 1986); cf. SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d 845, 848 n.4, 849 (5th
Cir. 1993) (finding that settlement agreement becomes a judicial record once filed
and submitted to court for approval, but refusing to assign any particular weight to
resulting presumption).
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Under the functional analysis suggested in this Article, however,
the resulting presumption of public access is likely weak given that
even filed confidentiality agreements generally present no substantive
issue for adjudication by the court. 436 While filed settlements will be

presumed accessible, then, countervailing factors, such as party reliance upon the sealing order and its importance in achieving settlement, may rebut that presumption. 4 7 Ultimately, the decision
whether to seal the agreement will depend upon a balancing of the
438
private and public interests implicated by the settlement.

436 The presumption of public access would be much stronger in cases where the
litigants subsequently dispute the terms of their settlement and file it for judicial interpretation or enforcement. In such cases, the court does adjudicate the litigants'
substantive contractual rights under the settlement. See Bank ofAm. Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n, 800 F.2d at 345 (holding that litigants lose the confidentiality ordinarily accorded settlements when they "utilize the judicial process to interpret the settlement
and to enforce it"). A similarly strong presumption would exist in cases where a settlement agreement plays "an integral role" in a court's summary judgment or other
important pretrial rulings. See, e.g., Ex parte Knight Ridder, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 1080,
1082-83 (D.S.G. 1997).
437 A court might be more willing to seal a settlement agreement (or less willing to
subsequently unseal it) if its own assurances of confidentiality induced the parties to
file the settlement in the first place. See Bank of Am. Nat't Trust & Say. Ass'n, 800 F.2d
at 347-48 (Garth, J., dissenting) (arguing for greater burden on party seeking to unseal settlement where sealing order induced parties to file settlement and parties acted in reliance on continued secrecy); Palmieri v. NewYork, 779 F.2d 861, 864-65 (2d
Cir. 1985) (noting that magistrate's assurances of confidentiality induced parties to
negotiate and later file their settlement).
438 A court, for instance, may appropriately refuse to seal a settlement agreement
with the government or an agreement that implicates public health or safety or other
matters of legitimate public concern. See, e.g., Town of Moreau, 979 F. Supp. at 136-37
(noting that "entirely different question" would be presented if litigants had requested court to seal final consent decree and related settlement documents); Arkwright Mut Ins. Co. v. Garrett & West, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 376, 381 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(refusing to seal settlement because case involved disruption of phone service to
thousands of citizens and was thus a matter of significant public interest); Society of
Prof'IJournalists v. Briggs, 675 F. Supp. 1308, 1309-11 (D. Utah 1987) (holding that
settlement agreement between ex-county assessor and state was a "public document"
subject to state freedom of information laws and a constitutional right of access). But
see In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 92 F.R.D. 468, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (notwithstanding "historical importance" of bank failure, tremendous savings of time and legal
expenses justified sealing settlement).
For a more extensive discussion of the various private and public interests that a
court can consider in deciding whether to seal a filed settlement, see supraPart IV.D.2
(discussing factors relevant to issuance or modification of stipulated protective orders) and infra Part VI.B.3 (exploringjudicial discretion and confidentiality orders).
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3. Judicial Discretion and Confidentiality Orders
Settling parties generally can skirt any presumption of public ac-

439
cess to their agreement simply by refusing to file it with the court.

They cannot, however, altogether avoid judicial review of their confidentiality agreements and should not expect courts to blindly endorse
or enforce agreed confidentiality orders concerning their settlements.
Instead, such orders necessarily call for the exercise of judicial discretion, not only by the court whose docket will be lightened if the case is
settled, 4 40 but also by other courts in similar lawsuits who are faced
with requests to discover information protected by a confidentiality
44 1
agreement or order.
439 If a document is never filed with the court or, after filing, is returned to the
parties' possession, it will not constitute ajudicial record subject to further court control. See Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 681-83 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that
district court lacks authority to compel return of trial exhibits for inspection and
copying by third parties after such exhibits have been returned to the parties or destroyed by the clerk); Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1571-72 (11th
Cir. 1985) (noting that while only a compelling government interest can justify sealing a trial record, trial exhibits need not remain in court custody). But see Littlejohn,
851 F.2d at 688 (SciricaJ., dissenting) (arguing that trial exhibits returned to litigants
after trial or settlement should remain public records as long as they are available
from any source). Thus, if a settlement agreement is not filed with the court, it will
not constitute a judicial record, even if the court retains jurisdiction to enforce it or
reviews the agreement before issuing a confidentiality order. See Pansy v. Borough of
Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 782 (3d Cir. 1994). But see TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(2) (b)
(designating certain settlement agreements "not filed of record" as "court records"
that are presumptively open to the general public); Luban, supra note 3, at 2650 &
n.140 (arguing that litigants should not be permitted to invoke public authority, but
avoid public scrutiny, simply by failing to file their agreement).
440 This court exercises discretion initially with respect to the entry and terms of a
confidentiality order, and later with respect to its potential modification or vacatur.
Some commentators argue that this judicial discretion should be statutorily circumscribed given a trial court's self-interest in clearing its own calendar. See supra notes
114-15 and accompanying text.
441 Recently, in Baker v. General Motors Corp., the United States Supreme Court
addressed whether a court in one state must give Full Faith and Credit to the confidentiality orders and injunctions entered by a court in another state. See Baker v.
General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998). In that case, a Michigan court entered a
stipulated injunction that barred a former employee of General Motors ("GM") from
testifying against GM in other product liability cases. Plaintiffs in another product
liability action against GM in Missouri subpoenaed the ex-employee's testimony,
which GM argued was barred by the Michigan injunction. See id at 660-63. While
noting that the settlement agreement and injunction could prevent the settling employee from volunteering his testimony, the Supreme Court held that they could not
bind persons not parties to the Michigan proceeding nor dictate the admissibility of
the testimony to another court. See id- at 665-66. Thus, the Missouri court could
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a.

"Good Cause"

No consensus of opinion exists concerning the showing necessary
to justify a confidentiality order concerning the terms of a private setlement. Unfiled settlement agreements, however, are similar to unfiled discovery; both are traditionally private components of a civil
trial, implicate the privacy interests of litigants, and carry a potential
for abuse if disclosed. 442 To that extent, one can rightly analogize to
protective orders governing discovery and require that the litigants
similarly demonstrate "good cause" to justify entry of a confidentiality
order governing their settlement. 4 43 In deciding whether to initially
enter a confidentiality order or to later modify or vacate it, therefore,
a court can consider many of the factors associated with entry or modification of stipulated protective orders.4
b.

Public Interest and Settlements with the Government

As with discovery orders, a legitimate public interest in a lawsuit
may defeat the litigants' mutual desire to consummate their settlement with a confidentiality order.44 5 In the settlement context, the
public has a particular interest in overseeing the receipt or expenditure of public funds. A confidentiality order that binds the government might impede such monitoring under applicable freedom of
information laws. 446 A court should thus consider a settlement's pocompel the employee to testify without violating the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See
id at 660; see also infra Part VI.B.3.d (discussing settlements that suppress evidence).
442 See Grove Fresh Distrib., Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 888 F. Supp. 1427, 1440-41
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (comparing sealing order governing filed settlement to protective
order concerning discovery); see also supra Part IV.A (discussing Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart).
443 In Pansy, the Third Circuit adopted such a standard, stating:
Protective orders and orders of confidentiality are functionally similar, and
require similar balancing between public and private concerns. We therefore.., conclude that whether an order of confidentiality is granted at the
discovery stage or any other stage of litigation, including settlement, good
cause must be demonstrated to justify the order.
Pansy, 23 F.3d. at 786.
444 See supra Part IV.D.2 (discussing factors).
445 See City of Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1991) (recognizing
court's larger role reviewing resolutions of suits affecting the public interest); see also
supra Part IV.D.2.d (examining public interest considerations).
446 For a discussion of the intersection of confidentiality orders and freedom of
information laws, see supra note 141 and accompanying text.
Although a confidentiality order might insulate a settlement from statutorilyrequired disclosure, vacatur of such an order will not guarantee public access to an agreement that has never been filed with the court. Instead, it
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tential accessibility under such laws before entering or drafting any
447
gag order concerning a compromise with a public entity or official.
c.

Contents of Settlement

In contrast, disclosing the specific terms, amounts, or conditions
of a settlement involving an essentially private dispute between purely
private litigants generally will not advance any legitimate public interest and may invade the privacy rights of the parties. While such information might strategically assist other present or future litigants in
assessing the settlement value of their cases, it will not materially advance the adjudication of the underlying merits of these other controversies. 448 At the same time, many defendants pay a premium to
secure the confidentiality of their compromise and would not settle at
all if its amount or conditions could be readily broadcast to the media
or other existing or potential claimants. 4 49 Unlike the historical facts
giving rise to the settlement, settlement facts lay peculiarly within
merely frees the public to seek disclosure via other legal avenues, including
freedom of information-type laws. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 784 (recognizing
that newspaper was free to seek access through other legal channels without
interference of court order); Daines v. Harrison, 838 F. Supp. 1406, 1409 (D.
Colo. 1993) (indicating that newspapers must seek disclosure of unfiled settiement under Colorado Open Records Act).
447 See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 791-92 (asserting that even particularized need for confidentiality in reaching settlement will not "outweigh important values manifested by
freedom of information laws"); Mullins v. City of Griffin, 886 F. Supp. 21, 22-23 (N.D.
Ga. 1995) (vacating confidentiality order that prohibited discussion of settlement in
sexual harassment suit against city, city manager, and chief of police); Daires, 838 F.
Supp. at 1408-09 (stating that neither the desire to hide bad behavior nor the strong
interest in promoting settlement will outweigh the "public's interest in seeing that
public funds are utilized properly").
A court may be able to accommodate the various competing interests either by
conditioning a confidentiality order to become inoperative if settlement information
is later determined to be accessible under freedom of information laws or by limiting
the scope of such an order to exclude legally-required disclosures. Pansy, 23 F.3d at
791.
448 See In re New York County Data Entry Worker Prod. Liab. Litig., 616 N.Y.S.2d
424, 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that defendants' need to obtain settlement
agreements was "nothing more than trial strategy" and did not arise "out of materiality or necessity but, rather, desirability").
Although a confidentiality agreement may shield the contents of a settlement, it
might not preclude disclosure of the existence of the compromise itself. See id at 427
(asserting that witness' credibility can be tainted by "the mere fact that there was a
settlement" between plaintiffs and settling co-defendants).
449 See id. at 428 (noting that "[m] any defendants would almost certainly proceed
to trial rather than to broadcast to all potential plaintiffs how much they might be
willing to pay").
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party control and would not exist but for the litigation in which they
were generated. 450 Absent some unusual and compelling need for
disclosure, then, the strong public policy favoring finality, repose, and
settlement can justify protecting the contents of many confidential
45 1
settlements.
d.

Suppression of Evidence

In addition to agreeing not to disclose the terms of their settlements, litigants sometimes further consent not to discuss the factual
or legal merits of their settled dispute. In determining whether good
cause justifies entry of a confidentiality or protective order, however,
courts appropriately distinguish between the facts concerning the settlement itself and evidentiary information relevant to the underlying
4 52
merits.
450 In this respect, settlement facts would seem to merit greater protection than
even the raw fruits of discovery, which, while generated by the litigation process, predate and exist independent of that process. See supraPart IV (discussing public access
to unfiled discovery).
451 Just as the court in the settled case might find good cause to enter a confidentiality order concerning settlement terms, so might a court in a collateral lawsuit determine that good cause supports entry of a protective order that prevents discovery of
the confidential contents by third parties. See Butta-Brinkman v. FCA Int'l, Ltd., 164
F.R.D. 475, 476-77 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (denying motion to compel production of confidential settlement agreement in other sexual harassment suits against defendants unless plaintiff could not otherwise obtain information); Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151
F.R.D. 363, 367 (D. Nev. 1993) (requiring a collateral litigant to "show a compelling
need" to justify disclosure of specific terms of settlement). Even if such discovery is
warranted, a collateral court can protect the continued confidentiality of settlement
terms by conditioning discovery upon a confidentiality agreement or by issuing a protective order that prohibits further disclosure. See LaFarge Corp. v. Hartford Cas. Ins.
Co., 61 F.3d 389, 400-01 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting a district court's order to condition
Hartford's discovery of settlement amount and terms upon its confidentiality agreement); Wendt v. Walden Univ., Inc., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas. (BNA) 1542, No. Civ. 495-467, 1996 WL 84668, at *3 (D. Minn.Jan. 16, 1996) (entering protective order that
prohibited deposition attendees from divulging revealed confidences).
452 See Wendt, 1996 WL 84668, at *2 (finding requests for contents of settlement
agreements "emphatically different" in scope from' effort to discover underlying
facts); Kalinauskas,151 F.R.D. at 367 (distinguishing amount and conditions of settlement from factual information surrounding case); see also Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 32, at 2685 (distinguishing "settlement facts" from adjudicative facts); Weinstein,
supra note 55, at 517 (finding "much less public interest" in settlement terms and
amounts than in evidence relevant to the merits); Yeazell, supra note 6, at 650 (comparing distinction to work product immunity that only prevents disclosure of information generated by litigation and that does not bar disclosure of underlying historical

facts).
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A confidential settlement should not significantly impede persons not privy to that agreement from collecting testimony or evidence that is relevant to a sufficiently related existing lawsuit.
Notwithstanding the strong commitment to party autonomy and private settlement, secrecy agreements that purport to derogate the dis453
covery rights of third parties violate a countervailing public policy.

"While parties have the freedom to contract, courts must carefully police the circumstances under which legitimate areas of public concern
454
are concealed."
Thus, while the parties might privately agree not to voluntarily
disclose factual information relating to the underlying merits of their
controversy, a court should hesitate to "condone the practice of
'buy[ing] the silence of a witness with a settlement agreement.' "455
Although a confidentiality order concerning a dispute's underlying
merits might be a linchpin to its ultimate resolution, such an order
should not prevent discovery by other bona fide litigants with a legiti456
mate need to obtain the historical facts underlying the settlement.
453 In these cases, "the parties' contractual confidentiality provision... impacts on
the public interest, namely the ability of a non-party to the contract to pursue discovery in support of its case ....
Wendt, 1996 WL 84668, at *2. See also United States v.
Alex Brown & Sons, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 235, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that parties to
consent decree may not "seal existing evidence that would ordinarily be accessible to
other litigants"); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on Bell Communications Research, Inc., No. MA-85, 1997 WL 10919, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1997), mod. by No.
MA-85, 1997 WL 16747 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1997) (stating that confidentiality
agreements cannot impede "the truth-seeking function of discovery in federal
litigation").
454 Wendt, 1996 WL 84668, at *2. See also Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 365. In both
Wendt and Kalinauskas, plaintiffs in sexual harassment and discrimination cases
sought to depose former employees who had confidentially settled similar sexual discrimination claims against the defendant employers. The Kalinauskassettlement expressly prohibited the former employee from discussing any aspect of her
employment with the defendant, other than the dates of her employment and herjob
titie. See Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 365. The defendants in both cases moved to
quash the depositions, arguing that the requested discovery would compel the former
employees to breach their confidentiality agreement, which was a critical component
of their settiements. The courts in both cases permitted the plaintiffs to depose the
former employees concerning their employment with defendants, knowledge of sexual harassment, and other "factual information" surrounding their settled cases. See
id. at 367; see also Wendt, 1996 WL 84668, at *2.
455 Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 365; see also Baker v. General Motors, 118 S. Ct. 657,
667 (1998) (noting that stipulated injunction could prevent party to settlement from
volunteering his testimony); Wendt, 1996 WL 84668, at *2 (distinguishing case before
court from one that involves "disputes between the parties to the contracts").
456 See Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 365-67 (refusing to enter protective order that
would prevent deposition of party to confidential settlement); Grundberg v. Upjohn
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Just as a court might modify a protective order to permit discovery
sharing in sufficiently related litigation, so might a court decline to
457
enter any order that would suppress relevant evidence.
C.

Conclusion Regarding Confidential Settlements

Thus, a court possesses little authority to open a private settlement that the litigants choose to effect through an unconditional,
stipulated dismissal. Even court-sponsored or filed settlements carry
little to no presumption of public access. A court can and should,
however, exert significant discretion when asked to convert a confidentiality agreement into a court order.
In exercising this discretion, courts should resist the urge to leave
the litigants entirely to their own contractual devices and instead take
advantage of the opportunity presented to reconcile the legitimate
private and public interests implicated by a confidential settlement. A
confidentiality order will undoubtedly facilitate the settlement of
many cases-a significant objective that serves public as well as private
interests. At the same time, some settlements do radiate beyond the
immediate lawsuit and may affect persons and interests not necessarily
represented by the settling parties. To promote settlement, then, a
court should give the litigants significant autonomy in crafting a confidentiality order concerning matters of essentially private concernunfiled discovery or the terms and conditions of their settlement.
Even the interest in promoting settlement, however, may not justify
the indiscriminate sealing ofjudicial records or the suppression of evidence relevant to other proceedings.

Co., 140 F.RID. 459, 473 (D. Utah 1991) (vacating confidentiality order to avoid interfeting with discovery in other pending cases); cf. Flynn v. Portland Gen. Elec. Corp.,
Civ. No. 4-88-0681, 1989 WL 112802, at *2 (D. Or. Sept. 28, 1989) (granting protective
order concerning matters within scope of confidential settlement in case with "sufficiently distinguishable" facts).
457 As previously discussed, a stipulated protective order merely confines confidential discovery to the case in which it is generated and does not prevent independent
discovery to obtain the equivalent information in collateral proceedings. See supra
note 330 and accompanying text. In contrast, a confidentiality order that enjoins
settling parties from discussing the underlying facts or merits of their controversy may
impede even this tight to independent discovery. The discovery sharing rationale for
modifying a stipulated protective order thus affords even greater support for a decision either to vacate a confidentiality order or to deny its enforcement in another
lawsuit. See supraPart IV.D.2.c (discussing discovery sharing as a rationale for modifying a stipulated protective order).
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CONCLUSION

Any resolution of the numerous issues of public access discussed
in this Article necessarily hinges upon what side one takes in the perhaps irresolvable broader debate over the appropriate role of the civil
justice system, the traditional primacy of party autonomy, and the institutional value of settlement. One must acknowledge, however, that
we are moving away from a completely party-centered view of litigation where the litigants can, by mutual consent, automatically dictate a
shield of silence over their dispute and its settlement. Indeed, there
are some cases in which nonparties (whether other litigants, third parties, or the general public) legitimately possess a stake in the dispute,
the information generated in its wake, and its ultimate resolution. At
the same time, however, fair and efficient dispute resolution remains a
primary objective of our civil courts, which confidentiality can, in
many cases and at certain stages, promote.
This Article has suggested a functional construct that helps identify when the interest in public access may appropriately override our
strong preference for settlement and the litigants' mutual desire for
confidentiality. That approach assesses stipulated confidentiality in
light of the underlying objective of public access-the monitoring of
the courts' primary dispute-resolving, adjudicative function. That
touchstone guides analysis of the diverse issues that surround stipulated protective orders, the sealing of judicial records, and confidential settlements. It can also facilitate discussion of other possible uses
4 58
of agreed secrecy to promote settlement.
For the time being, however, litigation confidentiality best remains in the hands of a court's sound discretion. Guidelines can influence the exercise of that discretion. But the infinite array of public
and private interests potentially affected by settlements requires that a
court be given broad authority to perform the necessary balancing.
458 For example, a court's orders, decrees, judgments, and opinions that resolve
the factual and legal merits of a case are the "quintessential" product of the adjudicative function. See EEOC v. National Children's Ctr., 98 F.3d 1406, 1409 (D.C. Cir.
1996) ("A court's decrees, its judgments, its orders, are the quintessential business of
the public's institutions."). Because they carry an exceptionally strong presumption
of public access, then, courts should carefully scrutinize settlements conditioned
upon the sealing of consent decrees, see i&!at 1410 (holding that trial court erred by
sealing the consent decree); B.H. v. McDonald, 49 F.3d 294, 300 (7th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing consent decree from private settlements), or the stipulated vacatur of civil
judgments. See United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513
U.S. 18 (1994) (holding that only "exceptional circumstances" can justify vacatur of
"civil judgments of subordinate courts in cases that are settled after appeal is filed or
certiorari sought").

